By Matthew Hooker

           For the duration of the COVID-19 emergency, North Carolina corporations may conduct shareholders’ meetings completely via remote communication technology, pursuant to an executive order by Governor Roy Cooper.[1] This order temporarily resolves an ambiguity in the North Carolina Business Corporation Act pertaining to remote participation in shareholders’ meetings, allowing North Carolina corporations to address pressing business matters without raising concerns about the validity of actions taken at wholly virtual shareholders’ meetings.[2]

            The global crisis stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic[3] has brought the global, national, and local economies to a collective screeching halt.[4] For those businesses that have sought to continue operations, those operations now look vastly different. In the United States, currently at least forty-two states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico (together representing around 316 million people) are under various forms of “stay-at-home” orders.[5] Now that avoiding even small groups and staying at home have become the new normal, virtual conferencing platforms using video and screen sharing technology have quickly emerged as vitally necessary to businesses’ continued operations.[6]

            Corporations in North Carolina have been forced to deal with the question of whether shareholders’ meetings may be conducted completely remotely and still be valid under North Carolina law. As drafted, the North Carolina Business Corporation Act is not entirely clear on this issue; it can be interpreted as providing that a valid shareholders’ meeting may only be held at a physical location. To illustrate, the Act refers to holding both annual and special meetings “in or out of this State at the place stated in or fixed in accordance with the bylaws”[7] and requires that a valid notice of a meeting include the “place” of the meeting.[8] Under certain circumstances, the Act allows shareholders to participate and vote in those meetings “by means of remote communication.”[9] But the Act is silent as to whether the entire meeting may be held virtually with no physical place of meeting.[10]

            To bring clarity to this issue in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and the need for business to be conducted remotely as much as possible, North Carolina Governor Roy Cooper issued an executive order on April 1, 2020 authorizing and encouraging remote shareholders’ meetings.[11] This order appears to apply equally to annual meetings and special meetings. Under the order, a corporation’s board of directors may determine that all or part of a shareholders’ meeting may be held solely via remote communication.[12] This type of remote shareholders’ meeting is permissible under two conditions: (1) shareholders must be allowed to participate and vote under the existing remote participation and voting statute,[13] and (2) all shareholders must have the right to participate in the meeting via remote communication.[14] Governor Cooper’s executive order resolves the ambiguity of the North Carolina Business Corporation Act by providing that a “place” of a meeting within the meaning of the Act can include a meeting where all shareholders participate through remote communication (i.e., there is no physical “place” of the meeting).[15]

            But the order goes even further. It also permits a corporation’s board of directors to limit the number of attendees physically present at a shareholders’ meeting in order to ensure conformity to other state gathering restrictions.[16] In other words, it appears that not only may a board of directors call for a completely remote shareholders’ meeting, but the board could also hold a meeting at a physical place but then prohibit shareholders from physically attending and force shareholders to attend remotely.

            This executive order provides North Carolina corporations with clarity during the COVID-19 crisis. It enables them to conduct meetings and business that involve shareholders without fear that actions taken at a remotely held shareholders’ meeting will be deemed void.[17] In the midst of a global crisis such as COVID-19, it is important that corporations can continue to operate as best as they can without compromising the health and safety of shareholders, among others.

            However, not only does Governor Cooper’s order resolve this important issue for corporations as long as the COVID-19 emergency lasts, but it also reveals that the North Carolina Business Corporation Act needs updating. The current version of the North Carolina Business Corporation Act was enacted in 1989 and thus does not comprehend many of the vast technological shifts and developments of the 21st century.[18] Although the Act was amended in 2013 to allow shareholders to remotely participate in shareholders’ meetings,[19] the addition of that provision only explicitly allows remote participation; the Act overall still seems to contemplate some sort of physical location where the meeting is actually held. If anything, that 2013 amendment creates ambiguity rather than resolving confusion. Interestingly enough, Governor Cooper’s executive order actually concludes by advising that the order should not be construed or interpreted as suggesting that a shareholders’ meeting held wholly via remote communication would not otherwise be valid if not for the executive order.[20] Thus, even Governor Cooper’s order seems to subtly acknowledge the lack of clarity within the North Carolina Business Corporation Act on this matter.

