By: Patrick Southern

Today, in United States v. Catone, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the defendant’s conviction for making false statements in connection with his receipt of federal workers’ compensation benefits. However, it reversed the decision of the District Court for the Western District of North Carolina with respect to the defendant’s jail sentence and restitution, deepening a split between the circuits in the process.

The defendant, Catone, worked for the United States Postal Service until 2006, when he submitted a claim for workers’ compensation benefits based on injuries arising from extended periods of driving. His benefits were approved, and he began receiving them in March 2007. To verify continued eligibility, Catone was required to submit a “CA-1032” form each year. The form instructed him to disclose if he had been employed in any way during the previous year. In 2008 and 2009, he indicated he had not been employed. As a result, Catone received more than $121,000 in benefits until September 2009.

Catone was indicted in 2011 on two counts of making false statements on the forms by failing to disclose a job at which the government alleged he performed custodial work. He also was charged with knowingly making a false statement to a federal official (he had told an agent his wife was employed as a custodian and that he occasionally assisted her with her tasks).

At trial, testimony indicated one check in the amount of $635 was written directly to Catone for custodial work performed during the time he received federal workers’ compensation benefits. The jury convicted him of one count of making a false statement on the CA-1032 form he filled out in April 2008, and acquitted him of the other two counts.

A pre-sentence investigation report prepared by a probation officer concluded the conviction carried a statutory maximum sentence of five years. The probation officer found Catone was responsible for a loss of $128,124.75 (the entire amount of benefits he had received). Based on the loss calculated and Catone’s criminal history, sentencing guidelines advised a range of twenty-one to twenty-seven months in jail and restitution of $106,411.83. The district court ultimately imposed a sixteen-month sentence and ordered payment of the full amount of restitution advised in the pre-sentence investigation report. Catone appealed his conviction, his sentence, and the award of restitution.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Catone’s conviction. The defendant argued the government failed to disclose evidence (a CA-1032 form filled out by Catone in 2007 which included an admission of employment as a custodial worker) that undermined its theory that Catone willfully concealed his custodial work. This, Catone argued, was a violation of the rule from Brady v. Maryland. However, to establish a valid Brady claim, the evidence must be known to the government but not the defendant. Since the evidence at issue here was a form filled out by the defendant himself, and that evidence was available to the defendant, his Brady claim failed. Thus, the conviction was affirmed.

However, the sixteen-month sentence of imprisonment was reversed. The statute in question in this case provides the maximum sentence is one year “if the amount of the benefits falsely obtained does not exceed $1,000.” Here, the jury made no finding that Catone’s offense led to more than $1,000 in falsely obtained benefits. The Fourth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had recently held in Apprendi v. New Jersey that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” The Supreme Court also extended that reasoning to mandatory minimum sentences, finding that when a fact “aggravates the legally prescribed range of allowable sentences, it constitutes an element of a separate, aggravated offense that must be found by the jury . . . .”

Essentially, the Fourth Circuit held that because the higher sentence required a finding that the offense led to more than $1,o00 in falsely obtained benefits, the amount of benefits falsely obtained was an element of the offense which must be submitted to the jury. The court acknowledged this would deepen a split between the circuits, with the Fourth Circuit joining the Eleventh Circuit in this interpretation of Apprendi (the Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have disagreed). Because this element of the offense was not submitted to the jury, and the error was not harmless, the Fourth Circuit reversed the sentence.

The court also reversed the district court’s order of restitution. The Fourth Circuit noted that precedent indicates the amount of loss in a government benefits case like this is to be calculated by determining the difference in the amount of benefits the defendant actually received and the amount he would have received had he truthfully and accurately completed the CA-1032 forms. The government’s argument at trial was that without his deception, Catone would have received no benefits at all.

Catone argued instead that the loss was less than $1,000, citing testimony of two federal employees who stated his benefits would have been reduced, not terminated, had he disclosed his work properly on the CA-1032 forms. Further, it was possibly the small amount of income he earned would not have reduced his benefits at all. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not perform the calculation required by precedent, and that the government provided no evidence as to the results which would have come from a proper calculation of loss. As a result, it reversed the district court’s order as it related to restitution.

The case was remanded to the Western District of North Carolina for further proceedings.

by Katharine Yale

On October 10th in U.S. v. Stroud, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a judgment that revoked the defendant’s supervised release, ordered him to serve twenty-four months consecutively to any state sentence, and directed that he be given credit for the time that he was in federal detention prior to sentencing.

