By: Will Boyce
Background
The human body is made up of water, proteins, fats, and . . . per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances? These chemicals, or PFAS for short, are a group of nearly 15,000 synthetically made chemicals known for their strong resistance to heat and other substances, earning them the title “forever chemicals.”[1] And while they are extraordinarily useful for producing water-repellent materials, non-stick pans, and other common products, their durability also means that they, well, endure.[2] These days, PFAS can be found pretty much everywhere, including in drinking water and, yes, the blood of most people in the United States.[3] Studies suggest that PFAS can contribute to a number of health problems, including liver damage, birth defects, and increased risk of some cancers.[4] In recent years, the EPA, states, and private litigants have all responded to the threats PFAS pose to human health and the environment through regulation and litigation.[5]
Maryland v. 3M Co.
In 2023, Maryland and South Carolina initiated litigation intended to hold manufacturers including 3M Company responsible for polluting waterways through their use of PFAS in manufacturing industrial and consumer products.[6]Each state brought two suits pleading state-law causes of action in their respective state courts: one suit directed at 3M’s production of aqueous film-forming foam (“AFFF”), a widely used firefighting foam, for the U.S. military, and one suit specifically excluding 3M’s production of AFFF directed at all other PFAS production.[7] 3M removed all four suits to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), the federal officer removal statute, and each state moved to remand the non-AFFF suits back to state court.[8] The district courts in Maryland and South Carolina agreed with the states that there was no basis for removal to federal court, as the non-AFFF complaints had specifically disclaimed any remediation for AFFF-related pollution.[9] 3M appealed each district court’s decision, and the Fourth Circuit consolidated the cases for review.[10]
The majority opinion, authored by Judge Agee and joined by Judge Rushing, held that removal was proper under the federal officer removal statute.[11] Under that statute, 3M’s removal would be proper “if it plausibly allege[d] ‘(1) that it acted under a federal officer, (2) that it has a colorable federal defense, and (3) that the charged conduct was carried out for or in relation to the asserted official authority.’”[12] Each district court’s rejection of the removal centered on the third element.[13]
Judge Agee first rejected the district courts’ acceptance of the complaints’ disclaimers as dispositive.[14] He stated that the officer removal context required the Court to “credit a removing defendant’s theory of the case” regarding whether it was related to federal work, not to accept the plaintiff’s pleading.[15] Accordingly, the majority held that the district courts had erred in considering it as dispositive.[16]
Then, Judge Agee addressed the third element head-on, determining that the nexus element was met because the contaminating PFAS would have commingled such that disentangling their precise sources would be impossible.[17] And because the AFFF production is “inextricably related” to the more general pollution, the third element is met.[18] Still, the Court ultimately vacated and remanded the case to the lower courts for a determination of whether the other two elements required for removal were met.[19]
Judge Floyd dissented.[20] He distinguished prior cases allowing removal as complaining of conduct that “could not be separated from the relevant federal authority.”[21] Here, Judge Floyd maintained, the fact that the different chemicals would be intermingled in the environment was “too tenuous” a causal connection to support removal.[22] In his view, such a broad interpretation of the causal nexus requirement would effectively and improperly prevent many state-law claims from being brought in state courts, so long as the defendant could identify a minor connection to work performed for government contracts.[23]
The Future of PFAS Litigation in North Carolina
It should come as no surprise that there is already PFAS litigation taking place in North Carolina. One class-action suit alleged that DuPont and Chemours dumped PFAS into the Cape Fear River.[24] It was filed in the Eastern District of North Carolina on January 31, 2018, and has slowly been making its way through the courts.[25] And in 2021 and 2022, then-Attorney General Josh Stein filed a total of six lawsuits related to AFFF in North Carolina state court.[26] In other words, PFAS litigation is near and dear to the interests of many North Carolinians, and PFAS litigations will likely be in the public eye for years to come.