            The world has changed greatly since 1989—and even since 2014. With key provisions of the North Carolina Business Corporation Act now over three decades old, it may be time for the North Carolina legislature to revisit the Act. Modern technology has opened up a world of possibilities for corporations, and the Act should reflect that. Remote communication options are just one example. These technologies are becoming increasingly prevalent and dependable—even when no global health crisis exists—and the law should not inhibit progress in the corporate context. In fact, Delaware has long permitted shareholders’ meetings to be held solely via remote communication.[21] Amending the North Carolina Business Corporation Act will align North Carolina with other leading states in corporate law. Ultimately, this will enhance North Carolina’s viability as a modern, attractable location for entity incorporation as well as facilitate existing domestic corporation’s continued leverage of the digital world.


[1] See N.C. Exec. Order No. 125 (Roy Cooper, Governor) (Apr. 1, 2020), https://files.nc.gov/governor/documents/files/EO125-Authorizing-Encouraging-Remote-Shareholder-Meetings.pdf.

[2] See id. § 1(A).

[3] See WHO Director-General’s opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 – 11 March 2020, World Health Org. (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19—11-march-2020.

[4] See, e.g., Harriet Torry & Anthony DeBarros, WSJ Survey: Coronavirus to Cause Deep U.S. Contraction, 13% Unemployment, Wall St. J. (Apr. 8, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wsj-survey-coronavirus-to-cause-deep-u-s-contraction-13-unemployment-11586354400.

[5] Sarah Mervosh et al., See Which States and Cities Have Told Residents to Stay at Home, N.Y. Times, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-stay-at-home-order.html (last updated Apr. 7, 2020).

[6] See, e.g., Akanksha Rana & Arriana McLymore, Teleconference Apps and New Tech Surge in Demand Amid Coronavirus Outbreak, Reuters (Mar. 13, 2020, 3:33 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-teleconference/teleconference-apps-and-new-tech-surge-in-demand-amid-coronavirus-outbreak-idUSKBN21033K.

[7] N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 55-7-01(b), 55-7-02(c) (2019).

[8] Id. § 55-7-05(a).

[9] Id. § 55-7-09(a).

[10] Cf. § 55-7-05(a) (requiring notice of the place of the shareholders’ meeting).

[11] See N.C. Exec. Order No. 125, supra note 1.

[12] Id. § 1(A).

[13] See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-7-09.

[14] N.C. Exec. Order No. 125, supra note 1, at § 1(A)(1)–(2).

[15] See id. § 1(B)(2).

[16] Id. § 1(B)(3).

[17] See id. § 1(C).

[18] See 1989 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 265 (LexisNexis).

[19] See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-7-09 (2019); 2013 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 153 (LexisNexis).

[20] See N.C. Exec. Order No. 125, supra note 1, at § 1(D).

[21] See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 211(a) (2020).

By Agustin Martinez

Across the globe, the COVID-19 pandemic has devastated many lives,[1] including those of immigrants living in the United States.[2]  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) recently announced that it “will neither consider testing, treatment, nor preventative care (including vaccines, if a vaccine becomes available) related to COVID-19 as part of a public charge inadmissibility determination . . . even if such treatment is provided or paid for by one or more public benefits” as defined by the new public charge rule.[3]  USCIS’s announcement came days after several congressional leaders asked the Trump Administration to rescind the new public charge rule altogether, in light of the rule’s chilling effect on immigrants seeking COVID-19-related medical assistance.[4]

USCIS’s announcement clarified that obtaining COVID-19-related testing and treatment will not factor into a future public charge analysis, even if such testing or treatment is publicly-funded.  But what about the payments that millions of Americans will receive as part of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (the “CARES Act”) that was recently signed into law by President Trump?[5]  Some immigrants, for example, recipients of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, are expected to receive CARES Act payments.[6]  Will accepting these federally-funded payments negatively affect these immigrants’ chances of obtaining lawful permanent resident status (i.e., a green card) in the future as a result of the new public charge rule?  Although USCIS has not yet directly answered this question,[7] the answer is “no” based on existing law.  Immigrants who are eligible for CARES Act payments should rest assured that receiving this economic relief will not negatively impact any public charge determination in the future.[8]   

Under American immigration law, a person deemed likely to become a public charge is inadmissible, meaning that the person can be denied a green card, visa, or admission into the country.[9]  The new public charge rule does not change this basic principle.[10]  But it does significantly expand the types of publicly-funded programs that USCIS may take into account when assessing whether a person is likely to become a public charge in the future.[11]  Consequently, the new rule may cause immigrants who are eligible for CARES Act payments to think twice before accepting these publicly-funded payments.