Under a plain error standard of review, the Fourth Circuit found no error in the district court’s sentencing decision.   The defendant did not meet his burden in proving that there was an error, that the error was clear, and that the error affected his substantial rights in that it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.

The defendant argued that the district court compounded its error in ordering sentencing credit by selecting the wrong date to start calculating the credit.   The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument because the Attorney General (through the Bureau of Prisons, the “BOP”) is responsible for computing the sentencing credit for the time in detention prior to sentencing. The BOP will determine the amount of credit when it implements the defendant’s sentence. If the defendant does not agree with the credit, he can seek an administrative remedy, then file a petition if he is not happy with that result. Because the BOP would have the responsibility to calculate the amount of credit, the court found that there was no reason to vacate the district court’s judgment.

Further, the defendant argued that because his sentence was unreasonable, his counsel was ineffective. To bring this claim on direct appeal, the record must conclusively show that counsel was indeed ineffective. Here, the court held that the record did not make a conclusive showing on the issue and denied review.

By Kelsey Kolb

This past Friday, in United States v. McCrea, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Western District of Virginia’s amended order of forfeiture, which included the defendant’s residence. In doing so, the Fourth Circuit found that the Government can seize a defendant’s residence to satisfy a money judgment against him, as a “substitute asset” under 21 U.S.C. § 853(p), when he makes unavailable the primary forfeiture source: the proceeds of his offense.

In general, substitute assets are reachable when the defendant cannot otherwise pay the forfeiture money judgment. If the defendant’s conviction involved a conspiracy and the proceeds from that conspiracy are unavailable, § 853(p) mandates forfeiture of any other property that the defendant owns to satisfy the money judgment.

McCrea’s drug conspiracy and money laundering violations resulted in a $76,062.63 money judgment against him, for which it was undisputed that he did not have the money to pay. The Government then looked to any other property that McCrea owned to satisfy the money judgment. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of the Government’s motion to substitute McCrea’s residence for forfeiture under § 853(p).

by David Darr

Today, in United States v. Moore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District of Maryland’s judgment finding the Defendant guilty of drug trafficking, possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The defendant, Corey A. Moore, appealed his conviction based on the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence of a police officer’s stop and the District Court’s finding that his possession of a firearm was “in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.”

On September 25, 2010, an officer observed Moore walking down the street carrying a green bottle. Thinking this bottle might be alcohol, the officer initiated a stop and Moore took off running. The officer and two bystanders observed Moore toss a package in the dumpster. That package contained a half kilogram of cocaine, worth over $10,000. Moore was then arrested. Two days later, there was an attempted break-in at an apartment rented by Moore. Upon discovering Moore resided in the apartment (he had given them a different address when he was arrested), the police obtained a search warrant. In the apartment, the police found 2.8 kilograms of PCP, drug distributing materials with traces of cocaine on them, $45,000 in cash, and two handguns. Moore was charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine and PCP, possession firearms in the furtherance of drug trafficking, and possession of firearms by a felon. Before closing arguments, the defense moved to suppress all tangible evidence on the grounds that the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to stop Moore in the first place. The District Court denied the motion on the grounds that the defense had waived the right to suppress evidence by not raising it before the trial as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court then found Moore guilty on all counts and sentenced Moore to 271 months in prison. Moore raised two issues on appeal; the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence and the District Court’s finding that Moore possessed firearms “in furtherance of drug trafficking.”

Moore first claimed that the District Court did not decide that he waived his right to a motion to suppress evidence, but instead found on the merits of his motion that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred. Alternatively, Moore claimed that he qualified for a “good cause” exception to the waiver rule because he learned new evidence at the trial. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require parties to raise motions to suppress evidence before trial, unless the court grants relief for a good cause. This rule is not merely procedural and it is an important rule due to fairness considerations. The rule helps parties to know what evidence to base their case on before the trial. The rule also prevents from unnecessary delays in the trial that may inconvenience the jury. The Fourth Circuit ruled that despite that the District Court briefly brought up the merits of Moore’s motion when it decided the issue was waived, the court was very clear that it was deciding that the issue was waived. The Fourth Circuit decided that the District Court waived the motion instead of deciding the issue on its merits. The Fourth Circuit also decided that new information is not sufficient good cause because new information is learned all the time at trial. It does not change that the evidence could have been challenged before the trial. Because the District Court properly and correctly decided the issue was waived and that there was no good cause for the motion coming late, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision to deny the motion to suppress evidence.

