Wake Forest Law Review
6Mar

Churches, Classrooms, and Clinics: President Trump Lifts Immigration Enforcement Protections on “Sensitive Areas”

Categories: Current Issues Blog
Comments Off on Churches, Classrooms, and Clinics: President Trump Lifts Immigration Enforcement Protections on “Sensitive Areas”

By: Sam Zeliff

History of the “Sensitive Area” Policy

“Sensitive areas,” or “protected areas,” are designated locations where the government has prohibited immigration enforcement activities.[1] These areas may include schools, healthcare facilities, places of worship, and social service establishments.[2] This is not an exhaustive list, and law enforcement officers have previously been directed to exercise their own judgment on a case-by-case basis, considering whether the location provides access to essential services or activities.[3]

The sensitive area policy first began under President Obama in 2011 when the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued guidelines to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).[4] A similar directive was issued to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in 2013.[5] Under these guidelines, prohibited actions in sensitive areas included arrests, civil apprehensions, searches, inspections, seizures, service of charging documents or subpoenas, interviews, and surveillance for purposes of immigration enforcement.[6] Certain exceptional circumstances allowed for action, including threats to national security or the existence of an imminent risk of harm to a person.[7] At the time, the government felt they could “accomplish [their] enforcement mission without denying or limiting individuals’ access to needed medical care, children access to their schools, the displaced access to food and shelter, people of faith access to their places of worship, and more,” and that “[a]dherence to this principle is one bedrock of [their] stature as public servants.”[8]

During President Trump’s first term, the sensitive area policy remained largely intact and was not officially rescinded by the administration.[9] However, ICE did begin to arrest undocumented immigrants in courthouses, a location where law enforcement activity was reserved only for situations involving threats to national security or public safety under the Obama administration.[10] In response, several State Supreme Court Chief Justices wrote to ICE to warn of the chilling effect these arrests could have on immigrants attending court hearings or serving as witnesses.[11] This fear of a “chilling effect” on the use of essential services was one of the primary justifications behind sensitive area protections when implemented under President Obama half a decade earlier.[12] Despite this warning, courthouse arrests continued, and DHS Secretary John Kelly insisted courthouse arrests were necessary when ICE was prevented from operating in “so-called sanctuary jurisdictions.”[13]

In 2021, DHS, under the authority of President Biden, issued new directives to both ICE and CBP reaffirming the sensitive area policy.[14] These directives largely resembled the policy put in place by President Obama. 

Sensitive Areas in President Trump’s Second Term

On January 21, one day after President Trump was sworn in for his second term, his administration issued a directive rescinding this decade-old policy.[15] As a result, ICE and CBP agents are now able to carry out immigration enforcement in these formerly protected areas.[16] One DHS spokesperson stated, “[t]his action empowers the brave men and women in CBP and ICE to enforce our immigration laws and catch criminal aliens–including murder[ers] and rapists. . . . Criminals will no longer be able to hide in America’s schools and churches to avoid arrest.”[17] This move came as an initial part of President Trump’s mass deportation plan, one of his most notable campaign promises, and a central issue for voters in the 2024 presidential election, following a surge in illegal border crossings over the past few years.[18]

While rescinding this decade-old policy may allow for greater ease in apprehending undocumented immigrants, it also creates enormous barriers in the everyday lives of immigrant families, both documented and undocumented. “This action could have devastating consequences for immigrant families and their children, including U.S. citizen children, deterring them from receiving medical attention, seeking out disaster relief, attending school, and carrying out everyday activities,” said Olivia Golden, interim executive director of the Center for Law and Social Policy.[19]70% of households containing an undocumented immigrant also contain a documented immigrant or an American citizen, according to the Pew Research Center.[20] The new risk of deportation faced by undocumented members of these households could deter all members of the household from accessing essential services out of fear that it will lead to family members being uprooted from their homes.

North Carolina Church Leaders Bring Legal Challenge

On February 11, twenty-seven Christian and Jewish religious organizations sued the Trump administration in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for their decision to rescind the sensitive area policy.[21] Among these organizations are the North Carolina Council of Churches, the Western North Carolina Conference of the United Methodist Church, and the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church.[22] These organizations collectively represent dozens of denominations, thousands of churches and synagogues, and countless parishioners located in North Carolina.[23]

The plaintiffs argue that the policy change violates their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1994 and the First Amendment.[24] Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that “the Trump administration has created a theologically untenable situation for Christian and Jewish congregations that welcome immigrants to worship or offer social service programs aimed at helping them.”[25] Religious leaders have said that since the directive from the Trump administration, an increasing number of immigrant families have stopped showing up to worship or social service programs like soup kitchens and English classes.[26] “They’re under the threat of being found in places where they would typically seek community and assume safety,” said Jennifer Copeland, executive director of the North Carolina Council of Churches.[27] The suit asks the court to prevent DHS and its agents, including ICE and CBP, from acting on the directive and taking immigration enforcement action in or near these formerly sensitive areas.[28]

Response from North Carolina Lawmakers

In response to President Trump’s directive, North Carolina lawmakers have introduced several bills to both deter and assist federal immigration authorities in conducting activities in formerly designated sensitive areas.[29]

Democratic lawmakers have introduced two bills aimed at restricting local law enforcement from assisting federal immigration authorities.[30] House Bill 78 (H.B. 78) would prohibit local law enforcement from assisting ICE in either the apprehension or arrest of persons for alleged immigration violations or in the service of warrants for removal from the United States.[31] Assistance would be specifically prohibited when occurring in or near places of worship, public and nonpublic schools, and hospitals.[32] House Bill 80 (H.B. 80) would extend these same protections to apply to farms and construction sites.[33] “Subjecting people with no criminal record to disruptive and traumatic enforcement actions in places of worship, hospitals, or schools is unconscionable,” said Representative Renee Price, sponsor of H.B. 78.[34]

With the addition of H.B. 80, Democratic lawmakers have framed these protections not only as a humane approach to immigration policy but also as a pragmatic economic policy. An estimated 35% of North Carolina’s construction workers are undocumented, making it the industry with the highest number of undocumented workers in the state.[35] “When law enforcement is used as an extension of ICE, it discourages workers from showing up, reporting unsafe conditions, or even engaging with their own communities,” said Representative Deb Butler, sponsor of H.B. 80.[36]

On the other side of the aisle, Senate President Pro Tem Phil Berger has introduced a bill requiring local law enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration authorities.[37] Senate Bill 153 (S.B. 153) directs the Department of Public Safety, the Department of Adult Correction, the State Highway Patrol, and the State Bureau of Investigation to determine the legal status of those in their custody and to notify ICE if a determination cannot be made on one’s status.[38] S.B. 153 also specifically prohibits University of North Carolina institutions from becoming sanctuary universities.[39] Republican lawmakers felt the bill was necessary because, in their view, Democratic Governor Josh Stein “has yet to take a clear stance on cooperating with federal immigration officials and President Trump’s efforts to address the border crisis.”[40]

With Republicans controlling both the House and Senate in North Carolina, S.B. 153 is likely to make it to Governor Stein’s desk, while efforts from Democratic legislators are likely to fail. It remains uncertain whether Governor Stein would sign the bill into law. However, the Governor’s approval may not matter, as last November, Republican lawmakers were able to enact legislation strengthening ICE’s presence in the state despite a veto from former Democratic Governor Roy Cooper.[41] 

[1] Sensitive Location/Protected Areas and Immigration Enforcement, Global Refuge (Dec. 2024), https://www.globalrefuge.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Sensitive-Locations-Protected-Areas-and-Immigration-Enforcement.pdf.

[2] Id.

[3] Guidelines for Enforcement Actions in or Near Protected Areas, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Oct. 2021), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/21_1027_opa_guidelines-enforcement-actions-in-near-protected-areas.pdf.

[4] Enforcement Actions at or Focused on Sensitive Locations, U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf’t (Oct. 24, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/ero-outreach/pdf/10029.2-policy.pdf.

[5] U.S. Customs and Border Protection Enforcement Actions at or Near Certain Community Locations, U.S. Customs and Border Prot. (Jan. 18, 2013), https://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/wp-content/uploads/CBP-Sensitive-Locations-Policy-2013.pdf.

[6] U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf’t, supra note 4.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Muzaffar Chishti & Jessica Bolter, The Trump Administration at Six Months: A Sea Change in Immigration Enforcement, Migration Pol’y Inst. (July 19, 2017).

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] U.S. Immigr. and Customs Enf’t, supra note 4.

[13] Chishti & Bolter, supra note 9.

[14] U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 3.

[15] Statement from a DHS Spokesperson on Directives Expanding Law Enforcement and Ending the Abuse of Humanitarian Parole, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Jan. 21, 2025), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2025/01/21/statement-dhs-spokesperson-directives-expanding-law-enforcement-and-ending-abuse#:~:text=“This%20action%20empowers%20the%20brave,and%20churches%20to%20avoid%20arrest.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Camilo Montoya-Galvez, Amid Trump Crackdown, Illegal Border Crossings Plunge to Levels Not Seen in Decades, CBS News (Mar. 3, 2025), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/illegal-crossings-plunge-to-levels-not-seen-in-decades-amid-trump-crackdown/.

[19] Rebecca Santana, Trump Administration Throws Out Policies Limiting Migrant Arrests at Sensitive Spots Like Churches, AP News (Jan. 21, 2025), https://apnews.com/article/immigration-enforcement-sensitive-locations-trump-ab0d2d2652e9df696f14410ebb52a1fc.

[20] Jeffrey S. Passel & Jens Manuel Krogstad, What We Know About Unauthorized Immigrants Living in the U.S., Pew Rsch. Ctr. (July 22, 2024).

[21] Heidi Perez-Moreno, Trump’s Immigration Orders Fuel Isolation Among Immigrant Parishioners, The Assembly (Mar. 5, 2025), https://www.theassemblync.com/culture/religion/trump-immigration-churches-north-carolina/.

[22] Id.

[23] Martha Quillin, NC Faith Groups are Suing the Trump Administration to Stop Immigrant Arrests at Churches, The News & Observer (Feb. 13, 2025), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/state/north-carolina/article300203004.html.

[24] Perez-Moreno, supra note 18.

[25] Quillin, supra note 20.

[26] Perez-Moreno, supra note 18.

[27] Id.

[28] Quillin, supra note 20.

[29] H.R. 78, 2025 Gen. Assem. (N.C. 2025); H.R. 80, 2025 Gen. Assem. (N.C. 2025); S. 153, 2025 Gen. Assem. (N.C. 2025).

[30] N.C. H.R. 78; N.C. H.R. 80.

[31] N.C. H.R. 78.

[32] Id.

[33] H.R. 80.

[34] Ahmed Jallow, NC Democratic Lawmakers Introduce Bills to Protect Immigrants in Sensitive Locales, NC Newsline (Feb. 25, 2025), https://ncnewsline.com/briefs/nc-democratic-lawmakers-introduce-bills-to-protect-immigrants-in-sensitive-locales/.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] N.C. S. 153.

[38] Id.

[39] Id.

[40] Avi Bajpai, Republicans Push for Stein to Cooperate with Trump on Immigration. Where does NC Stand?, The News & Observer (Feb. 26, 2025), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/article300978944.html.

[41] Id.

Tags:
6Feb

The Burden of Belief: An Analysis of Quakers’ Challenge ICE Enforcement Policy in Places of Worship

Categories: Current Issues Blog
Comments Off on The Burden of Belief: An Analysis of Quakers’ Challenge ICE Enforcement Policy in Places of Worship

By: Grace Mohlin

For decades, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has limited Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) actions in churches, places of worship, and other sensitive locations to protect access to essential services. In January 2025, the current administration rescinded this policy, prompting Quaker congregations to sue the DHS, arguing that the policy violated their religious freedoms.[1] Filed in the Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction, this case could impact faith communities across North Carolina.[2]

Since 1993, an ICE policy prohibited agents from enforcing immigration laws in “sensitive locations” absent exigent circumstances.[3] Under the most recent iteration of this policy, these sensitive locations included places like schools, healthcare facilities, places of worship, food banks, and domestic violence shelters.[4] The underlying rationale is that enforcement actions taken in or near these areas restrain an individual’s access to receive or engage in essential services and activities.[5]

Policies regarding sensitive locations have changed depending on the administration. For example, ICE has classified hospitals and courthouses as sensitive locations under some administrations, but not others.[6] Yet, ICE has recognized places of worship as protected spaces for over thirty years.[7] This continued protection is often viewed as a commitment to religious freedom.[8]

On January 20, 2025, the current Trump administration issued a new directive revoking the sensitive place policy.[9] The directive stated “bright line rules regarding where our immigration laws are permitted to be enforced,” were unnecessary, and instructed ICE agents to use discretion and “a healthy dose of common sense” in enforcing immigration laws.[10] Thus, churches and places of worship are no longer given special protection regarding immigration enforcement.