The new public charge rule’s definitions[12] and USCIS’s policy manual[13] help answer whether an immigrant’s acceptance of a CARES Act payment will, in turn, be deemed acceptance of a public benefit as defined by the new rule.  Under this regulatory guidance, CARES Act payments are not public benefits, and therefore, USCIS should not consider acceptance of such payments during future public charge determinations.

The new public charge rule generally defines a public benefit as “[a]ny Federal, State, local, or tribal cash assistance for income maintenance (other than tax credits),” “Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP),” “Section 8 Housing Assistance under the Housing Choice Voucher Program,” “Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance,” “Medicaid,” or “Public Housing under section 9 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937.”[14]  At first glance, it would seem that CARES Act payments fall within the “Federal, State, local, or tribal cash assistance for income maintenance” public benefit category.  That, however, would be an incorrect interpretation of the new rule for the simple reason that CARES Act payments are considered tax credits under the Act.[15]  Indeed, Congress specifically referred to these payments as tax credits within the CARES Act’s text.[16]  Thus, since the new public charge rule expressly excludes “tax credits” from its definition of public benefit, a CARES Act payment is not a public benefit as defined by the rule.[17]

USCIS also confirms, in its policy manual, that tax credits are not public benefits under the new rule.[18]  The agency further explains that “[c]ash emergency disaster relief – Stafford Act disaster assistance including financial assistance provided to persons and households under the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individuals and Households Program and any comparable disaster assistance provided by State, local, or tribal governments” does not mean “cash assistance for income maintenance”[19]  This “cash emergency disaster relief” carveout, along with USCIS’s decision to exclude COVID-19-related testing and treatment from future public charge determinations,[20] likely means that the agency will not interpret CARES Act payments as public benefits.

But even if a CARES Act payment was erroneously deemed a public benefit in an individual case, it is highly unlikely that the payment, alone, would result in the recipient being deemed a public charge.  That is because public charge determinations are, by law, forward-looking and based on the totality of the immigrant’s circumstances.[21]  It would be quite surprising—not to mention, inconsistent with both the Immigration and Nationality Act and the CARES Act—for a one-time payment, authorized by Congress to provide assistance in the midst of a global pandemic, to negatively impact a person’s green card eligibility in the future. To remove any chilling effect[22] and alleviate fear in the immigrant population, USCIS should confirm, like it did for COVID-19-related testing and treatment, that CARES Act payments are not public benefits as defined by the new public charge rule.  Even without this additional guidance, however, the law is clear that there should be no public charge repercussions when eligible immigrants receive CARES Act payments.


[1]  See Ed Yong, How the Pandemic Will End, Atlantic (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/03/how-will-coronavirus-end/608719/.

[2]  See Miriam Jordan, ‘We’re Petrified’: Immigrants Afraid to Seek Medical Care for Coronavirus, N.Y. Times (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/18/us/coronavirus-immigrants.html.

[3]  Public Charge, U.S. Citizenship & Servs. [hereinafter Public Charge] (emphasis added), https://www.uscis.gov/greencard/public-charge (last visited Apr. 4, 2020).  There are actually two new public charge rules.  One, which was promulgated by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), applies to cases adjudicated by USCIS.  Public Charge, Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr. [hereinafter Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr.], https://www.ilrc.org/public-charge (last visited Apr. 4, 2020).  The other, which was promulgated by the Department of State (“DOS”), applies to cases involving individuals who go through a process outside the United States, at a consulate or embassy, to obtain lawful permanent resident status.  Id.  This article refers to a single “new public charge rule,” since both the DHS rule and the DOS rule are virtually identical.  Id.