Moore next claimed that the firearms found in his apartment with the drugs were insufficient evidence that the firearms were used in the furtherance of drug trafficking. The Fourth Circuit reviewed this issue on a clearly erroneous standard because the nexus between the firearms and the drug trafficking crime is a factual question. The Fourth Circuit found plenty of evidence in the record supporting a close nexus between the firearms and drugs. The cash and amount of drugs found with the firearms suggested that Moore was dealing the drugs. Further, Moore did not challenge his conviction on the drug trafficking charges. The firearms being beside Moore’s bed was evidence that Moore used the firearms for protection of the drugs. Another factor that the Fourth Circuit considered was that Moore was not allowed to legally own firearms in the first place as a convicted felon. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Courts conviction on this count because it was completely reasonable for the court to find the firearms were in the furtherance of drug trafficking. Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Moore’s conviction on all counts.

By: Michael Klotz

In United States v. David Carlton Norton, Jr., the defendant appealed his sentence of 180 months under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (“ACCA”). The ACCA punishes an individual who is convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm after three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses committed on separate occasions.

The issue in Norton was whether prior offenses that were committed on different occasions, but sentenced in a single consolidated judgment count as distinct offenses for the purpose of the ACCA. When determining career offender enhancement, a consolidated sentence for multiple North Carolina convictions is treated as a single sentence even when it punishes separate offenses committed on different occasions (United States v. Davis, 720 F.3d 215 (4th Cir. 2013)).

However, the Norton court reiterated that Davis does not apply to the ACCA. While the ACCA requires that the defendant committed the predicate offenses on different occasions, neither the statutory language of the ACCA nor the guidelines indicates that the offenses must have been tried or sentenced separately. As a result, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Mr. Norton’s conviction and sentence of 180 months.

 

 

 

By Caroline Daniel

In United States v. Cain, an unpublished opinion released today, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Lenny Cain’s guilty verdict.  Cain was charged with: (1) conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute oxycodone and (2) possession with intent to distribute oxycodone, and aiding and abetting.

One of the issues Cain appealed involved the use of the word “slight” in the jury instructions.  The instructions involved Cain’s conspiracy conviction, and read: “[a] defendant’s connection to the conspiracy can be slight” and “the Defendant must have participated in some way, however, slight, with knowledge of at least some of the purposes or objectives of the conspiracy and with the intention of aiding in the accomplishment of those unlawful ends.”  Cain contended that the court’s use of the word “slight” in this context created the risk of confusing the jury.  He argued that because the instructions included this word, the jurors potentially believed the burden of proof to be less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Reviewing the issue de novo, the Fourth Circuit dismissed this argument.  The Court reviewed the jury instructions as a whole instead of piece by piece.  In addition to the use of the word “slight,” the jury instructions also emphasized that the applicable burden of proof was “beyond a reasonable doubt.”  The Court held that the district court had correctly applied and explained the applicable law.  It cited United States v. Allen, a case in which the Fourth Circuit had determined that evidence linking a Defendant to an established conspiracy need only be slight.

Cain also appealed his conviction based on: the district court’s response to a juror’s question; the district court’s denial of his proffered jury instructions; the type evidence admitted; the district court judge’s questions in trial; and insufficient evidence.  The Fourth Circuit upheld his conviction on all counts.

By Chad M. Zimlich

Today, in United States v. Manrich, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a judgment sentencing former Baltimore Police Department (“BPD”) Officer Kelvin Manrich to a forty-one-month prison sentence after previously vacating the original sentence and remanding the case back to the district court. United States v. Manrich, 529 F. App’x 322 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-4624). Manrich returned to the Fourth Circuit questioning the calculation of loss (meaning the amount of monetary loss caused by his criminal conspiracy) used in his sentencing.

Manrich had entered a “straight up guilty plea” to a criminal conspiracy involving Hernan Moreno and Edwin Mejia, joint owners of the Majestic Auto Repair Shop, and seventeen additional BPD officers. When responding to the scene of a vehicular accident, Manrich would encourage the owner of the vehicle to have Majestic tow and/or repair the damaged vehicle. Moreno and Mejia would then pay Manrich, or one of the other BPD officers, a kickback of $250 to $300 for directing the victim to Majestic. Majestic would then repair the damage, and would also add damage in order to submit a higher insurance claim.