As a result, four Quaker congregations filed suit in U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland on January 27, 2025, against the DHS.[11] The complaint alleges that the new policy violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), in addition to First Amendment and Administrative Procedure Act.[12] The RFRA claim is particularly nuanced because it alleges the new policy substantially burdens their religious freedom as a result of indirect, rather than direct, government interference.[13]

Under the RFRA, the federal government cannot substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion unless the government has a compelling interest that it pursues through the least restrictive means.[14] A burden is substantial when it puts “substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs” or “forces a person to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting [governmental] benefits, on the other hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion.”[15]

Most cases involving substantial burdens involve direct prohibitions or obligations that force individuals to violate their religious beliefs.[16] Yet, this case raises a different substantial burden issue because it involves third-party actions rather than direct government interference.

Quakers believe that the presence of worshippers from different backgrounds at meetings is central to hearing messages from God.[17] They allege the new policy substantially burdens religious practices arising from this belief. Specifically, despite God’s call to participate, many immigrants are pressured to not attend meetings out of fear of arrest.

While this policy clearly burdens immigrants, they are not the plaintiffs – the congregations are. Thus, the congregations argue that because the policy deters immigrants from their meetings, congregations are denied the presence of worshippers from different backgrounds.[18] Put differently, the absence of immigrants fundamentally alters the plaintiffs’ religious exercise. Additionally, they allege the new policy inhibits their ability to encourage immigrants to attend meetings, as subjecting a person to the possibility of a violent encounter with an ICE agent would violate Quaker beliefs in peace and nonviolence.[19]

While framing the injuries in this way may shield the plaintiffs from potential justiciability issues,[20] the relationship between the policy and the alleged burden is less direct. Courts have sometimes found burdens were not substantial when actions of independent decisionmakers attenuated the relationship between the religious objector and the government action.[21] Here, immigrants’ decisions to not attend meetings distances the burden on the congregations from the new policy. Any deterrent effect on immigrant attendance at these meetings is not a direct government action, but rather just an indirect effect of lawful enforcement.

Yet, courts have not found all attenuated burdens insubstantial. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, the Supreme Court found that the Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate was a substantial burden on employers in the absence of direct government action.[22] The employers were religiously opposed to abortion and forms of contraception.[23] While they had to provide insurance coverage for contraception, they were not required to purchase or provide the contraceptives; rather, they only had to place money into undifferentiated funds to financing the plans.[24] In finding that a substantial burden existed, the Supreme Court held that courts must credit individuals’ sincerely held religious convictions regardless of how many causal links separate the burden and the government action.[25]

Under the Hobby Lobby court’s reasoning, the Quaker congregations’ beliefs would be considered substantially burdened by the policy as long as the court finds that their beliefs are sincerely held. While the Supreme Court has not addressed how to evaluate sincerity, its deferential treatment towards claimants’ sincerity in recent years indicates a likely finding of sincerity here.[26] Thus, the plaintiffs are likely to succeed in proving that the new policy places a substantial burden on their religious freedom. Upon proving so, the burden would shift to the DHS to show that the policy serves a compelling interest, which they are pursing through the least restrictive means.[27]

The DHS is likely to succeed in proving it has a compelling interest. The Supreme Court has recognized national security as a compelling interest in the past.[28] Accordingly, the DHS would only need to prove that undocumented immigrants sought for deportation might have criminal records, so bright line rules dictating where the law can be enforced hinders their ability to detain dangerous individuals. Therefore, the policy promotes public safety and national security, a recognized compelling interest.

However, DHS is likely to fail when it comes to proving this policy is the least restrictive means, a standard which the Supreme Court has described as “exceptionally demanding.”[29]

The DHS is not using the least restrictive means to pursue national security. Under the 2021 sensitive locations policy, the former administration stated that the DHS is able to accomplish its mission “without denying or limiting individuals’ access to . . . people of faith access to their places of worship.”[30] Without showing a significantly changed immigration environment, the DHS could have an uphill battle in justifying its change in policy.

Ultimately, the Quaker congregations’ biggest hurdle will likely be establishing the existence of a substantial burden. If the court follows the reasoning of Hobby Lobby, they have a strong argument that this new policy violates the RFRA. Regardless, the outcome of this case could have real implications for the rights of religious organizations, especially those with large immigrant communities.

[1] Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 8:25-cv-00243 (D. Md. Jan. 27, 2025).

[2] Id.

[3] Memorandum from James A. Puleo, Acting Associate Commissioner, on Enforcement Activities at Schools, Places of Worship, or at funerals or other religious ceremonies to District Directors (May 17, 1993), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/policy/10029.1_EnforcementActivitiesSchoolsPlacesWorship_05.17.1993.pdf.

[4] Memorandum from Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec’y, on Guidelines for Enforcement Actions in or Near Protected Areas to Tae D. Johnson, Acting Dir., et al. (Oct. 27, 2021), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/21_1027_opa_guidelines-enforcement-actions-in-near-protected-areas.pdf.

[5] See id.

[6] Lydia Weiant, Immigration v. Religious Freedom in Trump’s America: Offering Legal Sanctuary in Places of Worship, 58 Am. Crim. L. Rev.  257, 266 (2021).

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Memorandum from Benjamine C. Huffman, Sec’y, on Enforcement Actions in or Near Protected Areas to Caleb Vitello, Acting Dir., et. al. (Jan. 20, 2025), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/dhs-memo-enforcement-actions-protected-areas.pdf.

[10] Id.

[11] Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 1, at 1.

[12] Id. at 27, 29, 31, 33.

[13] Id. at 27.

[14] 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a), (b); Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43, 45 (2020).

[15] El Ali v. Barr, 473 F.Supp.3d 479, 525 (D. Md. 2020) (quoting Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006)).

[16] See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 U.S. 682 (2014).

[17] Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 1, at 2.

[18] Id. at 26.

[19] Id.

[20] See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (“[T]he plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”).

[21] See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (holding that despite a Native American father’s sincerely held belief that the assignment of a social security number to his daughter violated his religion, there was no action required of him to violate his faith).

[22] 573 U.S. 682 (2014).

[23] Id. at 691.

[24] Id. at 759 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).

[25] Id. at 723–724.

[26] James deBoer, Dispelling the RFRA Shibboleth: Affirming Religious Freedom and Expressive Rights, 38 Wis. J. L. Gender & Soc’y 192, 223 (2023).

[27] Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 U.S. at 695.

[28] Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 36 (2010).

[29] Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 U.S. at 728.

[30] Memorandum from Alejandro N. Mayorkas, supra note 4. 

 

Tags:
15Nov

Changing the Language, Not the Law: North Carolina’s Citizens-Only Amendment

Categories: Current Issues Blog Uncategorized
Comments Off on Changing the Language, Not the Law: North Carolina’s Citizens-Only Amendment

 

By Emily Gordon

When North Carolina residents voted in the 2024 election, they might have been surprised to see a ballot measure regarding a proposed amendment to the state constitution.[1] Prior to the election, the North Carolina State Constitution allowed “every person born in the United States and  every person who has been naturalized” to vote in an election.[2] The proposed initiative asked if voters would be “for” or “against” removing the naturalization provision, modifying the voter qualification to read that “only a citizen of the United States who is 18 years of age and otherwise possessing the qualifications for voting shall be entitled to vote in any election in this state.”[3] 

At first glance, the proposed amendment was a mere restatement of what the law already declared.[4] And that’s just it–while the amendment proposed changing the language of North Carolina’s constitution, the law would remain unchanged: it is illegal for a non-citizen to vote in either a federal or statewide election.[5] 

North Carolina was one of a handful of states that voted on an amendment targeting noncitizen voting.[6] Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Wisconsin also asked voters to consider amending their state constitutions to explicitly bar non-citizens from voting in a state or federal election.[7] 

Background

On June 27, 2024, the General Assembly of North Carolina passed House Bill 1074, allowing the proposed amendment to appear on the ballot in the 2024 federal election.[8] The measure was largely championed by the NCGOP, which controlled the state legislature.[9] NC House Rules Chairman Destin Hall said that “[t]ightening our election laws so that only U.S. citizens are voting in this country ensures that those making decisions about our country’s future have a vested interest in its well-being.”[10] The amendment was likely proposed in response to the NCGOP’s growing concerns over voter fraud by undocumented immigrants in both the 2016 and 2020 election.[11] Trump notoriously alleged that thousands of non-citizens had voted in the 2020 election, particularly in the state of Arizona, and claimed that such illegal voting led to his unsuccessful reelection.[12]

Critics of the amendment, led by Democrats, were strongly opposed to the proposed new language.[13] Reiterating that it is already illegal for noncitizens to vote in federal and state elections, opponents found the amendment unnecessary.[14] ACLU North Carolina further noted that 44% of immigrants in North Carolina are naturalized U.S. citizens, believing the amendment was spurred by “fearmongering” and “hateful rhetoric” towards naturalized immigrants in North Carolina.[15] Moreover, the NC ACLU viewed the amendment as a tactic to discourage naturalized immigrants from exercising their fundamental right to vote.[16] Similarly, Democracy NC believed the proposed amendment was part of a Republican agenda to create distrust “about immigrants and voting to sow doubts” about the upcoming election, “opening the door to confusion” amongst naturalized citizens.[17] 

Opponents of the amendment also turned to various studies refuting Republican claims of noncitizen voting in prior elections.[18] Analyzing the Heritage Foundation’s database of voter fraud cases brought by prosecutors, the Washington Post found only 85 cases of noncitizen voting allegations from 2002 to 2023.[19] Another study by the Brennan Center for Justice after the 2016 election found only 30 cases of suspected noncitizen voting in the election, out of 23.5 million votes from 42 different jurisdictions.[20] In North Carolina, a 2016 election audit found that suspected noncitizen voters, based on data from the state’s Division of Motor Vehicles, were citizens 98% of the time.[21] ACLU North Carolina additionally commented that “[b]ipartisan election officials confirmed that the 2020 election results were credible, accurate, and secure.”[22]

Results

            North Carolinians overwhelmingly voted in favor of the amendment, with 77.6% of votes “for” the amendment and 22.4% “against,” as of the time of writing.[23]  Of the 100 counties in North Carolina, only two had a majority of votes against the amendment: Durham and Orange County.[24] Notably, those whose who voted against the amendment in these counties only won by a slim majority: 53% and 52%, respectively.[25] In all other counties, proponents of the amendment won the vote by a majority of at least 66%.[26] Camden County and Bladen County had the highest percentage of  favorable votes as 93% of their constituents voted in favor of the amendment.[27] 

            All 8 states with similar constitutional amendments on their ballots adopted the language, making it explicitly illegal for noncitizens to vote in their jurisdictions. [28]

Implications

With the amendment taking effect, opponents will need to work harder to fight against the potential spread of misinformation about naturalized citizens.[29] Without explicit language allowing naturalized citizens to vote, it is possible that the amendment could be viewed as a substantive change to NC’s voting laws.[30] Likewise, the amendment may have confused other voters into believing that non-citizens could legally vote in the election prior to the amendment.[31] Educating newly naturalized citizens of their rights and encouraging them to vote, as well as educating Americans on currently existing law, will be key to battling any misleading information. Furthermore, opponents to the amendment worry that such language could open the door to interpretation of who qualifies as a “citizen,” potentially stripping away birthright citizenship from people who were born in the U.S. to parents without American citizenships.[32] Trump has explicitly said that if reelected, he would end birthright citizenship via executive order.[33] 

 Proponents of the amendment hoped that the language change would help North Carolinians feel more secure in the state’s election results.[34] North Carolina House Speaker Tim Moore echoed this sentiment, stating that the alleged “efforts to allow non-citizens to vote would undermine the public’s confidence in our electoral system and leave the door open for chaos and election fraud to take hold.”[35] Referring to the amendment as a “safeguard,” he further clarified his belief that “this amendment to our constitution would further strengthen election integrity in North Carolina.”[36] 

Across the country, North Carolina and the seven other states that voted in favor of adopting the amendment during the 2024 election join seven states with pre-existing language in their state constitutions explicitly prohibiting noncitizen voting.[37] Those states include Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, North Dakota, and Ohio.[38] Considering this, it would be unsurprising to see more and more states propose similar amendments to their state constitutions in the next election, particularly in states led by Republican supermajorities. 