[4]  Press Release, Torres: As USCIS Ends Public Charge Rule for Coronavirus Cases, Every American is Safer, Congresswoman Norma Torres (Mar. 16, 2020), https://torres.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/torres-uscis-ends-public-charge-rule-coronavirus-cases-every-american

[5]  See Tara Siegel Bernard & Ron Lieber, F.A.Q. on Stimulus Checks, Unemployment and the Coronavirus Plan, N.Y. Times (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-stimulus-package-questions-answers.html.  These cash payments are known by different names, including “economic impact payments,” “recovery rebates,” and “stimulus checks.”  Libby Kane & Tanza Loudenback, Everything We Know About the Coronavirus Stimulus Checks that Will Pay Many Americans Up to $1,200 Each, Bus. Insider (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/personal-finance/coronavirus-stimulus-check-questions-answers-2020-4.

[6]  See Understanding the Impact of Key Provisions of COVID-19 Relief Bills on Immigrant Communities, Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr. 12 (Apr. 1, 2020) [hereinafter Understanding the Impact of Key Provisions], https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/COVID19-relief-bills-understanding-key-provisions.pdf?fbclid=IwAR2yiNB-kyhr-33bQTVp7YcdNBZ4LeBbia6JUIzbGOhf6d1jJYY9Rzgjs_c (explaining the eligibility requirements for CARES Act payments, which include having a valid social security number); see also Monique O. Madan, Millions of Immigrant Families Won’t Get Coronavirus Stimulus Checks, Experts Say, Miami Herald (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/immigration/article241531211.html (“Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Temporary Protected Status (TPS) holders would be able to qualify for the money because they are issued Social Security numbers.”).

[7]  See Public Charge, supra note 3 (explaining USCIS’s position as to COVID-19-related testing and treatment, but not CARES Act payments).

[8]  The question of which immigrants are eligible for CARES Act payments is beyond the scope of this article, but the sources cited supra note 6 provide some guidance on this question.

[9]  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A) (2018) (“Any alien who, in the opinion of the consular officer at the time of application for a visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney General at the time of application for admission or adjustment of status, is likely at any time to become a public charge is inadmissible.”); 8 C.F.R. § 212.21(a) (2019) (“Public charge means an alien who receives one or more public benefits, as defined in paragraph (b) of this section, for more than 12 months in the aggregate within any 36-month period (such that, for instance, receipt of two benefits in one month counts as two months).”); Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr., supra note 3 (“[Immigration] law says that those who are viewed as likely to become dependent on the government in the future as a ‘public charge’ are inadmissible.”).

[10]  See Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr., supra note 3 (providing basic background of public charge law before the new rule was implemented).

[11]  See 8 C.F.R. § 212.21(b) (listing the benefits that are considered “public benefits” for purposes of the new public charge rule); Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr., supra note 3 (“The rules expand the list of publicly-funded programs that immigration officers may consider when deciding whether someone is likely to become a public charge. Under the new rules, federally-funded Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as food stamps), Section 8 housing assistance and federally subsidized housing will be used as evidence that a green card or visa applicant is inadmissible under the public charge ground.”).

[12]  8 C.F.R. § 212.21.

[13]  Chapter 10 – Public Benefits, U.S. Citizenship and Servs. [hereinafter Chapter 10 – Public Benefits], https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-8-part-g-chapter-10 (last visited Apr. 4, 2020).

[14]  8 C.F.R. § 212.21(b)(1)–(6) (emphasis added).

[15]  See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, H.R. 748, 116th Con. § 2201 (2020) (providing that the Internal Revenue Code will be amended to state that “[i]n the case of an eligible individual, there shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by subtitle A for the first taxable year beginning in 2020 an amount equal to the sum of—(1) $1,200 ($2,400 in the case of eligible individuals filing a joint return), plus (2) an amount equal to the product of $500 multiplied by the number of qualifying children (within the meaning of section 24(c)) of the taxpayer”) (emphasis added); see also Kane & Loudenback, supra note 5 (“The payment . . . is technically an advance tax credit meant to offset your 2020 federal income taxes.”) (emphasis added).

[16]  See H.R. 748 § 2201.

[17]  8 C.F.R. § 212.21(b)(1).

[18]  Chapter 10 – Public Benefits, supra note 13 (“Other benefits not considered public benefits in the public charge inadmissibility determination include, but are not limited to . . . Tax Credits . . . .”) (emphasis added).

[19]  Id. (footnote omitted).

[20]  Public Charge, supra note 3.