Manrich’s offense level, the numerical distinctions within the criminal sentencing guidelines, was eventually set at 24 due to the “foreseeable loss” amount costing between $70,000 and $120,000. Though Manrich questioned this determination on appeal, FBI Agent Robert Guynn had prepared data from witness testimony, plea agreements, and stipulated statements of facts by Manrich’s co-conspirators that substantiated the claim. The insurance companies had paid $63,971.95 in claims submitted into evidence, $48,966.96 of which was for fraudulent damage. Added to this were the kickbacks Manrich received (with his co-conspirators) totaling at least $37,000.

Though Manrich also questioned the reliability of the chart due to the co-conspirator’s testimony, this was resolved by the testimony of Agent Guynn. Additionally, the questions of foreseeability in this circumstance had already been answered in the previous appeal. As this was the only remaining issue, the Fourth Circuit affirmed.

By Dan Menken

Last Thursday, in United States v. Dawkins, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conviction and sentencing of Ciara Dawkins for conspiracy to distribute oxycodone and oxymorphone, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012), and aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute oxymorphone, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).  Dawkins appealed, claiming that the district court erred in determining the drug quantity attributable to her for sentencing purposes.

A district court’s findings on drug quantity are generally factual in nature and, therefore, the Fourth Circuit reviewed for clear error.  Dawkins claimed that the probation officer utilized a “concocted formula” based on speculation and conjecture.  She further claimed that the testimony of Jason McClure was inherently unreliable because he was a pill abuser.  The Fourth Circuit noted that the government must prove the drug quantity attributable to a defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.  The Fourth Circuit further noted that the district court may rely on information in the presentence report unless the defendant affirmatively shows that the information is inaccurate or unreliable.  To reverse the court’s findings on drug quantity, the court must have a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”

The Fourth Circuit found no clear in error in the district court’s conclusion that the probation officer arrived at a thorough and conservative estimate of relevant conduct based on McClure’s testimony.  Additionally, Jason McClure’s reliability is not at issue because credibility determinations are for the trier of fact, not the reviewing court.  Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Dawkins’ conviction and sentence.

By Diana C. Castro

Today, in United States of America v. Gregory Lawrence Tropea, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Defendant Gregory Tropea pled guilty to three counts of receipt of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) (2012), and one count of making a false statement to a probation officer, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012). Consequently, Mr. Tropea was sentenced to 336 months in prison.

Arguing that he was unaware that by pleading guilty he was waiving his right to appeal the District Court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence, Mr. Tropea appealed to the Fourth Circuit claiming that the District Court erroneously denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

However, the Fourth Circuit Court determined that the District Court had complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, Pleas. The Court noted that Mr. Tropea acknowledged he had read the plea agreement, understood it, and had reviewed it with his attorney. In the plea agreement, Mr. Tropea waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, and did not reserve the right to appeal the ruling on the motion to suppress. Moreover, at the Rule 11 hearing, defense counsel and the Assistant United States Attorney both stated that Mr. Tropea had not reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling. Mr. Tropea, then having the opportunity to disagree, did not object.

Under United States v. Nicholson, a defendant does not have an “absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.” 676 F.3d 376, 383-84 (4th Cir. 2012). Instead, the defendant must demonstrate a “fair and just reason” for withdrawal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B); United States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000).

Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit reviewed and held that the District Court had not abused its discretion because the District Court had properly conducted Mr. Tropea’s Rule 11 proceeding, and it had correctly applied the factors set forth in United States v. Moore. See United States v. Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 414 (4th Cir. 2003). The United States v. Moore factors applied include “(1) whether the defendant has offered credible evidence that his plea was not knowing or not voluntary, (2) whether the defendant has credibly asserted his legal innocence, (3) whether there has been a delay between the entering of the plea and the filing of the motion, (4) whether defendant has had close assistance of competent counsel, (5) whether withdrawal will cause prejudice to the government, and (6) whether it will inconvenience the court and waste judicial resources.” 931 F.2d 245,
248 (4th Cir. 1991).

Noting that Mr. Tropea failed to offer any credible evidence that he pled unknowingly or involuntarily, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court ruling denying Mr. Tropea’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

 

 By: Kaitlin Price

The Fourth Circuit, in United States of America v. Moody, affirmed the District Court’s 110-month sentence imposed in accordance with Defendant’s guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Fourth Circuit held that the District Court properly applied the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)(2013).

