Wake Forest Law Review
29Oct

Private Correctional Officers Occupy “Sensitive Position” For Sentencing Purposes

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By Patrick Southern

Did the District Court Err in Determining a Private Correctional Officer Occupies a “Sensitive Position” for the Purpose of Enhanced Sentencing?

Today, in United States v. Dodd, the Fourth Circuit decided a matter of first impression. The appellant Dodd challenged a decision to enhance the sentence he received after pleading guilty to bribing a correctional officer and conspiracy. Specifically, Dodd argued private correctional officers do not occupy a “high-level decision-making or sensitive position” as defined in sentencing guidelines. The Fourth Circuit disagreed, affirming his sentence.

Appellant Bribed Private Correctional Officers

The case began when staff members at a private correctional institution (which contracts with the Federal Bureau of Prisons to house inmates) found prohibited items in Dodd’s cell. An investigation revealed Dodd was paying correctional officers to smuggle cell phones and tobacco products into the institution, where he would then re-sell them to other inmates.

Dodd pleaded guilty to bribing a private correctional officer and to conspiracy. Prior to sentencing, a probation officer determined that sentencing guidelines provided for a sentence of thirty-seven to forty-six months for Dodd. The calculation included a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(3), which applies when “the offense involved an elected public official or any public official in a high-level decision-making or sensitive position.” Without the enhancement, the sentencing range would have been twenty-four to thirty months.

Dodd objected to the enhancement, arguing the officers did not occupy a “high-level decision-making or sensitive position.” The probation officer recommended the district court find that correctional officers occupy a sensitive position because they “have substantial authority, influence, and control over inmates and are responsible for the overall management, safety, and security of a given facility.”

The District Court found that correctional officers occupy a sensitive position because they have “the authority and ability to directly and significantly influence inmates’ lives and the entire facility’s safety with the decisions he or she makes.” Dodd then appealed to the Fourth Circuit.

Private Correctional Officers Occupy a “Sensitive Position” For Sentencing Purposes

The commentary on the sentencing guidelines provides a definition for a “high-level decision-making or sensitive position.” Such positions are “characterized by a direct authority to make decisions for, or on behalf of, a government department, agency, or other government entity, or by a substantial influence over the decision-making process.” The definition continues to note that officials in a sensitive position “include a juror, a law enforcement officer, an election official, and any other similarly situated individual.”

Prior to this case, only the Fifth Circuit had considered whether correctional officers hold a sensitive position, and then only in unpublished opinions. It held they do because they “have the authority and the ability to directly and significantly influence inmates’ lives and the entire facility’s safety with the decisions [they] make.” The Fifth Circuit cases defined a sensitive position as “one that has power to affect the integrity and workings of the judicial and law enforcement system.

Private Correctional Officers are “Similarly Situated” to Law Enforcement Officers

Dodd made four arguments as to why private correctional officers should not be considered to hold a “sensitive position.” The Fourth Circuit dismissed them all in turn.

First, he argued private correctional officers don’t make “any governmental decision” or wield “any influence, much less substantial influence, over any government agency decision.” The Fourth Circuit responded that the correctional officers operated under contract with the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and the arrangement empowered officers to make decisions “on behalf of” the Bureau of Prisons. Dodd’s bribes caused the officers to wield their authority in improper ways.

Second, Dodd said he did not intend for his bribes to influence official acts, arguing that the officers performed no official act because guards delivering contraband are operating outside their official capacity. The court responded that any public official acting pursuant to a bribe is acting contrary to his or her role. Dodd bribed the officers specifically to use their position to undermine the institution’s security.

Third, Dodd argued private correctional officers are not similarly situated to jurors, law enforcement officers, or election officials (the examples from the Guidelines commentary) because private correctional officers do not take an oath, are not publicly employed, do not determine guilt or innocence, and cannot arrest members of the public. The court agreed that private correctional officers are not identically situated to the examples, but noted that is not the standard. The definition in question includes those who are “similarly situated” to the listed examples. Private correctional officers “wield the coercive power of the state to maintain order and safety among the populations they protect.” Bribes lead to a violation of the public trust placed in them.