[21]  See 8 C.F.R. § 212.22(a) (“The determination of an alien’s likelihood of becoming a public charge at any time in the future must be based on the totality of the alien’s circumstances by weighing all factors that are relevant to whether the alien is more likely than not at any time in the future to receive one or more public benefits, as defined in 8 CFR 212.21(b), for more than 12 months in the aggregate within any 36–month period (such that, for instance, receipt of two benefits in one month counts as two months).”).

[22]  See Jordan, supra note 2.

By Alexandria Montgomery

As the COVID-19[1] pandemic continues to spread across the United States, a new wave of abortion litigation has reached federal courts. In the wake of the ongoing pandemic, several states—including Texas, Ohio, Iowa, Alabama, and Oklahoma—have attempted to restrict women’s access to abortion procedures under the guise of promoting social distancing and conserving healthcare resources.[2] These temporary abortion bans have most commonly come in the form of an executive order from a state’s governor regarding limitations on non-essential medical procedures.[3] This raises several legal questions. May abortion be considered a “nonessential” medical procedure? Moreover, are these abortion bans constitutional given that they are supposedly only temporary? And finally, does the public interest in stopping the spread of COVID-19 and conserving much-needed personal protective gear (“PPG”) for healthcare professionals outweigh a woman’s constitutional privacy interest in obtaining an abortion?

On Monday, March 30, a federal judge halted a temporary abortion ban in Texas.[4] Texas Governor Greg Abbott had issued an executive order (“Executive Order GA-09”) on March 22 that required all health care professionals and facilities to postpone  “all surgeries and procedures that are not immediately medically necessary to correct a serious medical condition of, or to preserve the life of, a patient who without immediate performance of the surgery or procedure would be at risk for serious adverse medical consequences or death . . . .”[5]

The next day, the Attorney General of Texas, Ken Paxton, issued a press release clarifying that the that the Executive Order GA-09 prohibited “any type of abortion that is not medically necessary to preserve the life or the health of the mother.”[6] Of note, the Attorney General’s interpretation, which explicitly prohibited “any type” of abortion, would not only ban surgical abortions, but medication abortions as well—despite the fact that medication abortions do not require any type of surgery or procedure. The Attorney General’s interpretation also made clear that those who did not comply with Executive Order GA-09 could face criminal “penalties of up to $1,000 or 180 days of jail time.”[7]

Several abortion providers (collectively, “Planned Parenthood”) quickly filed a constitutional challenge against the Governor and state officials seeking a temporary restraining order against both the Texas Attorney General’s interpretation of Executive Order GA 09 and the Order itself.  In granting the temporary restraining order, which prohibits Texas from enforcing Executive Order GA-09 as applied to any type of abortion, the court made several determinations.

First, the court stated in no uncertain terms that, “[r]egarding a woman’s right to a pre-fetal-viability abortion, the Supreme Court has spoken clearly. There can be no outright ban on such procedure.” Indeed, for nearly half a century, the Supreme Court has repeatedly and emphatically held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes a right of privacy that protects a woman’s right to make the ultimate decision to terminate a pregnancy at any point prior to viability.[8] Before the point of viability, “a state has no interest sufficient to justify an outright ban on abortion.”[9] In other words, although states may regulate pre-viability abortions, they may not outright ban them.[10]

The court, however, also addressed several factors that are specific to this unprecedented situation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Although Texas and some other states have attempted to classify “any type” of abortion as nonessential, abortion is a time-sensitive procedure.[11] Many states such as Texas have placed gestational limits on when a woman may legally obtain an abortion.[12] Because of these limits, even a temporary ban on abortion would allow some women’s pregnancies to progress to a point at which it would no longer be legal to obtain an abortion, effectively stripping some patients of their constitutional right to choose to terminate a pregnancy.[13]

Moreover, it has always been and will continue to be the case that restricted access to abortion services disproportionately impacts low-income women. Long before the COVID-19 pandemic, some of the most common reasons that abortion patients provided for choosing to terminate a pregnancy included the inability to afford raising a child and the belief that continuing the pregnancy would interfere with their ability to work.[14]  And now, in the midst of a pandemic that has already wreaked havoc on the United States economy, the risks of requiring someone to continue an unwanted pregnancy are perhaps even greater.[15] In only a two week time-span, unemployment insurance claims in the United States have increased a shocking 1500%.[16] Labor economists estimate that potentially 14 million workers will lose their jobs due to the pandemic by the summer.[17] In the face of such severe economic distress, it is vital now more than ever that women are able to make deeply personal decisions relating to whether they are in a position to bring a dependent child into the world.