The Court explained that the Sentencing Guidelines allow a court to enhance a sentence under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) when the possession of a firearm has the potential of facilitating another felony offense. This requirement for enhancement is satisfied “‘if the firearm had some purpose or effect with respect to the other offense,’” even if that purpose is protection. The commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines specifically explain that if a firearm is found within the proximity of drugs, then the enhancement requirement is satisfied because a firearm would have the potential to facilitate a drug-trafficking felony offense.

The record in United State of America v. Moody indicates that the firearm found satisfies the enhancement requirement and thus the 110-month sentence is affirmed. There was sufficient evidence of temporal proximity of possession of the firearms and the illegal activity because the evidence showed that the Defendant had purchased the gun a few days prior to when the police obtained it and the Defendant had conducted a drug sale the day before the police found the fire arm. Further, the argument that the Defendant possessed the gun for protection is not a valid defense in light of the fact the Defendant was a drug trafficker. The firearm and marijuana were located in the same closet in the Defendant’s residence. The Court concluded this fact further strengthened the nexus between the Defendant’s firearm possession and drug activity because the presence of the firearm empowered the Defendant to use his residence for drug trafficking by offering him protection.

By: Patrick Southern

Today, in United States v. Jeter, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a twenty-four month sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina pursuant to the revocation of the appellant’s supervised release. On appeal, Jeter argued his sentence was procedurally unreasonable and that the district court’s explanation of the sentence was insufficient. In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Fourth Circuit rejected both arguments.

Citing its 2006 decision in United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, the Fourth Circuit indicated it will affirm a revocation sentence that falls within the statutory maximum unless it finds the sentence to be “plainly unreasonable.” The analysis of whether a revocation sentence is reasonable is the same as that employed to review original sentences. Thus, a sentence must be procedurally or substantively unreasonable to qualify as “plainly” unreasonable.

A sentence is procedurally reasonable so long as the district court considers applicable factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and policy statements contained in chapter seven of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual. The pertinent portion of the Sentencing Guidelines provides that “the court should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.”

The court noted the underlying policy goal behind such sentences is not to punish new criminal conduct, but instead to penalize a defendant’s failure to comply with court-ordered terms of supervision. A district court “may not impose a revocation sentence based predominately on the seriousness of the releasee’s violation or the need for the sentence to promote respect for the law and provide just punishment.”

However, the Fourth Circuit held that the fact the district court made reference to those considerations in its explanation of Jeter’s revocation sentence did not render that sentence “procedurally unreasonable” when such discussion was relevant to its § 3553(a) analysis. Importantly, a district court has broad discretion to impose a sentence up to the statutory maximum. The Fourth Circuit found the aforementioned requirements had been met, and thus held that the sentence imposed on Jeter by the district court was procedurally reasonable.

Regarding Jeter’s argument that the district court’s explanation of his sentence was insufficient, the court noted that while the explanation was brief and conclusory, it was nonetheless sufficient because the court recognized Jeter’s failure to comply with the conditions of his supervised release and Jeter was sentenced at the bottom of the range provided for in the Sentencing Guidelines. While the district court is required to provide an explanation for its chosen revocation sentence, the explanation does not have to be as detailed or specific as that which would accompany an original sentence. Thus, Jeter’s twenty-four month sentence was affirmed.

 

by Katharine Yale

Today, in Hardy v. Warden of the Greensville Correctional Center, the Fourth Circuit considered the district court’s order denying relief on prisoner’s habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

To appeal a final order in a habeas proceeding, a circuit justice or judge must issue a certificate of appealability. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, a certificate of appealability may issue only if the defendant is able to show “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”

The court, in an unpublished per curiam decision, reiterated the standard for such a showing as set forth in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000).  If a prisoner’s relief is denied on the merits of his claim, he can meet the “substantial showing” standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong.   Alternatively, if the constitutional claim is not reached and the relief is denied solely on procedural grounds, the prisoner must show that reasonable jurists could debate over whether the petition states a claim of the denial of a constitutional right and whether the district court was correct in its dispositive procedural ruling.

In this case, after reviewing the record, the court held that the prisoner had not made the requisite showing. Thus, the certificate of appealability was denied and the appeal was accordingly dismissed.