Finally, Dodd said sentencing enhancement has “no conceivable outer limits” if it covers private correctional officers. The Fourth Circuit responded that these officers are responsible for maintaining safety and security among a captive, potentially dangerous population, and as such they play an integral role in the operation of the justice system, distinguishing them from most public officials

Ultimately, the court said private correctional officers are “similarly situated” to law enforcement officers, which are specifically mentioned in the definition in the commentary to the sentencing guidelines. As a result, they are considered to hold a “sensitive position” as outlined under the sentencing guidelines. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentencing enhancement as it applied to Dodd.

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29Oct

Fourth Circuit Upholds Conviction and Sentencing in Drug-Trafficking and Firearm Case

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By: Carson Smith

Defendant Contends Possession of a Firearm Conviction and Multiple Sentencing Enhancements.

In United States v. Pineda, the Fourth Circuit upheld the lower court’s conviction and sentencing of the defendant, Jesus Pineda. The Eastern District of North Carolina convicted the defendant on two counts of distribution of cocaine, possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug-trafficking, and possession of a sawed-off shotgun. The district court sentenced the defendant to 132 months in prison. On appeal, the defendant challenged the “possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug-trafficking” conviction as well as several sentencing enhancements which greatly increased the length of his imprisonment. The Court affirmed the possession conviction based on specific statements and actions, involving the handgun, made by the defendant during the cocaine transaction. Furthermore, the Court upheld the sentencing enhancements applied by the district court.

Defendant Convicted for Selling Cocaine and Firearms to Confidential Informant.

On November 30, 2011, a confidential informant (CI) purchased an ounce of cocaine and stolen assault rifle from Raul Sanchez. Sanchez acquired the items earlier in the day from Jesus Pineda and Pineda accompanied Sanchez to the transaction with the CI. Shortly thereafter, Pineda contacted the CI directly and proposed cutting Sanchez out of any future deals. On January 25, 2012, the CI purchased 54 grams of cocaine and a 12-gauge sawed-off shotgun from Pineda. The two had also discussed the purchase of a .380 caliber handgun; however, Pineda, at the meeting, refused to sell the gun. On February 8, 2012, the CI purchased 54 grams of cocaine and the .380 caliber handgun from Pineda. Subsequently, Pineda was arrested, charged, and convicted.

Court upholds “Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of Drug-Trafficking” Conviction Because Defendant Exposed the Firearm During the Transaction and Emphasized the Firearm’s Necessity.

On appeal, Pineda contended that mere possession of a firearm during a drug transaction does not constitute “possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug-trafficking.” According to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), the government must present evidence indicating that the possession of a firearm “furthered, advanced, or helped forward a drug trafficking crime.” At trial, it was established that during the January 25, 2012 meeting, Pineda took out the .380 caliber handgun and “placed it underneath his leg while conducting the drug transaction.” The CI asked to buy the gun, but Pineda refused, stating that it was “the only piece” he owned. The Court affirmed the conviction, stating that the evidence was sufficient enough for a reasonable juror to determine that the firearm was critical to Pineda’s drug trafficking activities.

Sentencing Enhancement Involving Hearsay Evidence Upheld Based on the Reliability of the Information.

Pineda also raised several issues challenging the sentencing enhancements applied by the district court. First, Pineda argued that the district court should not have factored the November 30, 2011 meeting into sentencing considerations because the only evidence tying Pineda to the Sanchez-CI purchase were hearsay statements by Sanchez. In sentencing, a district court is allowed to consider information that would otherwise be kept out of trial due to evidentiary rules as long as the information “has a sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” In reviewing the reliability of information surrounding Pineda’s involvement in the November 30, 2011 transaction, the Court found persuasive the fact that Pineda was present at the transaction. Therefore, the Court determined that the information had a sufficient indicia of reliability.

Sentencing Enhancement Involving Three or More Illegal Transactions Upheld Based on the High Degree of Similarity Between the Transactions.