Finally, the court noted that because of the pandemic, travelling to other states to obtain an abortion is increasingly risky.[18] The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has warned that travelling, even within the United States, may increase the possibility of contracting COVID-19.[19]  Accordingly, the court determined that allowing medical providers to resume abortion services would not disserve the public interest.[20] Any benefits of conserving a limited amount of PPG for healthcare providers is outweighed by the harm of allowing a state to ban abortions outright.[21] A woman’s constitutional right must take precedence, especially when paired with the unfortunate current economic circumstances and the increased health risks that travelling to other states to obtain an abortion would pose. In short, a woman’s constitutional right to obtain an abortion continues to survive, even in the midst of an unprecedented pandemic.


[1] COVID-19 is the name of the disease caused by the novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2). See Naming the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) and the Virus That Causes It, World Health Org., https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/naming-the-coronavirus-disease-(covid-2019)-and-the-virus-that-causes-it (last visited Apr. 1, 2020).

[2] See Kate Smith, Abortion in Texas will resume, despite attorney general orders, CBS News (Mar. 30, 2020, 06:47 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/texas-abortion-ban-halted-federal-judge/.

[3] See, e.g., Tex. Exec. Order No. GA-09 (Mar. 22, 2020), https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/EO-GA_09_COVID-19_hospital_capacity_IMAGE_03-22-2020.pdf (prohibiting nonessential surgeries and medical procedures in Texas).

[4] See Smith, supra note 2. In recent days, federal judges have also enjoined similar COVID-19-related abortion bans in both Ohio and Alabama. See Ema O’Connor, Judges Struck Down Three State Bans On Abortions During The Coronavirus Outbreak (Mar. 31, 2010, 10:53), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/emaoconnor/judge-struck-down-abortion-ban-texas-coronavirus.

[5] See Tex. Exec. Order No. GA-09, supra note 3.

[6] See Press Release, Ken Paxton, Attorney Gen. of Tex., Health Care Professionals and Facilities, Including Abortion Providers, Must Immediately Stop All Medically Unnecessary Surgeries and Procedures to Preserve Resources to Fight COVID-19 Pandemic (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/health-care-professionals-and-facilities-including-abortion-providers-must-immediately-stop-all.

[7] See id.

[8] See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (declaring that a state’s regulation is an unconstitutional “undue burden” if the regulation’s “purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 170 (1973); see also Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016) (reaffirming the central holdings of Roe and Casey that prior to the point of viability, the state may not unduly burden a woman’s constitutional right to obtain an abortion).

[9] Planned Parenthood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott, No. A-20-CV-323-LY, slip op. at 6 (W.D. Tex. filed Mar. 30, 2020) (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–64)

[10] See id.  

[11] See Abortion & COVID-19, Nat’l Abortion Federation, https://prochoice.org/abortion-covid-19/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2020).

[12] See Abbott, slip op. at 7 (citing Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 171.044 (West 2017)) (explaining that Texas bans abortions after 20 weeks post-fertilization).

[13] See id.

[14] See Rachel K. Jones et al., Guttmacher Inst., Characteristics of U.S. Abortion Patients, 2008, at 7, 9 (2010) (“Poor women were overrepresented among abortion patients.”).

[15] See Abbott, slip op. at 8.

[16] See Heidi Shierholz, Unemployment Insurance Claims Jumped Nearly 1,500% in Two Weeks, Econ. Policy Inst. (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.epi.org/press/unemployment-insurance-claims-jumped-nearly-1500-in-two-weeks-i-have-been-a-labor-economist-for-a-very-long-time-and-have-never-seen-anything-like-this/ (stating that there were 3.3 million unemployment insurance claims in the week before March 26).

[17] See id.

[18] See Abbott, slip. op. at 8.

[19] See Coronavirus and Travel in the United States, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/travel-in-the-us.html (last updated Mar. 30, 2020). Although the CDC does not typically issue domestic travel restrictions or advisories, it has now issued a travel advisory urging the residents of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut “to refrain from non-essential domestic travel for 14 days” due to the severity of the COVID-19 outbreak in these states. See id.

[20] See Abbott, slip. op. at 8.

[21] See id.