[1] What is the ‘citizens-only’ amendment on the 2024 ballot in North Carolina?, ABC11 (Oct. 22, 2024), https://abc11.com/post/2024-election-what-is-citizens-amendment-ballot-north-carolina/15450474/. 

[2] Id.

[3] Id.

[4] Vote No on NC’s Citizens-Only Ballot Measure, ACLU North Carolina (Sept. 25, 2024), https://www.acluofnorthcarolina.org/en/news/vote-no-ncs-citizens-only-ballot-measure.

[5] Id.

[6] Kaanita Iyer, 8 states will vote to bar noncitizen voting, CNN projects, something already illegal in federal elections, CNN (updated Nov. 6, 2024), https://www.cnn.com/2024/11/03/politics/noncitizen-voting-ballot-measures-election/index.html.

[7] Id.

[8] H.R. 1074, 156th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2023). 

[9] ABC11, supra note 1.

[10] NCGOP Commends General Assembly for Placing Citizen-Only Voting Constitutional Amendment on 2024 Ballot, NCGOP (July 1, 2024), https://www.nc.gop/ncgop_commends_general_assembly_for_placing_citizen-only_voting_constitutional_amendment_on_2024_ballot.

[11] Id.

[12] Laura Doan, Trump falsely claims noncitizen voter fraud is widespread. Here are 5 facts., CBS News (October 30, 2024), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-noncitizen-voter-fraud-fact-check/.

[13] Nicole Acevedo & Sakshi Venkatraman, Citizens-only ballot measures make newly naturalized Americans voting for the first time feel on edge, NBC News (Oct. 22, 2024), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/citizens-only-ballot-measures-make-newly-naturalized-americans-voting-rcna176092.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] ACLU North Carolina, supra note 4.

[17] Vote “Against” Constitutional Amendment, Democracy NC, https://democracync.org/resources/vote-no-on-citizens-only-amendment/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2024).

[18] Doan, supra note 12.

[19] Glenn Kessler, The truth about noncitizen voting in federal elections, Wash. Post (March 6, 2024), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/03/06/truth-about-noncitizen-voting-federal-elections/.

[20] Douglas Keith et al., Noncitizen Voting: The Missing Millions, Brennan Center for Justice (May 5, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/noncitizen-voting-missing-millions.

[21] Emily Vespa, What to know about the citizen-only voting amendment on North Carolina’s Ballot, News & Observer (Oct. 31, 2024), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/election/voter-guide/article294655104.html.

[22] ACLU North Carolina, supra note 4.

[23] North Carolina Constitutional Amendment H1074/S630 Election Results: Require Citizenship to Vote, N.Y. Times, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/11/05/us/elections/results-north-carolina-constitutional-amendment-h1074s630-require-citizenship-to-vote.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2024).

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] Id.

[27] Id.

[28] Adam Edelman, Ballot measures targeting noncitizen voting approved in 8 states, NBC News (Nov. 6, 2024), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/ballot-measures-targeting-noncitizen-voting-approved-8-states-rcna178888.

[29] Will Doran, Citizen-only voting amendment passes with strong support among NC voters, WRAL News (updated Nov. 6, 2024), https://www.wral.com/story/citizen-only-voting-amendment-passes-with-strong-support-among-nc-voters/21705796/.

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

[32] Id.

[33] Ted Hesson, Trump vows to end birthright citizenship for children of immigrants in US illegally, Reuters (May 30, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-vows-end-birthright-citizenship-children-immigrants-us-illegally-2023-05-30/.

[34] NCGOP, supra note 10.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] Laws permitting noncitizens to vote in the United States, Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/Laws_permitting_noncitizens_to_vote_in_the_United_States#States_where_noncitizen_voting_is_prohibited (last visited Nov. 6, 2024).

[38] Id.

Tags:
20Feb

Department of Homeland Security v. Texas: Setting Boundaries on State Power

Categories: Current Issues Blog
Comments Off on Department of Homeland Security v. Texas: Setting Boundaries on State Power

By Jordan Carlson

Eagle Pass, Texas has become the latest battleground in the perennial struggle between the federal government and the states.[1] In a January 22, 2024 order, the Supreme Court vacated an injunction that had prevented federal agents from cutting wire placed on the Texas-Mexico border by Texas.[2] The case is one of several recent disputes between Texas and the federal government.[3] However, the Supreme Court’s laconic order vacating the injunction, consisting of only fifty-five words,[4] is unlikely to shed any light on the constitutional concerns that have emerged.

Federal Prerogatives Along the Border

Control over the borders of the United States is traditionally viewed as a fundamental federal function.[5] The Constitution expressly grants the federal government the ability to establish rules regarding citizenship,[6] the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations,[7] and broad authority over foreign affairs.[8] As recently as 2012, the Supreme Court held that “the Government of the United States has broad, undoubted powers over the subject of immigration and the status of” noncitizens.[9] Consequently, in a conflict between a federal immigration law and a state law, the status quo says the conflicting state law must yield to federal authority.[10]

To enforce its immigration policies, Congress established the federal Border Patrol, a law enforcement agency under the control of the Department of Homeland Security.[11] Border Patrol agents are empowered by Congress under 8 U.S.C. 1357(a)(3), to access any private land within twenty-five miles of an international boundary for the purpose of patrolling the border and executing its functions.[12]

Operation Lone Star

In 2021, Texas launched “Operation Lone Star” to aid federal authorities, including the Border Patrol, in securing the Texas-Mexico border.[13] The operation included the placement of concertina wire along the border on known entry points for illegal migrants, including a twenty-nine-mile stretch near Eagle Pass, Texas,[14] which the state claims is an effective deterrent to curb such illegal crossings.[15]

However, federal authorities are concerned that the wire restricts the federal government’s access to sections of the border.[16] The wire stretches along the riverbank on the U.S. side of the Rio Grande, and runs across gates and boat ramps which federal authorities use to access to the river and surrounding areas.[17] The federal government claims the wire hinders Border Patrol agents in their duties and prevents them from rendering emergency aid to endangered migrants.[18] As a result, Border Patrol has adopted a practice of cutting the wire in the course of its duties, much to Texas’s chagrin.[19]

On October 24, 2023 Texas filed an action against the United States for conversion and trespass of chattels for damage to its concertina wire fences.[20] The district court found that Texas had a likelihood of success on its claims as the federal government lacked the right to cut the wire, and granted a temporary restraining order preventing the Border Patrol from further damaging it.[21] However, the district court later denied Texas’s request for preliminary injunction on grounds that the federal government possessed sovereign immunity against Texas tort law.[22] The Fifth Circuit reversed on appeal and enjoined the federal government from “damaging, destroying, or otherwise interfering with Texas’s [concertina] wire fence.”[23] The federal government soon after applied to the Supreme Court to vacate the injunction.[24]

Arguments Presented to the Supreme Court

In support of its application to vacate, the federal government argued that 8 U.S.C. 1357(a)(3) requires the Border Patrol to have access to the border, including the areas around Eagle Pass.[25] Because the Supremacy Clause prohibits state law from restraining federal agents from carrying out their federally authorized activities,[26] Texas cannot use its state tort law to restrict Border Patrol agents from accessing the border.[27]

In opposition, Texas argued that no Supremacy Clause issue was presented in this case, as there is no conflict between Texas’s immigration laws and the immigration laws of the federal government.[28] Rather, Texas is asserting its rights as the property owner of the destroyed concertina wire.[29] While federal law preempts state law under the Supremacy Clause, the Supremacy Clause does not permit the federal government to take any unbridled action to achieve its goals.[30] Texas argues that to allow federal agents to needlessly destroy Texas’s property under the pretext of federal law would permit the government to destroy any obstruction within twenty-five miles of an international border at its convenience.[31]

The Supreme Court’s Lackadaisical Order

This case gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to analyze whether a state law may lawfully, though incidentally, impede the functions of a federal agency carrying out its congressionally granted responsibilities.[32] A Texas victory would have provided state’s with a potent tool to use against the federal government on matters of immigration.

However, the Supreme Court issued a terse order simply vacating the Fifth Circuit’s injunction with no further explanation.[33] While the Border Patrol is once again permitted to cut Texas’s wire, the 5-4 split on the order may indicate the Court’s wariness over the outcome.[34] In the context of the Texas’s other pending battles with the federal government,[35] Greg Abbott’s novel argument on the Constitution’s Invasion Clause,[36] and the recent impeachment attempt of the Secretary of Homeland Security,[37] perhaps the Supreme Court is simply saving its breath for other matters in the near future.

[1] See Valerie Gonzalez, How a Small Texas City Landed in the Spotlight During the State-Federal Clash Over Border Security, AP News (Feb. 3, 2023 6:31PM) https://apnews.com/article/abbott-biden-border-convoy-eagle-pass-f26d91bdef9802570c5aa9752598622f.

[2] Dep’t. of Homeland Sec. v. Texas, No. 23A607, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 577, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2024).

[3] See United States v. Abbott, 87 F.4th 616 (5th Cir. 2023) (regarding a floating barrier Texas placed in the Rio Grande River); see also United States v. Texas, No. 1:24-cv-00008 (W.D. Tex. filed Jan. 3, 2024) (challenging Texas statute allowing Texas courts to deport illegal immigrants).

[4] Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Texas, No. 23A607, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 577, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2024).

[5] See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012) (quoting Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982)); see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–63 (“[T]he supremacy of the national power in the general field of foreign affairs, including the power over immigration, naturalization and deportation, is made clear by the Constitution, was pointed out by the authors of the Federalist in 1787, and has since been given continuous recognition by this Court.”).

[6] U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 4.

[7] U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3.

[8] U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 11; U.S. Const. art. II, §2.

[9] Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394 (2012).

[10] Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941) (“[T]he regulation of aliens is so intimately blended and intertwined with responsibilities of the national government that where it acts, and the state also acts on the same subject, ‘the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State . . . must yield to it.’”).

[11] 1924: Border Patrol Established, United States Customs and Border Protection (Aug. 3, 2023), https://www.cbp.gov/about/history/1924-border-patrol-established.

[12] See 8 U.S.C. 1357(a)(3).

[13] State v. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., 88 F.4th 1127, 1130 (5th Cir. 2023).

[14] Id. at 1131.

[15] Response in Opposition to the United States’s Application to Vacate Injunction at 3–4, Dep’t. of Homeland Sec. v. Texas, No. 23A607, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 577 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2024) (“[T]he wire serves as a deterrent – an effective one at that . . . the wire was so successful that illegal border crossings dropped to less than a third of their previous levels.”).

[16] Brief for Appellees at 21, State v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 88 F.4th 1127 (5th Cir. 2023) (No. 23-50869).

[17] Id. at 20.

[18] Id.

[19] Response in Opposition to the United States’s Application to Vacate Injunction at 3, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Texas, No. 23A607, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 577 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2024).

[20] Texas v. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., No. DR-23-CV-00055-AM, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197502, at *3. (W.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2023).

[21] Id. at *7.

[22] Id. at *3.

[23] State v. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., 88 F.4th 1127, 1130 (5th Cir. 2023).

[24] Application to Vacate the Injunction Pending Appeal at 1–2, Dep’t. of Homeland Sec. v. Texas, No. 23A607, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 577 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2024).

[25] Application to Vacate the Injunction Pending Appeal at 2, Dep’t. of Homeland Sec. v. Texas, No. 23A607, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 577 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2024).

[26] Id.

[27] Id.

[28] Response in Opposition to the United States’s Application to Vacate Injunction at 24-25, Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. Texas, No. 23A607, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 577 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2024).

[29] Id. at 25.

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

[32] Application to Vacate the Injunction Pending Appeal at 24–26, Dep’t. of Homeland Sec. v. Texas, No. 23A607, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 577 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2024).

[33] Dep’t. of Homeland Sec. v. Texas, No. 23A607, 2024 U.S. LEXIS 577, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2024).

[34] Jordan Rubin, Supreme Court Splits 5-4 Against Texas on Border Control, Razor Wire, MSNBC (Jan. 22, 2024 4:35PM), https://www.msnbc.com/deadline-white-house/deadline-legal-blog/supreme-court-texas-border-razor-wire-rcna135146.