Second, Pineda argued that the November 30, 2011 transaction was not part of a common scheme or plan as the two subsequent deals because Pineda played a different role in the November 30 transaction and “there was no evidence showing that the three transactions were part of a larger pattern of illegal activity.” In order for the three transactions to be part of a common scheme or plan, it must be shown that they are “substantially connected to each other by at least one common factor, such as common victims, common accomplices, common purpose, or similar modus operandi.” Since Pineda was the seller of the cocaine and firearms in each of the three transactions, the Court held that the transactions had a “relatively high degree of similarity.” Therefore, the Court held that the district court did not err in grouping the three transactions for sentencing purposes.

Court Holds That Double Counting Involving the .380 Caliber Firearm Did Not Occur.

Finally, Pineda argued that the district court improperly double counted his possession of the .380 caliber handgun in applying the sentencing guidelines. Pineda’s sentencing was increased “for committing an offense that involved three or more firearms.” However, Pineda claimed that a statutory limitation prevented the trial court from counting the .380 caliber gun, for sentencing purposes, under both the “possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug-trafficking” conviction and the “three or more firearms” enhancement. “Double counting occurs when a provision of the Guidelines is applied to increase punishment on the basis of a consideration that has been accounted for by application by another Guideline . . . . Double counting is generally authorized unless the Guidelines expressly prohibit it.” The Court determined that the Guidelines did not expressly prohibit double counting and that double counting did not occur in this case. In particular, the Court held that the “in furtherance” conviction pertained to “particular unlawful uses of a firearm,” whereas the “three or more firearms” enhancement pertained to the number of firearms involved. Therefore, this was not an instance of double counting. The Court held that the sentencing enhancements applied by the trial court were proper.

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28Oct

Only Substantial Assistance Factors Considered in a § 3553(e) Motion

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By: Katharine Yale

Did the District Court Err in Declining to Consider Any 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Factors Other Than Substantial Assistance when Determining the Extent of Appellant’s Sentence Reduction Below the Mandatory Minimum?

Today, in United States v. Spinks, the Fourth Circuit considered the Appellant’s challenge to his eighty-four month sentence for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base. The Appellant argued that the district court erred by solely considering factors related to substantial assistance in reducing his sentence below the mandatory minimum. He contended that other 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors should have been considered.

Appellant Returns to the Fourth Circuit.

The appellant, Spinks, pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base in 2008. Due to a filing of an Information of Prior Conviction, the district court determined that a 240 month sentence was appropriate. The government then moved, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), for a thirty percent downward departure on Spinks’ sentence based on his substantial assistance in the prosecution of a co-defendant. Ignoring factors other than those related to the substantial assistance, the district court granted the reduction, resulting in a 168 month sentence.  On appeal, this court affirmed the sentence.

In 2012, Spinks filed a motion requesting a reduction in his sentence because the underlying felony supporting his initial sentencing enhancement no longer qualified for the enhancement, after the ruling in United States v. Simmons. After resentencing, Spinks’ sentence became 120 months. The government renewed its § 3553(e) motion and the district court again granted the thirty percent departure, resulting in a eighty-four month sentence.

Spinks then asked the court to consider “some additional amount” of reduction due to rehabilitation that occurred since his first sentencing. The district court concluded that it did not have authority to consider § 3553(a) factors once it had departed below the mandatory minimum sentence.

Under § 3553(e), Only a Defendant’s Substantial Assistance and Factors Related to That Assistance May be Considered when Determining the Extent of a Departure Below a Mandatory Minimum Sentence.

Spinks appealed on the basis of the district court’s denial of consideration of factors other than his substantial assistance under § 3553(e). He contended that his post-conviction rehabilitation should have been considered in determining the extent of his reduced sentence. Spinks relied on two cases, United States v. Davis and Pepper v. United States.

Distinguishing both Pepper and Davis, and relying on United States v. Hood, the court emphasized that the extent of a reduced sentence under § 3553(e) can only be influenced by a defendant’s substantial assistance when a further departure would be below the mandatory minimum sentence.

