By Taylor Ey
On August 6, 2015, the Fourth Circuit issued its unanimous, published opinion in the civil case of Cahaly v. LaRosa. This case involves Mr. Robert Cahaly’s (“Plaintiff”) constitutional challenge of South Carolina’s anti-robocall statute (S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-446(A)), asserting that the statute violates the First Amendment. After applying the Supreme Court’s 2015 test in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the Fourth Circuit decided that South Carolina’s statute did not survive strict scrutiny. However, it also decided that Cahaly lacked standing to bring his other constitutional challenges. Cahaly also sought damages from law enforcement officials, Paul C. LaRosa, III, and Reginald I. Lloyd (“Defendants”), who arrested him. The Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants.
Applying Reed to Determine Content Neutrality
The Fourth Circuit applied the test in Reed to determine whether the statute’s restriction was content-neutral based restrictions on speech. The statute prohibits robocalls that are “for the purpose of making an unsolicited consumer telephone call” or are “of a political nature including, but not limited to, calls relating to political campaigns.”
Under Reed, as a threshold inquiry, courts assess whether the law is content neutral on its face. Next, if facially neutral, courts ask whether the law cannot be justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech or adopted by the government because of a disagreement with the message the speech conveys.
Applying Reed, the Fourth Circuit found that the statute is content based on its face. The statute forbids calls with a consumer or political message and does not apply to calls made for any other purpose.
Because the Regulation Is Content Based, the Court Applied a Strict Scrutiny Analysis
To survive strict scrutiny, the government must prove that the restriction furthers a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to further that interest. In this case, South Carolina asserted its interest was to “protect residential privacy and tranquility from unwanted and intrusive robocalls.” The Fourth Circuit assumed that it was a compelling interest. However, it held that the statute was not the only way to serve this interest, and thus the statute was unconstitutional. The Court further stated that the statute was underinclusive.
Plaintiff Lacked Standing to Assert Compelled-Speech Challenge
Additionally, Cahaly raised a compelled speech challenge, which the Defendants appealed. Defendants argued that Calahy did not suffer an “injury in fact,” and therefore did not have standing to challenge the exceptions to the statute. The Fourth Circuit agreed because Cahaly was not charged with a violation of the statute. Because the district court ruled for Cahaly, stating that the exceptions were unconstitutional, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment on this issue.
The Fourth Circuit Affirmed the District Court’s Grant of Summary Judgment
The arresting officer had probable cause to arrest Cahaly for violating the anti-robocall statute. Officer LaRosa had six witnesses who described the robocalls, a recording of a phone call, and an investigation that connected the phone number to Cahaly. This evidence was sufficient to give probable cause, and therefore the Court affirmed.
