By Elizabeth DeFrance
In an opinion for the civil case, Marks v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., published June 29, 2015, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a general liability insurer for a hunt club had no duty to indemnify or defend a club member who accidentally shot a passing driver while hunting on land the club leased.
Marks Accidentally Hit by Pellets When Deer Hunter Shot Towards Public Road
Plaintiff Timothy B. Johnson (“Johnson”), a member of the Northumberland Hunt Club (“Hunt Club” or “Club”) was hunting deer on land leased by the Club when he took a shot that traveled towards an adjacent public highway. Pellets from Johnson’s gun struck Plaintiff-Appellant Danny Ray Marks, Jr. (“Marks”) in the head as he was driving. Marks filed a negligence claim against Johnson in Virginia state court, alleging that because Johnson was experienced with firearms and the location, he should have known his actions posed a risk to drivers on the highway. Marks also filed a negligence claim against the Hunt Club, alleging they failed to promulgate rules to protect the public. In a second complaint filed in Virginia state court, Marks sought a declaration that the Hunt Club’s insurer, Scottsdale Insurance Company (“Scottsdale”) had a duty to indemnify and defend Johnson due to an endorsement provision in the Club’s insurance policy. Scottsdale removed to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction and filed a counterclaim seeking an endorsement stating it does not have a duty to indemnify or defend Johnson. Johnson joined the district court litigation and the parties agreed to have a magistrate adjudicate the matter. On cross motions for summary judgment, the magistrate held that Scottsdale did not owe a duty to indemnify or defend Johnson, and granted Scottsdale’s motion.
Scottsdale issued a commercial general liability policy to the Hunt Club, establishing its duty to indemnify for “those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay for damages from bodily injury or property damage to which this insurance applies,” and to defend the Club in such suits. The policy also included an endorsement that modified its coverage “to include as an insured any of your members, but only with respect to their liability for your activities or activities they perform on your behalf.” “You” and “your” are defined as “the Named Insured.”
The Court Applied Contract Principles to Determine the Scope of the Policy’s Coverage
To determine whether Johnson was an “insured” under the policy’s endorsement, the Court looked to the plain meaning of the language. Under Virginia common law, ambiguous policy language is to be construed against the insurer. However, a term is only deemed ambiguous if it is “capable of more than one reasonable meaning.” An insurer only owes a duty to indemnify and defend if the allegations in the complaint come within the scope of the policy’s coverage.
Language of the Endorsement is not Ambiguous
The Court analyzed the language of the two clauses in the endorsement to determine the scope the coverage. The first clause insured “any of [the Club’s] members, but only with respect to [member] liability for the Club’s activities.” Johnson argued that the language was clear, and that his actions were covered under this clause because he was hunting at the time of the incident and hunting is one of the Club’s activities. In the alternative, he argued that the language was ambiguous and should be construed in his favor. The Court disagreed, reasoning that the language was clear, and that this clause “restricts coverage to situations involving a member’s alleged vicarious liability for the activities of the Club as an entity, not for torts allegedly committed by members during a Club activity.
Johnson conceded that the second clause in the endorsement, covering “activities [members] perform on [the Club’s] behalf,” did not apply to him in this situation.
The Court reasoned that Johnson’s proposed interpretation of the first clause was flawed when the language of the endorsement was examined as a whole. The court determined that the first clause covered actions taken by the Club that a member might be held vicariously liable for, and the second clause covered actions taken by an individual on behalf of the Club. However, under Johnson’s interpretation, the second clause becomes redundant because all member actions in connection with the Club would be covered under the first clause.
Once the scope of coverage was established, the court looked to Marks’s complaint to determine if the allegations against Johnson came within the scope of the policy’s coverage. The court reasoned that because the complaint only alleged that Johnson was a member of the club and on land leased by the club when he shot Marks, the complaint rested only on “the recreational pursuits indulged in by members,” not on Johnson’s vicarious liability for the Club’s activities.
Scottsdale has No Duty to Indemnify or Defend Johnson
Because Scottsdale was not be liable for any of the allegations against Johnson in the complaint, Scottsdale did not have a duty to indemnify or defend Johnson. The Court affirmed the judgment of the magistrate judge.