Factors Related to Appellant’s Rehabilitation do not Fall Under § 3553(e) Because They are not Related to his Substantial Assistance, and the Cases upon Which Appellant Relied do not Apply to These Facts.

This court found that Hood controlled under the facts of this case. In Hood, the issue was the same as here: can a district court consider non-assistance factors when determining the extent of a reduced sentence under § 3553(e)? The Hood court concluded that because Congress has authorized a departure from the minimum sentence for this limited purpose, only the defendant’s substantial assistance and factors related to that assistance could be considered under § 3553(e). Thus, in this case, factors relating to anything other than Spinks’ substantial assistance should not have been considered, and the district court was correct in declining to consider Spinks’ rehabilitation.

Spinks contended that Davis overruled Hood and permits consideration of other factors because in that case, other factors were considered in a motion for sentence reduction under rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument because here, the motion before the court was a § 3553(e) motion, not a 35(b) motion. The court emphasized the differences in the language of the two statutes. Section 3553(e) provides that the court can reduce the sentence “so as to reflect” substantial assistance, while Rule 35(b) does not contain language that the reduction must “reflect” the defendant’s assistance.

Spinks also contended that the Supreme Court decision Pepper abrogated Hood. In Pepper, the Supreme Court held that after a defendant’s sentence has been set aside on appeal, a sentencing court may consider a defendant’s post-sentencing rehabilitation to support a sentence outside of the advisory Guidelines range.   The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument because the Pepper court made clear that the holding applied to variances “from the now-advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines range.” In this case, Spinks was not seeking a variance from the advisory Guidelines range, but instead was seeking a departure from a mandatory minimum.

The District Court Was Correct in Only Considering Substantial Assistance Factors.

Based on the language of the statute and the reasoning in Hood, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not err by solely considering Substantial Assistance factors under § 3553(e).  The court affirmed the appellant’s reduced sentence.

Dissenting Judge Would Not Make the Distinction Between § 3553(e) and Rule 35(b).

The dissent would not have made the distinction between § 3553(e) and Rule 35(b). In the advisory committee notes to Rule 35(b), the committee states that the omission of “reflect” (and other changes) in Rule 35(b) “are intended to be stylistic only.” Thus, based on the committee note and the reasoning in the Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Tadio, Senior Circuit Judge Davis would not make the distinction between the two and would allow other factors to be considered in both circumstances.   However, because Spinks failed to offer sufficient evidence regarding his rehabilitation, Judge Davis concurred in the judgment and voted to affirm the sentence.

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27Oct

Fourth Circuit Denies Certificate of Appealability on § 2255 Motion.

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By Marcus Fields

Is the Denial of a Motion Attacking a Sentence Appealable Absent a Certificate of Appealability?

A district court’s order denying relief on a prisoner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion attacking a federal sentence is not appealable unless a Circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of admissibility pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Today, in United States v. Anderson, the Fourth Circuit denied a certificate of admissibility and dismissed Marion Anderson’s appeal from the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.

A Certificate of Appealability will not be Granted Unless a Constitutional Right has been Denied.

Quoting directly from the statute, the Fourth Circuit notes that “a certificate of appealability will not issue absent ‘a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.’” It then notes that this standard differs depending on whether the district court denies a prisoner relief on the merits or on procedural grounds.   If denied on the merits, the prisoner must only show that “reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong.” If denied on procedural grounds, the prisoner must show that both the procedural ruling and the “claim of the denial of a constitutional right” are debatable.

Anderson did not Make the Showing Necessary to Receive a Certificate of Appealability.

After independently reviewing the record the Fourth Circuit determined that Anderson had not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right and was therefore not entitled to a Certificate of Appealability.

Anderson’s Appeal Dismissed.

The Fourth Circuit denied Anderson a certificate of admissibility and dismissed the appeal. It dispensed with oral arguments determining that they would not help the decisional process.

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27Oct

Fourth Circuit Affirms that Statutory Minimum Sentence Imposed Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) Does Not Conflict with § 3553(a).