Now, North Carolina’s lawsuits were filed in state court years ago and remain in state court, so removal does not appear possible at this point. Still, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Maryland v. 3M Co. could impact future PFAS litigation in North Carolina. Let’s say a North Carolina plaintiff files two new suits with state law claims: one alleging harm resulting from the disposal of PFAS related solely to the manufacture of consumer-based products, and one related to the production of AFFF, including for military purposes. In that case, Maryland v. 3M Co. is perfectly on point—according to the majority, the necessary intermingling of the chemicals, once they reach waterways, would mean the nexus requirement would likely be met.[27] So if the other elements of federal officer removal are met, removal of both suits to federal court may be proper.[28]
Now imagine a slightly different situation—imagine that the plaintiff does not file a suit related to the military. Would removal of the state law claim out of state court still be possible? In Maryland v. 3M Co., the Fourth Circuit discussed a recent Seventh Circuit case where the state of Illinois sought to recover from a single 3M facility, disclaiming contamination from a facility that may have produced AFFF for military use.[29] In that case, Illinois’ concession meant that 3M’s removal failed on another element.[30] But think about it—that only works if the pollution can be traced to only one non-military serving facility.
But what about here, where the military production is “inextricably related” to the consumer production by their intermingling in the waterways?[31] In such a case, our hypothetical plaintiff may be subject to federal removal even if they only filed a suit that specifically excluded PFAS used for military purposes. After all, these forever chemicals trickle down into waterways and intermingle, making it nearly impossible to determine the precise point from which they originated. All of which is to say, PFAS suits might all be subject to removal to federal court.
At this point, PFAS are everywhere.[32] And since they do not fully degrade, they will likely be everywhere for a while. As PFAS litigation continues, courts may have to contend with the unique procedural challenges posed by chemicals that last, well, forever.
[1] See Lisa Friedman, Six Things to Know About ‘Forever Chemicals’, N.Y. Times (May 28, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/10/climate/six-things-to-know-about-forever-chemicals.html.
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] Id.
[5] See, e.g., Key EPA Actions to Address PFAS, EPA (Jan. 24, 2025), https://www.epa.gov/pfas/key-epa-actions-address-pfas; PFAS: Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances, California Water Boards (Mar. 7, 2025), https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/drinking_water/certlic/drinkingwater/pfas.html; Brian Ledger et al., EPA and Developing PFAS Science: Impacts on Litigation, Reuters (Jan. 30, 2024, 11:05 AM), https://www.reuters.com/legal/legalindustry/epa-developing-pfas-science-impacts-litigation-2024-01-30/#:~:text=The%20EPA%20and%20private%20well,claimed%20injuries%20to%20his%20cattle (describing how, “[i]n 1999, the first PFAS lawsuit was filed against DuPont by a West Virginia farmer”).
[6] Maryland v. 3M Co., No. 24-1270, 2025 WL 727831, at *2 (4th Cir. Mar. 7, 2025).
[7] Id. at *2–*3.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id. at *3.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at *4 (quoting Anne Arundel Cnty. v. BP P.L.C., 94 F. 4th 343, 347–48 (4th Cir. 2024)).
[13] Id.
[14] Id. at *5.
[15] Id.
[16] Id. at *6.
[17] Id.
[18] Id. at *8.
[19] Id.
[20] Id. at *9 (Floyd, J., dissenting).
[21] Id. at *10 (Floyd, J., dissenting).
[22] Id.
[23] Id.
[24] See Cape Fear River PFAS Litigation: Nix, et al. v. The Chemours Company FC, LLC, et al., CohenMilstein, https://www.cohenmilstein.com/case-study/carey-et-al-v-ei-du-pont-de-nemours-and-co-inc-et-al-cape-fear-river-nc-water/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2025).
[25] Id.
[26] See Attorney General Josh Stein Files Four Lawsuits Against 14 Companies Over Toxic Firefighting Foam, N.C.D.O.J.: Attorney General Jeff Jackson (Nov. 4, 2021), https://ncdoj.gov/attorney-general-josh-stein-files-four-lawsuits-against-14-companies-over-toxic-firefighting-foam/; Attorney General Josh Stein Filed Two Additional Lawsuits Over Toxic Firefighting Foam, N.C.D.O.J.: Attorney General Jeff Jackson (Oct. 18, 2022), https://ncdoj.gov/attorney-general-josh-stein-files-two-additional-lawsuits-over-toxic-firefighting-foam/.
[27] Maryland v. 3M Co., 2025 WL 727831, at *6.
[28] Id. at *8.
[29] Id. at *7; see also Illinois ex rel. Raoul v. 3M Co., 111 F.4th 846 (7th Cir. 2024).
[30] Id. at 849.
[31] Maryland v. 3M Co., 2025 WL 727831, at *8.
[32] See Friedman, supra note 1.