[35] See generally United States v. Abbott, 87 F.4th 616 (5th Cir. 2023); see also United States v. Texas, No. 1:24-cv-00008 (W.D. Tex. filed Jan. 3, 2024).

[36] Rafael Bernal, Abbott Doubles Down on Border ‘Invasion’ Declaration After Supreme Court Blow, The Hill (Jan. 24, 2024, 4:08 PM), https://thehill.com/latino/4427387-abbott-texas-border-invasion-supreme-court-immigration/.

[37] Kaia Hubbard, The House Just Impeached Alejandro Mayorkas. Here’s What Happens Next., CBS News (Feb. 14, 2024), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/house-impeached-alejandro-mayorkas-what-happens-next/.

Tags:
5Apr

Immigration Reforms Address Asylum Backlog but Do Little for the Most Vulnerable

Categories: Current Issues Blog
Comments Off on Immigration Reforms Address Asylum Backlog but Do Little for the Most Vulnerable

Madison Boyer

A proposed reform is coming to the U.S. immigration system concerning asylum seekers.

The reform would allow asylum claims to be heard by lower raking administrators to ease the backlog of cases in the immigration courts.[1]  A Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was issued jointly by the Executive Office for Immigration Review (part of the Department of Justice), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”)(out of the Department of Homeland Security).[2]  The proposed rule, entitled “Procedures for Credible Fear Screening and Consideration of Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT Protection Claims by Asylum Officers,” seeks to remedy the current backlog of asylum claims.[3]  

Only roughly sixty percent of asylum applications filed since 2001 have been completed, meaning that over 660,000 cases are still pending.[4]  The wait for those pending cases has ballooned to nearly five years.[5]  The proposed rule would ease the administrative burden by allowing asylum officers within USCIS to initially adjudicate whether an applicant would be entitled to asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).[6]  Individuals whose applications are denied by the asylum officer would be able to seek review of the decision by an immigration judge.[7]  

The backlog of asylum cases largely stems from a massive increase in asylum applications beginning in 2016.[8]  Between 2016-2020, over 450,000 cases were added to the backlog–an increase of 276%.[9] The COVID-19 pandemic also caused all of USCIS’s asylum offices to close and prevented any asylum interviews from March 2020 through June 2020.[10]  USCIS states that the backlog is “the result of a prolonged, significant increase in affirmative asylum application filings and credible fear screenings . . . . ”[11]  It further states that “despite significant staffing increases . . . workloads outpaced the expansion of asylum office staffing and the establishment of new or expanded facilities . . . . ”[12]  USCIS also points out that it is a “largely a fee-funded agency” and that the “drop in new receipt filings [due to the COVID-19 pandemic] reduced revenue and resulted in a national hiring freeze.”[13]  Together, these conditions created a “perfect storm” that resulted in the immense increase in the backlog of immigration cases.

The proposed rule points out that the demographics of immigration has changed radically since the immigration and asylum system was put into place.[14]   “Since the mid-2010s, the demographic characteristics of noncitizens encountered at the border with Mexico . . . consist[s] mainly of nationals from the Northern Triangle countries of Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) . . . including large numbers of families and unaccompanied children . . . . ”[15]  Fewer than a quarter of southwest border apprehensions in 2019 involved Mexican nationals.[16]  A decade earlier, Mexican nationals accounted for 92% of apprehensions.[17]  Most significantly, in 2019 a record high number of families were apprehended at the border – 56% of the total apprehensions were “family unit aliens.”[18]

In July 2021, over 200,000 interactions occurred at the border.[19]  Of those, close to half involved families with children or unaccompanied children.[20]  A third of all pending immigration cases involve children, and 40% of those are toddlers under the age of 4.[21]  However, the DOJ/DHS proposed rule “would not apply to unaccompanied children.”[22]  The rule is intended to decrease the backlog of asylum cases by applying the rule “only to recently-arrived individuals who are subject to expedited removal–i.e., adults and families.”[23]  Unaccompanied minors are “statutorily exempt from being placed into expedited removal” proceedings,[24] a process by which recently arrived immigrants who are not lawfully in the United States are deported by a low-level immigration officer with “virtually . . . unchecked authority.”[25]  So, although the rule does not allow children to be deported under expedited removal, neither does it do anything to help the newly arrived unaccompanied minors.

During the fiscal year 2021, 147,000 unaccompanied children presented themselves at the U.S.-Mexico border.[26]  The immigration system was woefully unprepared for the unprecedented amount of arrivals, and was forced to place children in “makeshift housing facilities that were not designed to house minors and lacked the standards of care enforced at traditional [Health and Human Services] shelters.”[27]  

USCIS’s new rule, once enacted, will be a useful tool in decreasing the immigration backlog that is causing undue delay for legal immigrants and asylum seekers across the country.  However, there is still much work needed in order to update the immigration system to account for modern immigration patterns, including the increase in families and unaccompanied migrant children who are arriving at the border.

[1] Procedures for Credible Fear Screening and Consideration of Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT Protection Claims by Asylum Officers, 86 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,907 (Aug. 20, 2021).

[2] Id. at 46,906.

[3] Id.

[4] TRAC Immigration, A Mounting Asylum Backlog and Growing Wait Times, Syracuse Univ. (Dec. 22, 2021),  https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/672/.

[5] Id.

[6] Procedures for Credible Fear Screening and Consideration of Asylum, 86 Fed. Reg. at 46,907.

[7] Id. at 46,911.

[8] TRAC Immigration, supra note 4.

[9] TRAC Immigration, supra note 4.

[10] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Backlog Reduction of Pending Affirmative Asylum Cases, Dep’t Homeland Sec., at ii (Oct. 20, 2021), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2021-12/USCIS%20-%20Backlog%20Reduction%20of%20Pending%20Affirmative%20Asylum%20Cases.pdf.

[11] Id.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Procedures for Credible Fear Screening and Consideration of Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT Protection Claims by Asylum Officers, 86 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,908 (Aug. 20, 2021).

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Mike Guo, Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2019, Off. Immigr. Stats., Dep’t Homeland Sec. (Sept. 2020), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2019/enforcement_actions_2019.pdf.

[19] Alyssa Aquino, DHS Floats Role For Asylum Officers to Ease Court Backlog, Law360 (Aug. 18, 2021, 12:23 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1413919.

[20] Id.

[21] Mike LaSusa, Toddlers Make Up 40% of Kids’ Immigration Court Cases, Law360 (Mar. 17, 2022, 9:49 PM), https://www.law360.com/immigration/articles/1475083/toddlers-make-up-40-of-kids-immigration-court-cases.

[22] Procedures for Credible Fear Screening and Consideration of Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and CAT Protection Claims by Asylum Officers, 86 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,910 (Aug. 20, 2021).

[23] Id. at 46,926.

[24] Id.

[25] A Primer on Expedited Removal, Am. Immigr. Council (July 22, 2019), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/primer-expedited-removal.

[26] Camilo Montoya-Galvez, U.S. Shelters Received a Record 122,000 Unaccompanied Migrant Children in 2021, CBS News (Dec. 23, 2021, 9:15 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/immigration-122000-unaccompanied-migrant-children-us-shelters-2021/.

[27] Id.

Photo by Greg Bulla from Unsplash

Tags:
27May

Niz-Chavez v. Garland: Pereira Groundhog Day

Categories: Current Issues Blog Uncategorized
Comments Off on Niz-Chavez v. Garland: Pereira Groundhog Day

By: Ashley Oldfield (Wake Forest School of Law alumnus)

In Niz-Chavez v. Garland,[1] the Supreme Court of the United States addressed, for the second time, what constitutes a notice to appear under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1).[2] In doing so, the Court may have also resurrected challenges to an immigration court’s jurisdiction which first arose following the Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions.[3]

In Pereira, the Court answered a “simple, but important, question of statutory interpretation”: does a putative “notice to appear” that does not specify the time and place of a removal hearing trigger the stop-time rule with regard to cancellation of removal?[4] The Court’s answer? A resounding “no.”[5] In order to trigger the stop time rule under § 1229b(d)(1), a notice must include all of the statutorily required information specified in § 1229(a)(1), including the time and place of the removal proceedings. Absent that information, such a notice is not actually a “notice to appear” at all.[6]

This commonsense decision, however, created an uproar in the immigration world. Immigration advocates saw in Pereira an opportunity to challenge an immigration court’s jurisdiction.[7] They argued that since jurisdiction only vests with the immigration court when a valid charging document (e.g., a notice to appear) is filed, and a notice to appear lacking time-and-date information is not valid, then the filing of an invalid notice to appear fails to vest jurisdiction with the immigration court.[8] Relying on this argument, immigration advocates moved to terminate active removal proceedings, challenge in absentia removal orders, and dismiss illegal reentry charges.[9]

Unsurprisingly, the Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) rejected this argument. In Matter of Bermudez-Cota,[10] the BIA distinguished Pereira, reasoning that it did not apply where, as in the case at hand, the noncitizen was “properly served with both a notice to appear and a subsequent notice of hearing,” such that he was “sufficiently informed to attend his hearings.”[11] The BIA also insisted that Pereira’s holding was “narrow” and thus only applied when the stop-time rule was at issue.[12] Furthermore, the BIA found support in the regulation applicable to vesting jurisdiction, which did not mandate time-and-date information.[13] Finally, relying on pre-Pereira decisions from the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, the BIA determined “that a two-step notice process is sufficient to meet the statutory notice requirements” and “vest[] an Immigration Judge with jurisdiction over the removal proceedings.”[14] Since Bermudez-Cota, the majority of circuits have also rejected Pereira-based jurisdictional challenges, albeit for varying reasons.[15] Furthermore, in Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez,[16] the BIA, again distinguishing Pereira, expressly held that service of a second document with time-and-place information satisfies notice requirements and triggers the stop-time rule.[17] 

In Niz-Chavez, the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Neil Gorsuch, addressed the two-step notice process head-on. There, the government had sought to initiate removal proceedings against Mr. Niz-Chavez by serving him with a document entitled “Notice to Appear,” but which lacked the time and place for the hearing.[18] The government later sent Mr. Niz-Chavez a second document that included the previously missing information, and he appeared at his hearing and was found removable.[19] Following the Court’s decision in Pereira, Mr. Niz-Chavez asserted that the notices he received were insufficient to trigger the stop-time rule, and thus, having now accrued the required period of continuous presence, he should be eligible for cancellation of removal.[20] The government responded that the second document completed the notice to appear and consequently triggered the stop-time rule.[21]

The Court, in a 6:3 decision, rejected this argument, holding that a notice to appear sufficient to trigger the stop-time rule is a single document, which must include all of the information listed in § 1229(a)(1).[22] Much of the Court’s decision hinged on the statute’s use of the indefinite article “a” before the word “notice.”[23] While the government and the dissent argued that “a” could precede “a single thing that can be delivered in multiple installments,”[24] the Court concluded that Congress’s use of “a” here indicated a single notice delivered at a discrete time, similarly to how Congress used indefinite articles before other case-initiating pleadings, such as a civil complaint or an indictment, which are never delivered by installment.[25]

The Court then found support for the single notice requirement in several related statutory provisions: 8 U.S.C. § 1229(e)(1), which provides “special rules the government must follow when it seizes [a noncitizen] at a sensitive location”; 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(7), which speaks to a noncitizen’s ineligibility for relief under certain circumstances; and 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2), which applies when the government wishes to change the noncitizen’s hearing date.[26] Each of these provisions refers to a notice of some type, pairs an article with a singular noun, and seems to contemplate a discrete document.[27]

Turning next to the statute’s history for support, the Court noted that under a previous law, removal proceedings were initiated by “an order to show cause” and that the law expressly permitted the government to specify the time and place for the hearing “in the order to show cause or otherwise.”[28] Congress’s decision not to include “or otherwise” in § 1229(a)(1) indicated that it intended for the government to no longer have the leeway to provide time and place information in a later document, but must instead include it in the notice to appear.[29]

Finally, the Court addressed, with little sympathy, the policy arguments advanced by both the government and the dissent. The Court rejected the idea that the administrative inconvenience of including time and place information in a notice to appear justified allowing the government “to send a person who . . .  may be unfamiliar with English and the habits of American bureaucracies [] a series of letters[] . . . over the course of weeks, months, maybe years, each containing a new morsel of vital information.”[30] As for the dissent’s speculations regarding disadvantages to noncitizens, the Court found these both off the mark and irrelevant.[31] In short, neither administrative inconvenience nor hypothetical disadvantages warranted disregarding the plain statutory command.[32]

Where does this decision leave noncitizens seeking to use Pereira to challenge an immigration court’s jurisdiction? Although the Court did not directly address jurisdiction issues in Niz-Chavez,[33] the decision upends the BIA’s rationale for rejecting Pereira-based jurisdiction arguments.