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By: Kelsey Kolb

Friday, in United States v. Stewart, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court for the District of Maryland’s 180-month armed career criminal sentence against Stewart. Stewart pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012), to which the district court attached the 180-month sentence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012).

Did the district court err in its imposition of both a statutory mandatory minimum and increased statutory maximum sentence?

Stewart contended that the district court’s imposition of the statutory mandatory minimum sentence was in direct conflict with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012), which mandates the court to impose a sentence that is “sufficient but not greater than necessary.” Stewart further appealed his statutory maximum sentence, arguing that the district court violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by increasing his sentence based on facts that were neither charged on the indictment, nor submitted to the jury.

The § 924(e) mandatory minimum does not conflict with the sentencing mandate of § 3553(a).

The Fourth Circuit held that § 3553(a) was not controlling in this case and thus, that the mandatory minimum was proper. The court reasoned that 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) only yields to § 3553(a), the general criminal sentencing provision, if there is no other specific mandatory sentencing provision on point. Consequently, the “no greater than necessary” language from § 3553(a) would not apply in this case since there was another specific provision on point, § 924(e). Furthermore, even if § 3553(a) were controlling in this case, the court reasoned that the “no greater than necessary” language does not authorize a district court to sentence below the mandatory statutory minimum.

The increased statutory maximum sentence is not in violation of Stewart’s Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights.

The court briefly held that this claim was foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228–35 (1998).

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23Oct

Fourth Circuit Affirms Decision to Classify Individual as an Armed Career Criminal

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By:  Steven M. Franklin

Yesterday, in U.S. v. Fikes, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision by the District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina to classify Mr. Kevin Fikes, Jr., as an armed career criminal.

What Happened?

Mr. Fikes pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The District Court designated Mr. Fikes as an armed career criminal, and thus sentenced him to 180 months in prison.

Is There a Problem?

On appeal, Mr. Fikes contended that the District Court erred in two regards. First, the District Court should not have considered predicate offenses that were neither pleaded in the indictment nor proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt to designate him as an armed career criminal. Second, because his predicate offenses were consolidated, the offenses should not have been considered separately to satisfy the armed career criminal enhancement.

No Problem Here, Mr. Fikes

In regard to Mr. Fikes first contention, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the District Court did not err. Even if a conviction is not found by a jury, the fact of a prior conviction nonetheless remains a valid enhancement. The Fourth Circuit also concluded that the District Court did not err in regard to Mr. Fikes’ second contention because predicate offenses do not need to be tried or sentenced separately to be considered “separate offenses” under the armed career criminal enhancement.

The Fourth Circuit Affirms

For these reasons, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision to classify Mr. Fikes as an armed career criminal.

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22Oct

Fourth Circuit Holds Improper Evidence Was Harmless Error

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By Joshua P. Bussen

 Issues Raised by the Defendant

 Today, in U.S. v. Briley, the Fourth Circuit addressed two issues. First, whether assault is a required element of the “physical contact” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 111; and second, whether Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) excludes prior “bad act” evidence where the two acts in question only share some similarities.

The Events of January 12, 2012

On January 12, 2012, two plain-clothes Park Police officers were patrolling the Washington Sailing Marina in Alexandria, Virginia. The Marina is a recreational area of the Dangerfield Island National Park where some have taken the “recreational” title to the limit; the Marina is a known hot spot for “sexual encounters.” While on patrol, the officers observed two individuals—one later determined to be the defendant—beginning to partake in the Marina’s reputed “recreational” activity in the front seat of an SUV. The officers called for backup and two officers in police marked tactical attire arrived and approached the vehicle.

Upon reaching the SUV, officers instructed the men to exit the vehicle. The defendant’s recreational companion quickly complied; the defendant would not go so easily. While attempting to remove the defendant from the vehicle, the defendant struck one of the officers in the arm, side, and lower back. The officer sustained various lower back injuries from the incident; his casualties would not be the worst. Another officer began striking the defendant in an attempt to loosen his grip in the SUV. The defendant returned a barrage of kicks to the officer’s abdomen; the kicks would later lead to impairment of the officer’s pancreas and the removal of his gallbladder. Eventually the defendant agreed to exit the vehicle, but again began resisting arrest. The officers eventually forced handcuffs onto the defendant, ending the tussle.

