By: Jojo Fina & Chase Stevens
In this case, SD3 II sought to revive its claim that the Table Top Manufacturers had colluded in contravention of antitrust laws to exclude its proprietary technology from the market. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Table Saw Manufacturers based on the bar of the statute of limitations since the acts and economic harm upon which SD3 II’s claims are based occurred by 2002. Under the general rules for claims accrual and limitations, SD3 II’s antitrust claims expired four years later in 2006. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment based on the conclusion that SD3 II’s suit was untimely because SD3 II was on actual notice of its claim by, at latest, 2003. Accordingly, the statute of limitations expired no later than 2007.
Matthew Dwoskin v. Bank of America
In this case, Plaintiffs brought suit against Bank of America under the Homeowners Protection Act. They claimed that the bank failed to make certain required disclosures in connection with their residential mortgage loans. The Fourth Circuit court disagreed and reasoned that the statute is clear that these mortgage insurance disclosures are mandated only if lender-paid mortgage insurance is a condition of obtaining a loan. See 12 U.S.C. § 4905(c). Because no such conditions applied to the plaintiffs’ loans, nondisclosure was not a Homeowners Protection Act violation. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the case.
In this case, Appellant Hamidullin appealed his conviction for providing and conspiring to provide material support to terrorists in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, arguing that he was entitled to combatant immunity under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and that he qualified for common law combatant immunity defense of public authority. He also appeals his conviction for conspiring and attempting to destroy an aircraft of the United States Armed Forces in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 32, arguing that § 32 does not apply to otherwise lawful military actions committed during armed conflicts. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, finding that the immunity grants did not apply to Appellant and that the plain language of § 32 supported the conviction. The Fourth Circuit affirmed Appellant’s conviction.
In this case, Plaintiff Ramirez sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision that found him ineligible for special rule cancellation of removal under the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA). The issue is whether Plaintiff’s convictions for obstruction of justice pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-460(A) qualify as crimes involving moral turpitude. The Fourth Circuit held that obstruction of justice under that statute is not a crime involving moral turpitude because it could be committed without fraud, deception, or any other aggravating element that shocks the public conscience. The Fourth Circuit overturned the Board of Immigration Appeal’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.
