Wake Forest Law Review

Frontier-Kemper Constructors, Inc. v. Director

In this civil case, Frontier-Kemper appealed from a decision of the United States Department of Labor Benefits Review Board, which held Plaintiff was responsible for paying benefits to a coal miner under the Black Lung Benefits Act. Frontier-Kemper disputed its liability for the claim, but the Court concluded Frontier-Kemper was liable for payment. The main question was whether Frontier-Kemper was defined as an “operator” under the relevant statute, as only operators can be liable for black lung benefits claims. The Court concluded it was an “operator” for the purposes of this case and, therefore, affirmed.

Nardea v. Sessions 

This case pertained to a petition for review of an Order of Removal by the Department of Homeland Security. Nardea, a citizen of Argentina, was removed without receiving a hearing after entering the United States under the Visa Waiver Program and waiving his right to contest removal. He challenged his waiver status and the constitutionality of any waiver under the program. After considering the Visa Waiver Program and the facts surrounding Nardea’s entry, the Court determined that the evidence supported the conclusion that he waived his right to contest removal. Further, because Nardea could not show prejudice, he could not succeed on a procedural due process claim. Thus, his petition for review was denied.

Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Stallard

In this petition for review, Westmoreland Coal Company challeneged a final agency decision by the U.S. Department of Labor Benefits Review Board that awarded Stallard federal disability benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act. The Court denied Westmoreland’s petition for review holding that there was substantial evidence to support the award of benefits and that the award accords with applicable law.

Penley v. McDowell County Board of Education

In this civil case, former McDowell County educator Penley appealed the District Court’s summary judgment and dismissal of his claim against the McDowell County Board of Education. The Fourth Circuit, finding no issue of material fact, affirmed the District Court’s summary judgment and held that Penley did not provide more than a speculation that the investigation into his behavior and recommendation of dismissal were in retaliation of his previous political speech. Summary judgment was affirmed for McDowell County.

By Mike Stephens

On February 2, 2017, the Fourth Circuit issued a published opinion in the criminal case United States v. Evans. The defendant, Jamal Evans, appealed his conviction and sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) for the federal crime of carjacking. The District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina denied Evans’ motion to dismiss, ruling that carjacking qualified as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c). The Fourth Circuit affirmed Evans’ conviction, holding that carjacking required the use of violent physical force and, therefore, was considered a crime of violence.

Facts and Procedural History

In July 2013, the defendant, Jamal Evans, was riding in a car with his friend, Amani Duke. Evans told Duke to drive to a nearby parking lot to meet Evans’ cousin. However, once in the parking lot, Evans pulled out a pistol, ordered Duke out of the car, and attempted to steal Duke’s wallet. Evans then shot Duke in each leg and drove off in Duke’s car.

A grand jury charged Evans with carjacking resulting in serious bodily injury, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(2), and with using a firearm during the carjacking, a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Evans was also charged with additional crimes not at issue on appeal. Evans filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the carjacking statute did not qualify as a “crime of violence” within the meaning of § 924(c). The district court denied Evans’ motion, ruling that carjacking qualified as a crime of violence under § 924(c). Evans entered a guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the district court’s ruling that carjacking qualified as a crime of violence. Evans was ultimately sentenced to serve 216 months’ imprisonment. Evans appealed the district court’s judgment regarding his conviction and sentence for carjacking under § 924(c).

Carjacking is Considered a “Crime of Violence”

The Fourth Circuit’s analysis hinged on determining whether subsection (1) of the carjacking statute qualified as a crime of violence. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that if subsection (1) was considered a crime of violence, then the aggravated offense under subsection (2) that Evans was charged with “necessarily also qualifies as a crime of violence.” The Court examined the definition of a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3) and compared that to the elements of the carjacking statute.

§ 924(c)(3) defines a crime of violence as any felony that either:

(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or

(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.

The Court determined that the use of “physical force” also required the use of “violent force,” meaning the degree of force employed must be “capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” Because § 924(c)(3) contemplates only crimes that have “as an element. . .use of physical force,” the Court applied the “elements-based categorical approach” described by the Supreme Court to determine whether the carjacking statute fit within this definition.

Evans argued that because carjacking could be committed “by intimidation,” the offense did not include “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force” required under § 924(c)(3). Evans argued that “intimidation,” as it is commonly defined, could include convictions for acts not contemplated by the carjacking statute. The government responded by arguing that “intimidation” within the full statutory phrase found in the carjacking statute signifies a threat to use violent force. The government argued that, under this reading of the statute, the use of intimidation to commit carjacking is covered by § 924(c)(3).

The Fourth Circuit relied their analysis in a recent decision, United States v. McNeal, to determine whether carjacking is considered a crime of violence. In McNeal, an element of the bank robbery statute at issue required the property be taken “by force and violence, or by intimidation.” The Fourth Circuit viewed this language similar enough to the element at issue under the carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119. The Fourth Circuit held in McNeal that “intimidation” required the threatened use of physical force and the crime of bank robbery qualified as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3). The Court noted that their decision in McNeal relied on the holdings from the Eleventh Circuit and the Second Circuit that concluded that carjacking under § 2119 was considered a crime of violence. The Fourth Circuit concluded that taking a motor vehicle “by force and violence” required the use of violent physical force and that the act of taking a motor vehicle “by intimidation” required threatened use of force. The Court was also careful to highlight that this decision did not alter their holding in United States v. Torres-Miguel.


The Fourth Circuit ultimately held that the term “intimidation” in § 2119 includes a threat of violent force within the meaning of § 924(c)(3). Thus, Evans conviction for carjacking resulting in bodily injury under § 2119(2) is a crime of violence under 924(c)(3). Evans’ conviction and sentence under § 924(c) was affirmed.