Later, in March, 2012, the defendant was again arrested for committing sexual acts in the same Marina parking area; fortunately for the officers, he did not again resist arrest.

18 U.S.C. § 111 and Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 111, whoever “forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any [federal officer] while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties . . . shall, where the acts in violation of this section constitute only simple assault, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both, and where such acts involve physical contact with the victim of that assault or the intent to commit another felony, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both.”

Under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character,” however, such evidence “may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”

The Law in This Case

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that assault is not an element of the “physical contact” portion of § 111. The court reasoned that requiring assault as an element of the “physical contact” portion of § 111 would: (1) render five of the six words within the statute inoperative; (2) would stray from the congressional intent of protecting federal officers; (3) would leave federal officials without protection for carrying out federal functions; and (4) produce an “absurd result,” allowing individuals to impede, intimidate, and interfere with federal officers so long as they did not commit assault.

Conversely, the court found that the 404(b) evidence came far to close to pure propensity evidence. The March arrest of defendant was similar to the January arrest in that the defendant was found engaging in obscene public acts in the same general area and in the same SUV. However, the defendant did not resist arrest on the March occasion. The court felt that this March incident was not only too dissimilar to the January incident to be “plan” or “intent” evidence, but also unnecessary in a case where multiple officers testified as to the defendant’s actions.

The Fourth Circuit’s Determination

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the holding of the lower court. Despite finding the 404(b) evidence should have been excluded, the overwhelming evidence against the defendant in this case rendered the admission of improper evidence harmless error.

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21Oct

Fourth Circuit Dismisses Sentencing Appeal as Moot

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By: Caroline Daniel

Is a Defendant’s Sentence Appealable if He is Released While the Appeal is Pending?

A defendant’s sentence is not necessarily appealable if he is released while the appeal is pending. Today, in United States v. Duane McAtee, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the Defendant’s appeal of his six month conviction as moot.  Duane McAtee was convicted of contempt of court, and was sentenced to serve six months.  He appealed this conviction, but while his appeal was pending, he was released.

On Appeal, the Court May Address Sua Sponte a “Live Case or Controversy.”

The Fourth Circuit addressed McAtee’s claim sua sponte.  Citing Friedman’s, Inc. v. Dunlap, the Court stated, “We may address sua sponte whether an issue on appeal presents ‘a live case or controversy . . . since mootness goes to the heart of the Article III jurisdiction of the courts.”  Here, the Court determined that a live case or controversy no longer existed.

McAtee’s Sentence No Longer Presented a “Live Case or Controversy.”

When the Court addressed McAtee’s appeal, he had already been released from his imprisonment.  The Fourth Circuit implied that McAtee’s appeal might have been preserved if he had raised “any collateral consequences of it.”  However, McAtee did not raise any collateral consequences.  Coupling this with his early release, the Fourth Circuit held that McAtee’s appeal no longer contained any live case or controversy regarding the duration of his incarceration.

McAtee’s Appeal Dismissed as Moot.

Finding that there was no appealable controversy remaining after McAtee’s release, the Fourth Circuit dismissed his appeal as moot.  The Court dispensed with oral argument, determining that the facts that were before the panel were sufficient pieces of evidence to warrant dismissal.

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21Oct

District Court Has Discretion to Ratchet Up Repeat Offender’s Sentence

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By Chad M. Zimlich

Today, in United States v. Locklear, the Fourth Circuit, finding no error, affirmed the district court’s sentencing of Clifton Kelly Locklear to 100 months of imprisonment.

Whether a Sentence Forty-three Months Above the Guidelines Is an Abuse of Discretion

The only issue on this appeal was whether or not the District Court of the Eastern District of North Carolina abused its discretion by giving Locklear a sentence that was forty-three months beyond the applicable range suggested by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual. Locklear argued that the sentence was not substantively reasonable, specifically because of his mental health issues.