First, the BIA can no longer argue that Pereira does not apply where the noncitizen was “properly served with both a notice to appear and a subsequent notice of hearing,” because those are the precise facts found in Niz-Chavez.[34] Second, contrary to the BIA’s assertion that Pereira’s holding was “narrow,” the Court indicated that its holding has implications outside of the stop-time rule, explaining that a notice to appear “serves as the basis for commencing a grave legal proceeding”[35] and that references to a “notice to appear” in other statutory provisions refer to the same “specific document in which the government can (and must) ‘include’ the required certification.”[36] Third, the Court explained that “pleas of administrative inconvenience and self-serving regulations never ‘justify departing from the statute’s clear text.’”[37] Finally, Niz-Chavez completely forecloses the two-step notice process championed by the BIA, making crystal clear that a “notice to appear” is a single document containing all of the information listed in § 1229(a)(1).[38]

Thus, Niz-Chavez presents another opportunity to challenge an immigration court’s jurisdiction. After all, “if men must turn square corners when they deal with the government, it cannot be too much to expect the government to turn square corners when it deals with them.”[39]

[1] 2021 U.S. LEXIS 2232 (2021).

[2] Id. at *7–8. This “seemingly simple rule has generated outsized controversy” because service of a notice to appear on a noncitizen triggers the stop-time rule, which stops the clock on a noncitizen’s period of continuous presence in the country. Id. at *7 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)). An otherwise removable noncitizen must accrue ten years of continuous presence in the U.S. in order to qualify for cancellation of removal and remain in the country. Id. at *6–7 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)). Thus, what qualifies as a notice to appear sufficient to trigger the stop-time rule may have life-altering implications for some noncitizens.

[3] 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018).

[4] Id. at 2113. By 2018, “almost 100 percent” of notices to appear served in the previous three years omitted time-and-date information. Id. at 2111. The government, however, asserted that these initial notices were sufficient to trigger the stop-time rule.

[5] Id. at 2110.

[6] Id.

[7] See, e.g., Kit Johnson, Pereira v. Sessions: A Jurisdictional Surprise for Immigration Courts, 3 Colum. Hum. Trs. L. Rev. Online 1, 2 (2018).

[8] Id. at 2–3.

[9] See generally Dan Kesselbrenner et al., Nat’l Immigration Project of the Nat’l Lawyers Guild & the Immigrant Def. Project, Practice Advisory: Challenging the Validity of Notices to Appear Lacking Time-and-Place Information (2018). For a discussion of Pereira-based challenges to indictments for illegal reentry after deportation, see Ashley Oldfield, Note, Pereira v. Sessions: The Supreme Court’s Call for Common Sense, 55 Wake Forest L. Rev. 415 (2020).

[10] 27 I. & N. Dec. 441 (B.I.A. 2018). 

[11] Id. at 443. In Pereira, the noncitizen did not receive the notice of hearing and was ordered deported in absentia. Pereira, 128 S. Ct. at 2112.

[12] 27 I. & N. Dec. at 443.

[13] Id. at 445.

[14] Id. at 447.

[15] See Goncalves Pontes v. Barr, 938 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2019); Banegas Gomez v. Barr, 922 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 954 (2020); Nkomo v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 930 F.3d 129, 133–34 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2740 (2020); United States v. Cortez, 930 F.3d 350, 362–65 (4th Cir. 2019); Pierre-Paul v. Barr, 930 F.3d 684, 690–91 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 2490 (2020); Hernandez-Perez v. Whitaker, 911 F.3d 305, 311–15 (6th Cir. 2018); Ortiz-Santiago v. Barr, 924 F.3d 956, 962–64 (7th Cir. 2019), reh’g denied; Ali v. Barr, 924 F.3d 983, 986 (8th Cir. 2019); Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1159 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1106 (2020); Martinez-Perez v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1273, 1278–79 (10th Cir. 2020); Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 935 F.3d 1148, 1154 (11th Cir. 2019).

[16] 27 I. & N. Dec. 520 (B.I.A. 2019).

[17] Id. at 535.

[18] Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 2232, at *9 (2021) (No. 19-863).

[19] Id. at *29–30 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).

[20] Id. at *31.

[21] Id.

[22] Id. at *27 (majority opinion).

[23] Id. at *10–17.

[24] Id. at *40 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).

[25] Id. at *13–16 (majority opinion).

[26] Id. at *17–20.

[27] Id.

[28] Id. at *20.

[29] Id.

[30] Id. at *23–25.

[31] Id. at *25–27.

[32] Id. at *26.

[33] The Court’s failure to address jurisdiction does not indicate that it accepted the immigration court’s jurisdiction. See Oldfield, supra note 10, at 436–37.

[34] See Niz-Chavez, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 2232, at *29–30 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).

[35] Id. at *15 (majority opinion).

[36] Id. at *18.

[37] Id. at *23 (citing Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2109 (2018)).

[38] See generally Niz-Chavez, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 2232.

[39] Id. at *27.

Tags:
12Feb

New ABA Program Helps Immigrants Navigate Daunting Government System

Categories: Current Issues Blog
Comments Off on New ABA Program Helps Immigrants Navigate Daunting Government System

By Alexandra N. Meyer

A new American Bar Association program aims to better prepare immigrants navigating one of America’s most time-consuming and expensive government systems. Unlike most government agencies, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, (“USCIS”), is fee-funded and relies almost exclusively on fees to operate.[1] In fact, service fees account for approximately 97 percent of the USCIS’s budget.[2] Last summer, the USCIS announced that it aimed to increase a number of immigration and naturalization benefit request fees by a weighted average of 20 percent.[3] The agency reasoned that “current fees do not recover the full cost of providing adjudication and naturalization services”[4] and would leave the agency underfunded by approximately $1 billion per year.[5] Luckily, after two preliminary injunctions preventing the implementation of the fee increases, the government filed a motion for voluntary dismissal of its appeal[6] of Immigrant Legal Research Center v. Wolf.[7]

Although fees not increasing (for the time being) is certainly something to celebrate, issues with the current fee-based system persist. The current fees for many of the most popular forms remain high.[8] For example, an I-485 “Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status” retains its $1,140 fee; an N-400 “Application for Naturalization” costs $640; and an N-600 “Application for Certificate of Citizenship” will set an individual back $1,170.[9] In addition, both the I-485 and N-400 forms require applicants to shell out an extra $85 for a biometrics fee.[10] Clearly, the costs of sending in even a single application can be incredibly high. These costs quickly multiply for families sending multiple forms—one for each family member—to the USCIS for processing.

To the USCIS’s credit, a fee-waiver program exists. However, the program is arguably inadequate, as the agency has narrowed eligibility and declined hundreds of thousands of applications for fee waivers.[11] At one time, nearly any form could be accompanied by a fee-waiver application. Unfortunately in 2007, the USCIS created a “limited list that prohibited two-thirds of the application types from the possibility of a fee waiver.”[12] In 2016, the USCIS approved more than 627,000 fee-waiver applications.[13] A year later, in 2017, the agency only approved 285,000 applications.[14]

Even if an applicant can afford the filing fees, the complexity of the forms may force additional, unanticipated costs. Theoretically, the USCIS lists the steps of the application process with instructions on how to fill out each form on its website, but in practice the website is difficult to navigate and understand, particularly for applicants who speak English as a second language.[15] Once an individual finds the correct form, they must fill it out correctly according to the USCIS’s standards—a task that seems designed to promote failure. For example, in recent years, the I-485 form has grown from six pages with an accompanying eight pages of instructions to twenty pages with forty-five pages of instructions.[16]

Forms also expire with little to no notice, only to be replaced with almost identical new forms.[17] Applications already mailed with the now obsolete form variants are rejected.[18] Furthermore, forms can be rejected or denied if any field is left blank, regardless of its applicability. For example, applications have been rejected for listing three siblings when there is space on the application for four or not including an address for a deceased parent.[19] Perhaps the most ridiculous reason for form rejection are typographical absurdities, like an applicant stating “NA” instead of “N/A” when a field is not applicable.[20]

Rejected applications not only serve to frustrate applicants, but add to the costs of immigration and naturalization. Rejections may not be appealed.[21] The applicant must resubmit a corrected form.[22] Every time an applicant submits a new form for review, the “USCIS requires new fees with any new benefit request,” even if the applicant is submitting the same form type with only minimal corrections.[23] The USCIS may even keep the rejected application fee.[24]

Hiring an immigration lawyer certainly helps to prevent issues that may arise during the application process. In fact, the nitpickiness of the USCIS has arguably made counsel a necessity. An immigration lawyer knows exactly what forms are applicable to a case and can help ensure that forms are properly completed according to the USCIS’s standards.[25] Although the thought of paying legal fees in addition to the USCIS’s form fees may deter some from seeking legal advice, the cost of legal fees are often comparable to the USCIS’s form fees.[26] Hiring an immigration attorney may even save the applicant money in the long run if the alternative is to resubmit rejected applications numerous times.[27]

Despite the benefits of hiring an immigration attorney to help with the immigration and naturalization process, reality is many individuals cannot afford form filing fees, let alone additional legal fees.[28] The American Bar Association’s online program, ABA Free Legal Answers, seeks to narrow this “justice gap.”[29] The service, which expanded to include immigration law in January 2021, allows users to ask volunteer attorneys legal questions regarding deportation, green cards, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, (“DACA”), and naturalization.[30] Unfortunately, individuals can only ask up to three questions per year, but for someone previously unable to ask any questions, this is an improvement to the situation.[31] At first glance, it’s also difficult to ascertain the parameters of asking questions, but it seems unlikely that an individual can submit an entire form for review. Still, the program provides attorneys with the opportunity to remind applicants not to leave blank fields in their forms, or to use “N/A” instead of “NA,” however ridiculous that necessary advice may seem.

[1] USCIS Adjusts Fees to Help Meet Operational Needs, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., (Jul. 31, 2020), https://www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/uscis-adjusts-fees-to-help-meet-operational-needs#:~:text=Unlike%20most%20government%20agencies%2C%20USCIS,97%25%20of%20USCIS’%20budget.

[2] Id.

[3] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Fee Schedule and Changes to Certain Other Immigration Benefit Request Requirements, 85 Fed. Reg. 46,788, 46,788 (Aug. 3, 2020).

[4] Id.

[5] U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., supra note 1.

[6] Featured Issue: Changes to USCIS Fee Schedule, Am. Immigr. Laws. Ass’n (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.aila.org/advo-media/issues/all/changes-to-uscis-fee-schedule.

[7] No. 20-CV-05883, 2020 WL 5798269 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2020).

[8] See Most Common USCIS Immigration Forms, Nat’l Notary Ass’n, https://www.nationalnotary.org/immigration/knowledge-center/uscis-immigration-forms (last visited Feb. 12, 2021).

[9] Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., Form G-1055: Fee Schedule 4, 11 (2020), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/forms/g-1055.pdf.

[10] Id.

[11] Juan Esteban Bedoya, Price Tags on Citizenship: The Constitutionality of the Form N-600 Fee, 96 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1022, 1027 (2020).

[12] Peggy Gleason and Melissa Rodgers, Status of USCIS Fee Waiver Changes–October 2, 2020, Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr., https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/pa_fee_waiver_10.9.20.pdf.

[13] Manuel Madrid, Border Wall or No, Immigrants Will Soon Have to Scale a Paywall, Am. Prospect (Jan. 23, 2019), https://prospect.org/civil-rights/border-wall-no-immigrants-will-soon-scale-paywall/.

[14] Id.

[15] See Filing Guidance, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/forms/filing-guidance.

[16] Catherine Rampell, Trump Didn’t Build His Border Wall with Steel. He Built It Out of Paper, Wash. Post (Oct. 29. 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/10/29/trump-immigration-daca-family-separation/?arc404=true.

[17] Id.

[18] Id.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Chapter 6-Submitting Requests, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-1-part-b-chapter-6.

[22] Id.

