* William T. Dalessi Professor of Law and Philosophy at the Gould School of Law at the University of Southern California. I am grateful to Nataline Viray-Fung for valuable research assistance, to the participants in this Symposium, to the attendees at a faculty workshop at Bar Ilan University in Israel, and to Arial Porat for many helpful comments. I am also grateful to Seana Shiffrin for several illuminating discussions of harm. Errors remain mine.

Tags: Emotional Distress Negligence Proximate-cause

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