Defendant’s Possession of a Stolen Firearm

Clifton Kelly Locklear pleaded guilty as part of a plea deal to possession of a stolen firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(j), 924 (2012). He was subsequently sentenced to 100 months of imprisonment, which was an upward variance from the forty-six to fifty-seven months that were suggested by the Guidelines.

The District Court Has Broad Discretion in Sentencing

In determining an appropriate sentence, the district court has broad discretion to take into account multiple factors, among them those enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). The Fourth Circuit’s role in reviewing a district court’s sentence is simply one of deciding whether or not the sentence was reasonable, which is a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Furthermore, this standard stays the same whether a sentence falls within, above, or below the Guidelines range.

In looking at reasonableness, the Fourth Circuit looked at the district court’s calculation of Locklear’s advisory Guidelines range, whether the court gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence, whether the § 3553(a) factors were considered, whether the sentence was based on clearly erroneous facts, or, finally, whether the court failed to explain the sentence chosen. In each of these, the court is given “due deference” because of the flexibility it has in fashioning a sentence, meaning there either has to be a clear procedural error or an unreasonable use of discretion for the Fourth Circuit to overturn a sentence.

The Reasonableness of the District Court’s Use of the § 3553(a) Factors

After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, the Fourth Circuit considered the calculation of Locklear’s Guidelines range to be substantively reasonable. This was mainly due to the court’s use of the § 3553(a) factors, such as Locklear’s prior criminal history and characteristics, the court’s need to promote respect for the law, the need to protect the public, and the need for adequate deterrence. All of these factors weighed in favor of the lengthier sentence, lending further support for the reasonableness of the sentence.

Lastly, turning to Locklear’s argument that the 100-month sentence was unreasonable in light of his mental health issues, the Fourth Circuit refused to substitute its judgment for that of the district court as the district court has “extremely broad discretion” when weighing the § 3553(a) factors. In this sentencing, the district court was acting well within its discretion.

Sentence Was Reasonable, There Was No Abuse of Discretion

The Fourth Circuit found that there was no reversible error, that Locklear’s sentence was reasonable, and affirmed the district court’s judgment.

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20Oct

Fourth Circuit Affirms Marijuana Conviction and Denial of Safety Valve

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By: Diana C. Castro

Today, in United States v. Ornis Leger, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Western District of North Carolina convicting the defendant of two counts of drug-related offenses.

Defendant Contends Insufficient Evidence and Improper Denial of Safety Valve.

On appeal, the defendant contended two issues: (1) there was insufficient evidence to convict him of two counts of possession of marijuana; and (2) the District Court improperly denied him the possibility of less time in prison than the mandatory minimum required.

Defendant Was Convicted of Conspiracy to Possess With Intent to Distribute More Than 100 Kilograms of Marijuana and Possession With Intent to Distribute Marijuana.

Ornis Leger appealed from the criminal judgment imposed after a jury found him guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana and possession with intent to distribute marijuana.

Leger was stopped by DEA agents with approximately 750 pounds of marijuana in his van, after unloading the shipment with the aid of his co-conspirators. Leger consistently stated that he thought the shipment was furniture.

A Jury’s Verdict Must Be Sustained When There is Enough Evidence in the Record to Support the Conviction.

Under United States v. Jaensch, 665 F.3d, 83, 93 (4th Cir. 2011), an appellate court must sustain a jury verdict when, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the conviction.  Evidence is substantial when a reasonable finder of fact could accept it as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Fourth Circuit’s review of the record indicated substantial evidence to support Leger’s convictions.

To Benefit From the Safety Valve, a Defendant Must Establish Five Statutory Requirements.

Safety valves are laws that allow courts to sentence an offender to less time in prison than the mandatory minimum requirement, if the person or the offense meets certain special requirements.  In determining whether the District Court improperly denied Leger the benefit of the safety valve, the Fourth Circuit applied a clearly erroneous standard of review.