[23] Id.

[24] Filing Fees, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.uscis.gov/forms/filing-fees (select “Refund Policy” at the bottom of the webpage).

[25] Liz Daneu, Is an Immigration Lawyer Worth the Cost?, Alllaw.com, https://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/us-immigration/lawyer-worth-cost.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2021).

[26] Id.

[27] Id.

[28] See Farida Jhabvala Romero, Immigrants Seek Stability of U.S. Citizenship But Cost Is Often a Barrier,  KQED (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.kqed.org/news/11660853/immigrants-seek-stability-of-u-s-citizenship-but-cost-is-often-a-barrier.

[29] Tali K. Albukerk, “ABA Free Legal Answers” Connects Clients and Pro Bono Attorneys Online, Am. Bar Ass’n (Apr. 13, 2020), https://businesslawtoday.org/2020/04/aba-free-legal-answers-connects-clients-pro-bono-attorneys-online/.

[30] Free Legal Answers Expands to Help Immigrants, Veterans, Am. Bar Ass’n (Jan. 25., 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2021/01/free-legal-answers/.

[31] Id.

Tags:
20Jan

Sharing is Caring: H-2B Visa Portability as the Lasting Solution to Temporary Problems

Categories: Current Issues Blog
Comments Off on Sharing is Caring: H-2B Visa Portability as the Lasting Solution to Temporary Problems

visa, approved, journey, template, service, tour, paperwork, visit, ticket, tourism, trip, international, immigration, sign, national, contract, permission, foreign, certificate, passport, business, hand, office, banner, paper, form, apply, application, document, authorization, embassy, agreement, text, product, logo, font, design, brand, graphic design, graphics, communication, illustration

Makenzie Taylor

Each year, 66,000 H-2B visa guest workers enter the United States to perform nonagricultural temporary and seasonal jobs[1] in industries such as forestry, landscaping, hospitality, seafood processing, and construction.[2] The workers typically perform “relatively low-skilled” jobs and often work in “geographic areas where the number of available U.S. workers is limited.”[3] They comprise less than 0.001% of total U.S. employment.[4]

Far from reducing job availability for U.S. workers, the H-2B program is essential to many smaller and seasonal businesses.[5] It “supplies a source of supplementary labor for [physically demanding] jobs that U.S. workers are unwilling to take.”[6] H-2B workers provide a “legal, stable and motivated work force,” allowing businesses to grow and create more jobs for Americans as well.[7] U.S. workers, though cheaper to hire, are not always available, interested, or dependable.[8]

By contrast, employers have reported that H-2B employees are consistently reliable and hard-working, and their productivity helps offset the cost of recruiting and hiring them.[9] H-2B employment also correlates with higher U.S. employment rates.[10] Without the program, many employers would go unstaffed, close their doors, and cause “lost income for American businesses, and lost tax revenues” for the States.[11]

The Problem

Despite these benefits, the program’s cumbersome nature discourages employer participation: “[T]he system [is] complicated, time-consuming, costly and inefficient.”[12] Petitioning employers must prove “[t]here are not enough U.S. workers who are able, willing, qualified, and available to do the temporary work.”[13] They must make “extensive efforts to recruit U.S. workers,” file documentation with four different government agencies, and foot the bill for guest workers’ visas and transportation costs.[14]

Once the 66,000 annual cap is reached, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) stops accepting petitions and will not issue additional visas until the next year.[15] This means that even after expending significant time and money into the petition process, many employers fail to secure their necessary workforce and are in a worse position than before they applied. Even one small mistake in the “complicated application process can mean delayed approval or visas denied—both extremely costly for employers.”[16] The uncertainty involved in the petition process incentivizes employers to petition for more H-2B workers than they actually need, “just in case their business takes off or some of their workers quit after the quota is hit.”[17] Employers who do so, and whose petitions are approved, further decrease the likelihood of other employers receiving their necessary visas.

Employers may use the premium processing track to “expedite the adjudication of certain forms,” but doing so costs an additional fee of $1,500 per petition.[18] Employers are also financially responsible for guest workers’ roundtrip transportation to and from their home countries, daily meals and lodging, and for each “visa, visa processing, and other related fees.”[19] Finally, businesses often require consultants and lawyers to navigate the process, adding to their costs.[20]

Each employer individually shoulders the full financial burden of this process, because H-2B workers may not “switch employers during their visa terms.”[21] In order for a guest worker to continue working for a second employer after her original visa term ends, the putative secondary employer must file and receive approval for a petition “requesting classification and an extension of the alien’s stay in the United States.”[22] H-2B workers are required to leave the States at the end of their authorized period of stay,[23] so if the secondary petition has not yet been granted, the worker must travel home before turning around and returning to the States for the second job. This unnecessarily duplicative process only adds to employer cost and restricts the employees’ access to stable employment.

The Solution

Visa portability, whereby an H-2B worker may transfer her employment from one authorized employer to another without an intermediate petition process, is the best solution to this problem.[24] Portability would encourage cost-spreading, allowing employers to share in recruitment, visa, and transportation expenses for shared workforces. For example, Colorado’s Steamboat ski resort hires H-2B employees as dishwashers for its winter season, from late November to April.[25] Lindy’s Seafood in Maryland hires H-2B workers as crab pickers from April through December.[26] Visa portability would allow Steamboat to send its H-2B workers to Lindy’s at the end of the ski season for the start of Lindy’s crab-processing season, as long as both companies proved a seasonal need for temporary workers and were approved by USCIS. Steamboat and Lindy’s could share the costs of the visa petition and travel expenses and provide workers with a longer term of employment. This would increase efficiency and make H-2B employment more affordable—benefitting both the workers and U.S. businesses.

The Department of Labor has already set the stage for this change by allowing for broader dissemination of job offer information.[27] It has instructed that job orders may be stored as electronic records in an electronic job registry, resulting in a “complete, real-time record of job opportunities for which H-2B workers are sought.”[28] H-2B employers could use a similar system to match approved employers with available employees who are already in the States.[29] Additionally, requiring H-2B workers to fulfill their contract with the petitioning employer before accepting a new job would assuage any employer fears of H-2B workers jumping to new employers upon arrival.[30]

Conclusion

The H-2B visa program is an essential supplement to the U.S. workforce and economy, enabling small- and mid-size businesses to successfully perform seasonal and temporary operations in essential industries. Far from taking jobs away from U.S. workers, H-2B employees comprise a small segment of the workforce and their employment correlates with higher U.S. worker employment. In order to increase the program’s feasibility for businesses and ease its burden on both employers and foreign workers, the best solution is a policy of visa portability. This solution would increase efficiency, reduce costs, and provide more stable employment for a crucial segment of the workforce.

[1] H-2B Temporary Non-Agricultural Workers, USCIS (May 29, 2020), https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/h-2b-temporary-non-agricultural-workers.

[2] Kati L. Griffith, United States: U.S. Migrant Worker Law: The Interstices of Immigration Law and Labor and Employment Law, 31 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 125, 135 (2009).

[3] Madeline Zavodny & Tamar Jacoby, The Economic Impact of H-2B Workers 4 (2010), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/16102_LABR%2520H2BReport_LR.pdf.

[4] Id. at 23.

[5] Charles C. Mathes, Note, The Department of Labor’s Changing Policies Toward the H-2B Temporary Worker Program: Primarily for the Benefit of Nobody, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1801, 1814 (2012).

[6] Id.

[7] Zavodny & Jacoby, supra note 3, at 10.

[8] See id. (explanation by a forestry contractor that he has “hired dozens and dozens of American workers. Only a handful have ever shown up for work. Of those, we have never had one last more than two days.”).

[9] Zavodny & Jacoby, supra note 3, at 10.

[10] Id. at 2.

[11] Mathes, supra note 5, at 1813. See also Suzanne Monyak, Trump to Suspend New Work Visas Through 2020, Law360 (June 22, 2020, 3:37 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1285526/trump-to-suspend-new-work-visas-through-2020 (reporting that in June 2020, President Trump restricted visas to “free up 525,000 jobs for Americans,” but he exempted food supply and seafood industry H-2B workers, evidencing the U.S. economy’s need for these workers and demonstrating that they do not compete with U.S. workers for jobs).

[12] Zavodny & Jacoby, supra note 3, at 20.

[13] Forms: H-2A, H-2B, and H-3 Visa, USCIS (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.uscis.gov/forms/explore-my-options/h-2a-h-2b-and-h-3-visa.

[14] Zavodny & Jacoby, supra note 3, at 2.

[15] Zavodny & Jacoby, supra note 3, at 6.

[16] Id. at 20.

[17] Id. at 21.

[18] Premium Processing Fee Increase Effective Oct. 19, 2020, USCIS (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.uscis.gov/news/premium-processing-fee-increase-effective-oct-19-2020.

[19] Fact Sheet #78F: Inbound and Outbound Transportation Expenses, and Visa and Other Related Fees under the H-2B Program, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage and Hour Div. (2015), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WHD/legacy/files/whdfs78f.pdf.

[20] Zavodny & Jacoby, supra note 3, at 21. See also Griffith, supra note 2, at 136 (revealing the admission of some employers that “they opt out of the H-2 program entirely and hire undocumented workers because the ‘process is too expensive, taxing, and time-consuming’”).

[21] Griffith, supra note 2, at 135.

[22] 8 C.F.R. § 214.2 (h)(2)(i)(D) (2020).

[23] Fact Sheet #69: Requirements to Participate in the H-2B Program, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage and Hour Div. (2009), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WHD/legacy/files/whdfs69.pdf.

[24] See Mathes, supra note 5, at 1812–13 (explaining that legislation was introduced in 2005 that allowed “temporary guestworkers to change employers without penalty,” but the bill was never voted on).

[25] Employment FAQ, Steamboat Ski & Resort Corp, https://www.steamboat.com/employment/faq (last visited Jan. 6, 2021).

[26] Job Opportunities, Lindy’s Seafood, Inc., https://www.lindysseafood.com/job-opportunities (last visited Jan. 6, 2021).

[27] Temporary Non-Agricultural Employment of H-2B Aliens in the United States, 77 Fed. Reg. 10038, 10128 (Feb. 21, 2012).

[28] Id.

[29] Mathes, supra note 5, at 1850.

[30] Id.

Tags:
5Apr

COVID-19 Stimulus Package: What CARES Act Rebates Mean for Immigrants

Categories: Current Issues Blog
Comments Off on COVID-19 Stimulus Package: What CARES Act Rebates Mean for Immigrants

By Agustin Martinez

Across the globe, the COVID-19 pandemic has devastated many lives,[1] including those of immigrants living in the United States.[2]  U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) recently announced that it “will neither consider testing, treatment, nor preventative care (including vaccines, if a vaccine becomes available) related to COVID-19 as part of a public charge inadmissibility determination . . . even if such treatment is provided or paid for by one or more public benefits” as defined by the new public charge rule.[3]  USCIS’s announcement came days after several congressional leaders asked the Trump Administration to rescind the new public charge rule altogether, in light of the rule’s chilling effect on immigrants seeking COVID-19-related medical assistance.[4]

USCIS’s announcement clarified that obtaining COVID-19-related testing and treatment will not factor into a future public charge analysis, even if such testing or treatment is publicly-funded.  But what about the payments that millions of Americans will receive as part of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (the “CARES Act”) that was recently signed into law by President Trump?[5]  Some immigrants, for example, recipients of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, are expected to receive CARES Act payments.[6]  Will accepting these federally-funded payments negatively affect these immigrants’ chances of obtaining lawful permanent resident status (i.e., a green card) in the future as a result of the new public charge rule?  Although USCIS has not yet directly answered this question,[7] the answer is “no” based on existing law.  Immigrants who are eligible for CARES Act payments should rest assured that receiving this economic relief will not negatively impact any public charge determination in the future.[8]   

Under American immigration law, a person deemed likely to become a public charge is inadmissible, meaning that the person can be denied a green card, visa, or admission into the country.[9]  The new public charge rule does not change this basic principle.[10]  But it does significantly expand the types of publicly-funded programs that USCIS may take into account when assessing whether a person is likely to become a public charge in the future.[11]  Consequently, the new rule may cause immigrants who are eligible for CARES Act payments to think twice before accepting these publicly-funded payments.

The new public charge rule’s definitions[12] and USCIS’s policy manual[13] help answer whether an immigrant’s acceptance of a CARES Act payment will, in turn, be deemed acceptance of a public benefit as defined by the new rule.  Under this regulatory guidance, CARES Act payments are not public benefits, and therefore, USCIS should not consider acceptance of such payments during future public charge determinations.