Under United States v. Henry, 673 F.3d 285, 292-95 (4th Cir. 2012), the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5C1.2(a) (2012), and  18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2012), a defendant seeking the relief of a safety valve must establish five requirements: “(1) the defendant does not have more than one criminal history point; (2) the defendant did not use violence or possess a firearm in connection with the offense; (3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury; (4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense; and (5) no later than the time of sentencing, the defendant truthfully provided the government with all evidence and information the defendant had concerning the offense or offenses comprising the same course of conduct or a common scheme or plan.”

Leger Did Not Overcome the Burden of Showing that He Was Truthful and Complete in His Disclosure.

Leger indisputably met the first four requirements necessary to seek the benefit of the safety valve.  To satisfy the fifth requirement, Leger must have truthfully disclosed all information he had “about the offense of conviction and any other crimes that constitute relevant conduct.”  United States v. Aidoo, 670 F.3d 600, 610 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 627 (2012).

The Fourth Circuit concluded that the District Court did not clearly err in denying Leger the benefit of the safety valve.  Although Leger claimed he thought he was unloading furniture and not marijuana, neither the jury nor the sentencing judge found him credible.  The Fourth Circuit emphasized that even though Leger was consistent in stating that he believed the shipment was furniture, consistency is not the sole indicator of truthfulness.

 Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit Affirmed.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding there was substantial evidence to support Leger’s convictions and the District Court did not clearly err in denying Leger the benefit of the safety valve.

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17Oct

Imprisonment Sentencing After a Revocation of A Supervised Release

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By: Kaitlin Price

In United States v. Kessinger, the Defendant appealed the district court’s issuance of a six-month sentence of imprisonment imposed after revocation of his supervised release. The Defendant questioned whether the Defendant’s sentence is plainly unreasonable. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s sentence.

District courts are given a broad discretion in imposing a sentence after a revocation of a supervised release. The only requirements are that the sentence must be within the statutory maximum and cannot be “plainly unreasonable”. Here, the district court explained the basis for Defendant’s sentence and considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion.

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17Oct

Failure to Register as a Sex Offender is Not a Crime of Moral Turpitude

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By Lauren Durr Emery

In Khalid Mohamed v. Eric Holder, Jr., the Fourth Circuit reversed a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision which ordered Mohamed’s removal from the country.  The BIA decision was based on Mohamed’s 2010 conviction for sexual battery and his 2011 conviction for failing to register as a sex offender. Under  U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), an alien is deportable if they have been convicted of two or more crimes of moral turpitude.

In defense of its position, the BIA cited its previous decision in Matter of Tobar-Lobo–which held that failure to register as a sex offender is a crime of moral turpitude.  It argued that sex offenders pose a serious risk to society and that their failure to register is “inherently base or vile” and therefore should be considered a crime of moral turpitude. The BIA asked the Fourth Circuit to defer to its reasonable interpretation of the statute. Mohamed conceded that his conviction for sexual battery was a crime of moral turpitude, but contended that failure to register as a sex offender was not.  Instead, Mohamed argued that failure to register was a “non-penal, regulatory offense.”

In its decision, the Fourth Circuit explained that committing a crime of moral turpitude means more than simply violating a written statute; otherwise, such a requirement would be superfluous.  A crime of moral turpitude violates moral norms.  Citing its previous decisions, the Court defined a crime of moral turpitude as, “conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved.”

Though the BIA focused on the purpose behind the statute–reducing the risk of repeated sex offenses–the statute itself does not prohibit the repetition of a sex offense.  It is a regulatory or administrative provision which merely requires the registration of a particular class of people.  Such regulatory offenses implicate no moral value other than the duty to obey the law.  Therefore, the Court declared that failure to register as a sex offender is “categorically not a crime involving moral turpitude” and that the BIA’s contrary interpretation was unreasonable and undeserving of deference.

Because Mohamed’s failure to register was not a crime involving moral turpitude, the BIA erred in its order to remove him from the country.  The Fourth Circuit reversed the BIA’s decision and remanded the case with instructions to vacate Mohamed’s order for removal.

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