The new public charge rule generally defines a public benefit as “[a]ny Federal, State, local, or tribal cash assistance for income maintenance (other than tax credits),” “Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP),” “Section 8 Housing Assistance under the Housing Choice Voucher Program,” “Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance,” “Medicaid,” or “Public Housing under section 9 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937.”[14]  At first glance, it would seem that CARES Act payments fall within the “Federal, State, local, or tribal cash assistance for income maintenance” public benefit category.  That, however, would be an incorrect interpretation of the new rule for the simple reason that CARES Act payments are considered tax credits under the Act.[15]  Indeed, Congress specifically referred to these payments as tax credits within the CARES Act’s text.[16]  Thus, since the new public charge rule expressly excludes “tax credits” from its definition of public benefit, a CARES Act payment is not a public benefit as defined by the rule.[17]

USCIS also confirms, in its policy manual, that tax credits are not public benefits under the new rule.[18]  The agency further explains that “[c]ash emergency disaster relief – Stafford Act disaster assistance including financial assistance provided to persons and households under the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Individuals and Households Program and any comparable disaster assistance provided by State, local, or tribal governments” does not mean “cash assistance for income maintenance”[19]  This “cash emergency disaster relief” carveout, along with USCIS’s decision to exclude COVID-19-related testing and treatment from future public charge determinations,[20] likely means that the agency will not interpret CARES Act payments as public benefits.

But even if a CARES Act payment was erroneously deemed a public benefit in an individual case, it is highly unlikely that the payment, alone, would result in the recipient being deemed a public charge.  That is because public charge determinations are, by law, forward-looking and based on the totality of the immigrant’s circumstances.[21]  It would be quite surprising—not to mention, inconsistent with both the Immigration and Nationality Act and the CARES Act—for a one-time payment, authorized by Congress to provide assistance in the midst of a global pandemic, to negatively impact a person’s green card eligibility in the future. To remove any chilling effect[22] and alleviate fear in the immigrant population, USCIS should confirm, like it did for COVID-19-related testing and treatment, that CARES Act payments are not public benefits as defined by the new public charge rule.  Even without this additional guidance, however, the law is clear that there should be no public charge repercussions when eligible immigrants receive CARES Act payments.

[1]  See Ed Yong, How the Pandemic Will End, Atlantic (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/03/how-will-coronavirus-end/608719/.

[2]  See Miriam Jordan, ‘We’re Petrified’: Immigrants Afraid to Seek Medical Care for Coronavirus, N.Y. Times (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/18/us/coronavirus-immigrants.html.

[3]  Public Charge, U.S. Citizenship & Servs. [hereinafter Public Charge] (emphasis added), https://www.uscis.gov/greencard/public-charge (last visited Apr. 4, 2020).  There are actually two new public charge rules.  One, which was promulgated by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), applies to cases adjudicated by USCIS.  Public Charge, Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr. [hereinafter Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr.], https://www.ilrc.org/public-charge (last visited Apr. 4, 2020).  The other, which was promulgated by the Department of State (“DOS”), applies to cases involving individuals who go through a process outside the United States, at a consulate or embassy, to obtain lawful permanent resident status.  Id.  This article refers to a single “new public charge rule,” since both the DHS rule and the DOS rule are virtually identical.  Id.

[4]  Press Release, Torres: As USCIS Ends Public Charge Rule for Coronavirus Cases, Every American is Safer, Congresswoman Norma Torres (Mar. 16, 2020), https://torres.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/torres-uscis-ends-public-charge-rule-coronavirus-cases-every-american. 

[5]  See Tara Siegel Bernard & Ron Lieber, F.A.Q. on Stimulus Checks, Unemployment and the Coronavirus Plan, N.Y. Times (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-stimulus-package-questions-answers.html.  These cash payments are known by different names, including “economic impact payments,” “recovery rebates,” and “stimulus checks.”  Libby Kane & Tanza Loudenback, Everything We Know About the Coronavirus Stimulus Checks that Will Pay Many Americans Up to $1,200 Each, Bus. Insider (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/personal-finance/coronavirus-stimulus-check-questions-answers-2020-4.

[6]  See Understanding the Impact of Key Provisions of COVID-19 Relief Bills on Immigrant Communities, Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr. 12 (Apr. 1, 2020) [hereinafter Understanding the Impact of Key Provisions], https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/COVID19-relief-bills-understanding-key-provisions.pdf?fbclid=IwAR2yiNB-kyhr-33bQTVp7YcdNBZ4LeBbia6JUIzbGOhf6d1jJYY9Rzgjs_c (explaining the eligibility requirements for CARES Act payments, which include having a valid social security number); see also Monique O. Madan, Millions of Immigrant Families Won’t Get Coronavirus Stimulus Checks, Experts Say, Miami Herald (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/immigration/article241531211.html (“Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Temporary Protected Status (TPS) holders would be able to qualify for the money because they are issued Social Security numbers.”).

[7]  See Public Charge, supra note 3 (explaining USCIS’s position as to COVID-19-related testing and treatment, but not CARES Act payments).

[8]  The question of which immigrants are eligible for CARES Act payments is beyond the scope of this article, but the sources cited supra note 6 provide some guidance on this question.

[9]  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A) (2018) (“Any alien who, in the opinion of the consular officer at the time of application for a visa, or in the opinion of the Attorney General at the time of application for admission or adjustment of status, is likely at any time to become a public charge is inadmissible.”); 8 C.F.R. § 212.21(a) (2019) (“Public charge means an alien who receives one or more public benefits, as defined in paragraph (b) of this section, for more than 12 months in the aggregate within any 36-month period (such that, for instance, receipt of two benefits in one month counts as two months).”); Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr., supra note 3 (“[Immigration] law says that those who are viewed as likely to become dependent on the government in the future as a ‘public charge’ are inadmissible.”).

[10]  See Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr., supra note 3 (providing basic background of public charge law before the new rule was implemented).

[11]  See 8 C.F.R. § 212.21(b) (listing the benefits that are considered “public benefits” for purposes of the new public charge rule); Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr., supra note 3 (“The rules expand the list of publicly-funded programs that immigration officers may consider when deciding whether someone is likely to become a public charge. Under the new rules, federally-funded Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as food stamps), Section 8 housing assistance and federally subsidized housing will be used as evidence that a green card or visa applicant is inadmissible under the public charge ground.”).

[12]  8 C.F.R. § 212.21.

[13]  Chapter 10 – Public Benefits, U.S. Citizenship and Servs. [hereinafter Chapter 10 – Public Benefits], https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-8-part-g-chapter-10 (last visited Apr. 4, 2020).

[14]  8 C.F.R. § 212.21(b)(1)–(6) (emphasis added).

[15]  See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, H.R. 748, 116th Con. § 2201 (2020) (providing that the Internal Revenue Code will be amended to state that “[i]n the case of an eligible individual, there shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by subtitle A for the first taxable year beginning in 2020 an amount equal to the sum of—(1) $1,200 ($2,400 in the case of eligible individuals filing a joint return), plus (2) an amount equal to the product of $500 multiplied by the number of qualifying children (within the meaning of section 24(c)) of the taxpayer”) (emphasis added); see also Kane & Loudenback, supra note 5 (“The payment . . . is technically an advance tax credit meant to offset your 2020 federal income taxes.”) (emphasis added).

[16]  See H.R. 748 § 2201.

[17]  8 C.F.R. § 212.21(b)(1).

[18]  Chapter 10 – Public Benefits, supra note 13 (“Other benefits not considered public benefits in the public charge inadmissibility determination include, but are not limited to . . . Tax Credits . . . .”) (emphasis added).

[19]  Id. (footnote omitted).

[20]  Public Charge, supra note 3.

[21]  See 8 C.F.R. § 212.22(a) (“The determination of an alien’s likelihood of becoming a public charge at any time in the future must be based on the totality of the alien’s circumstances by weighing all factors that are relevant to whether the alien is more likely than not at any time in the future to receive one or more public benefits, as defined in 8 CFR 212.21(b), for more than 12 months in the aggregate within any 36–month period (such that, for instance, receipt of two benefits in one month counts as two months).”).

[22]  See Jordan, supra note 2.

Tags:
28Feb

Leap Day’s Lengthy, and Litigious, History

Categories: Current Issues Blog
Comments Off on Leap Day’s Lengthy, and Litigious, History

By Nicole Tronolone

While for many February 29 is a normal day—simply a quirk of our system of leap-years—for lawyers and “Leapers” alike it presents a host of complexities and anomalies.  The variance between an astronomical year and the calendar year has plagued leaders and lawyers for millennia.[1]  Dating back to 46 B.C., the lengthy history of Leap Year and the corresponding uncertainty in date and measurements of time have created a multitude of problems including uncertainty in dates of birth, sentencing requirements, contractual obligations, and filing dates.[2]  Despite its calendrical predictability, Leap Day continues to serve as a basis for litigation, providing an intriguing, if not confusing, discussion of mankind’s ability to correctly, and continuously, measure time.[3]

In contrast to the 365-day calendar taught in primary schools, the Earth’s orbit around the sun takes 365.2422 days to complete.[4]  Because this is not an even number, the length of Earth’s orbit results in a “drift” of calendar years, with the date losing sync with holidays and seasons.  Efforts to address this problem through the use of an abbreviated calendar year date back to the ancient Sumerian calendar that divided the year into twelve equal months of thirty days.[5]  Ancient Egyptians modified this calendar, tacking on five additional days of festivals to the end of the year to ensure it matched the astronomical calendar.[6]  Prior to the reign of Julius Caesar, Romans observed a 355-day year; this approach, however, had caused the seasons to drift by about three months by the time Caesar ascended to power.[7]  In response, Caesar implemented the Julian calendar.  In 46 B.C. he decreed a single 445-day long year, appropriately called the “Year of Confusion,” and mandated all following years to be 365.25 days long with an additional day observed every four years.[8]  Although this solution greatly alleviated the problem, the discrepancy between the calendar and astronomical year persisted, with the astronomical year remaining eleven minutes longer than the calendar.[9]  This variation increased over time, resulting in a divergence of an entire day between the calendars every 128 years.[10]

By the 16th century, the accumulation of these extra days had caused the Catholic holidays to shift by ten days, with Easter losing its proximity to the Jewish Passover.[11]  In the papal bull Inter gravissimus, issued on February 24, 1582, Pope Gregory XIII implemented the Gregorian Calendar to resolve the situation.  Under the decree, October of 1582 lost ten days, as October 4, 1582 was directly followed by October 15, 1582.[12]  The Gregorian Calendar kept the 365 day-year used in the Julian calendar but modified the calculation of Leap Years.  Today, the current calculation of Leap Days and Years follows the Gregorian Calendar.  Every year divisible by four is a leap year, except for years divisible by 100.[13]  However, years divisible by 400 are leap years.[14]  The Gregorian calendar results in an average calendar year length of 365.2425 days, only twenty-six seconds longer than an astronomical year.[15]  This minimal divergence means that it will take over 3,300 years before the Gregorian calendar deviates a single day from the seasonal cycle.[16]

The Gregorian calendar was quickly adopted by Roman-Catholic countries, while Protestant states initially rejected the change.[17]  Great Britain and its colonies, including what is now the United States, did not adopt the Gregorian Calendar until 1752, instead relying on the Julian calendar.[18]  Once Great Britain adopted the Gregorian calendar, an eleven day discrepancy remained between the two calendar system.[19]  To correct this difference Parliament accelerated the calendar “overnight” so that September 2, 1752 was immediately followed by September 14, 1752.[20]  The 200 year period of divergence from 1582 to 1752, however, created long-lasting discrepancies in interstate communication.  For example, correspondence between Britain and France anytime between 1582 to 1752 written on the same day would actually carry a date discrepancy of between ten to eleven days.[21]  Perhaps one of the mostly widely known consequences of this overnight jump is the celebration of George Washington’s birthday.  Although Washington’s birthday was initially reported as February 11, because he was born prior to 1752 the eleven-day skip imposed in 1752 changed his birthday to February 22.[22]

Under the Gregorian calendar the probability of being born on February 29, Leap Day, is one in 1,461.[23]  For these “Leapers” information regarding their date of birth can become a challenging exercise in patience and ingenuity.  Hospitals report mothers scheduling caesarean sections and requesting to be induced either before or after Leap Day as a result of concerns over the complexities of celebrating Leap Day birthdays with small children.[24]  Doctors have even offered to change the birth certificates of babies born on Leap Year either back dating to February 28 or forward dating to March 1, a practice that is not entirely legal.[25]

The issues surrounding date of birth information are easily overlooked by those with birthdays that occur every year.  Leapers, however, often face business and organizations registrations that do not list their birthday as an option.  Even more extreme, previous healthcare IT systems have rejected February 29 as a valid date of birth.[26]  The nuisances faced by those with Leap Day birthdays include challenges regarding the effectiveness of a driver’s license that expires on February 29 or a life insurance policy that is calculated based on a birthday rather than the actual number of years lived.[27]  To address this ambiguity, most states have enacted statutes that explicitly define which date is to be used for age purposes, including the right to vote, purchase alcohol, and receive a driver’s license.  In states that exclude the day of birth from such calculations, Leapers are deemed to be a year older on March 1, whereas in states that include the day of birth, a Leaper’s legal date of birth is February 28.[28]

The confusion created by Leap Day extends far beyond birthdays, with the date a continuous source of litigation.  For example, Leap Years have the potential to create additional paydays if a company’s payroll is weekly or biweekly.  As a result, salaried employees who are paid on these schedules may experience one more payday in Leap Years than in others.[29]  Leap Day can also complicate the determination of timely filings and statute of limitations.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) adopts the “anniversary method,” under which the leap day is ignored, and the final day to file is the anniversary of the event that starts the clock.[30]  Interest calculations have also been challenged, with arguments premised on the notion that interest rates based on a 360-day year, a standard bank year, leave borrowers with higher effective interest rates in Leap years.[31]

More recently, Leap Day litigation has focused on the implications of a 366-day year on sentencing provisions.  In Habibi v. Holder,[32] the 9th Circuit addressed whether a prison term served over a Leap Year “qualifies as a ‘term of imprisonment [of] at least one year.’”[33]  Habibi, a lawful permanent resident, was convicted of a Battery of a Current or Former Significant Other in November 1999 and received a 365-day sentence that was to be served over the year 2000, a leap year.[34]  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) provides that a lawful permanent resident who commits an “aggravated felony” is ineligible to apply for cancellation of removal.[35]  As a result, the Department of Homeland security served him with a Notice to Appear, under the argument that his conviction and sentence, “made him removeable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), as an alien convicted of a crime of violence.”[36] An immigration judge denied his request for cancellation of removal holding his conviction qualified as an “aggravated felony” under § 1101(a)(43)(F).  The Immigration Judge rejected Habibi’s argument that his 365-day sentence, served during a 366-day leap year, did not qualify as an aggravated felony”[37] because “aggravated felony” is defined as a “crime of violence . . . for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least one year.”[38]  After analyzing the complexities of calculating Leap Years, the 9th Circuit held, “In the context of § 1101(a)(43), the BIA [Board of Immigration Appeals] correctly concluded that the phrase “‘term of imprisonment [of] at least one year’ means a sentence of at least 365 days, regardless of whether any part of the sentence was served during a leap year.”[39]  The court reasoned that adopting Habibi’s argument that a “one year” sentence during a Leap Year should require 366 days would “lead to unjust and absurd results.”[40]

Although many will regard February 29, 2020 as just another day, for some, the Leap Day presents unique complexities.  438 years after Pope Gregory XIII’s implementation of the Gregorian calendar, the variance between the astronomical and calendar year continues to generate uncertainty and legal challenges.  2020, a Leap Year, is unlikely to be an exception, witnessing a host of new and creative arguments regarding the unexpected implications of Leap Day. 

[1] Leap Year: 10 Things About 29 February, BBC (Mar. 1, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-17203353.

[2] See, e.g., State v. Mason, 66 N.C. 636, 637 (1872); Habibi v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 2011); Kreisler & Kreisler, LLC v. Nat’l. City Bank, 657 F.3d 729, 732–33 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hurst, 322 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2003).

[3] See, e.g., Habibi, 673 F.3d at 1084 (“How many days are in a year?  The answer is more complicated than it may first appear. . . . Despite its precision, the astronomical definition of a year does not help us answer the question of how long ‘one year’ is for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).”).

[4] Leap Year: 10 Things About 29 February, supra note 1.

[5] See Brian Handwerk, The Surprising History Behind Leap Year, Nat’l Geographic (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2016/02/160226-leap-year-science-time-world-cultures-february/#close.

[6] See id.

[7] Leap Year: 10 Things About 29 February, supra note 1; see also Handwerk, supra note 5.

[8] Handwerk, supra note 5.

[9] Id.

[10] See id.

[11] See id.; see also L.E. Doggett, Calendars, NASA: Goddard Space Cent. (last visited Feb. 11, 2020), https://eclipse.gsfc.nasa.gov/SEhelp/calendars.html#Greg.

[12] See Doggett, supra note 11.

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] See Handwerk, supra note 5.

[17] Doggett, supra note 11.

[18] See Julian/Gregorian Calendars, U. Nottingham: Manuscripts & Special Collections (last visited Feb. 11, 2020),  https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/manuscriptsandspecialcollections/researchguidance/datingdocuments/juliangregorian.aspx.

[19] See Julian/Gregorian Calendars, supra note 18.

[20] Id.

[21] See id.

[22] George Washington’s Birthday, Nat’l Archives (last updated June 19, 2019), https://www.archives.gov/legislative/features/washington?mod=article_inline.

[23] Leap Year: 10 Things About 29 February, supra note 1.

[24] See Meg Bryant, ‘Leap Year Babies’ Still Face Medical Records Challenges, Healthcare Dive (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/leap-year-babies-still-face-medical-records-challenges/414660/.

[25] See id.; see also Katie Bindley, Leap Year Babies: Expecting on February 29?, HuffPost (Feb. 28, 2012), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/leap-year-babies-2012_n_1307506.

[26] See Bryant, supra note 24.

[27] See id.

[28] The Leap Year and the Law, Thomson Reuters: Legal Solutions Blog (Feb. 29, 2016), https://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/events/the-leap-year-and-the-law/.

[29] See Samantha Koeninger Rittgers, 2020 is a Leap Year. Is This a Trick or Treat?, Graydon (Oct. 31, 2019), https://graydon.law/2020-is-a-leap-year-is-this-a-trick-or-treat/.

[30] Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a); see also United States v. Hurst, 322 F.3d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000)) (“Under this rule, when a statute of limitations is measured in years, the last day for instituting the action is the anniversary date of the relevant act.  The anniversary date is the ‘last day to file even when the intervening period includes the extra leap year day.’”).

[31] See Kreisler & Kreisler, LLC v. Nat’l. City Bank, 657 F.3d 729, 732–33 (8th Cir. 2001) (upholding 365/360 interest rate calculation included in promissory note).  A 366-day year would result in 0.278% more interest paid than in a 365-day year.

[32] 673 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2011).

[33] See Habibi, 673 F.3d at 1086.

[34] Id. at 1088.

[35] 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).

[36] Habibi, 673 F.3d at 1088.

[37] Id. at 1085.

[38] 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).

[39] Habibi, 673 F.3d at 1086.

[40] Id.

Tags:
22Nov

What’s Next for the Dreamers? SCOTUS Hears DACA Arguments

Categories: Current Issues Blog
Comments Off on What’s Next for the Dreamers? SCOTUS Hears DACA Arguments

By Olivia Rojas

On November 5, 2018, the United States Department of Justice filed a petition for writ of certiorari before judgment from the Supreme Court of the United States asking the court to review three cases from different circuits relating to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (“DACA”).[1] These cases, DHS v. Regents of the University of California, Trump v. NAACP, and McAleenan v. Vidal (collectively “Consolidated Cases”), directly addressed the validity of the Trump Administration’s attempt to halt DACA, and in June of 2019, the Court granted certiorari.[2]

On November 12, 2019, the Court heard oral arguments regarding the future of DACA. In reviewing the Consolidated Cases, the Court is asked to analyze two questions (1) whether the “phasing out” of the DACA program is eligible for judicial review in the first place and (2) whether the termination of the DACA program is legal.[3]

In June of 2012, former Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano submitted plans for an administrative program which would allow a select group of undocumented individuals who were born outside of the United States but immigrated as juveniles, to apply for deferred action.[4]  These individuals have since been referred to as Dreamers.[5] Deferred action refers to the ability of a federal immigration judge or an agent with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service to postpone the deportation of an individual as an act of discretion.[6] While deferred action does not adjudicate an individual as a “lawful” citizen, it awards that individual the status of “lawfully present” during the deferral period.[7] Under Napolitano’s plan, individuals were able to apply for a deferral with the potential for work authorization and the option to renew if a request was granted.[8] Unable to gain enough support for the program in Congress, then-President Barack Obama adopted the DACA plan by executive memorandum.[9] Since its establishment, nearly 800,000 people have deferred their pending deportations.[10]

Under the initial plan for DACA, people could apply for deferred action if: (1) they came to the United States before their 16th birthday; (2) they were 31 years old or younger; (3) they uninterruptedly resided in the United States since June 15, 2007; and (4) they were currently in school, graduated school, had a certificate of completion from a high school, had a General Educational Development (“GED”) Certificate, or were an honorably discharged veteran of the United States Coast Guard or Armed Forces.[11] Persons convicted of a felony, a “significant misdemeanor,” or three or more other misdemeanors were ineligible.[12] Additionally, if an applicant had “lawful status” on June 15, 2012, they were also ineligible.[13]

Following the inauguration of President Trump, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions wrote a letter to the Department of Homeland Security, expressing his concern over the broad reach of the program. Essentially, Sessions argued that the program lacked the necessary statutory authority, had no end date, and lacked support from Congress. Sessions argued it was an “unconstitutional exercise of authority.”[14] Subsequently, then-Homeland Security Secretary Kjersten Nielsen issued a memorandum which sought to rescind DACA and set forth a method for “phasing out” the program in its entirety.[15] The Administration planned to stop accepting new applications and began to only process renewals for those DACA recipients whose status expired before March 5, 2018.[16] 

The Arguments

Can the Court even review this matter?

In a brief submitted to the Court, the government contested that its termination of DACA is not judicially reviewable.[17] While lower courts ruled that the termination was “arbitrary and capricious,” the Administration argued that the Court could not review this standard if the termination was a form of permissible discretion under the Administrative Procedure Act.[18] The Administrative Procedure Act identifies the processes in which federal agencies may develop and enforce regulations.[19] As such, the government argued that it possesses the discretion to terminate DACA.  

The challengers in the Consolidated Cases argue, however, that this issue is a perfect example of what the Court can review, and one that has been reviewed in the past.[20] Further, the challengers maintain that even if their first argument failed, the Court has the power to review the matter because the Administration argued its reasoning for termination was the illegality of DACA as a whole.[21]

In oral argument, the Administration again argued that its termination of DACA was not reviewable because it was a discretionary decision, even though it also argued the DACA program was illegal. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg questioned this argument: if the Administration reasoned that it terminated DACA because the program was illegal, it would not be a matter of discretion, but a legal one, and therefore clearly within the purview of the Court.[22] Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch were less skeptical of this argument: where was the line between reviewable and non-reviewable decisions?[23]

Is the termination of DACA legal?

Relying on the Fifth Circuit’s decision to strike the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (“DAPA”) and an expanded DACA program, the Administration, in its brief, reasoned that the implementation of DACA in the first place was “highly questionable” [24] and “an ongoing violation of federal immigration law.”[25] The challengers, on the other hand, argued that if terminating DACA was of incredible importance, the Administration would not have waited seven months before attempting to terminate the program.[26] Further, they argued that anticipation of potential litigation is not sufficient enough to justify the termination of DACA and doing so would undermine nearly every agency decision to date.[27] Finally, the challengers highlighted the public policy implications for terminating the program, including the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people who are actively working and studying in the United States.[28]

In oral argument, the parties conceded to the fact that the Administration had the authority to terminate DACA.[29] As a result, the Court was asked to review the method in which the Administration terminated DACA, rather than if it could terminate DACA.[30] The argument appeared to break down along traditional conservative-liberal lines, although commentators noted that many justices appeared “torn” and it was unclear how the case would ultimately be decided.[31]

The holding in these Consolidated Cases is expected to be released in June 2020.[32] While the future of DACA remains unclear until then, various district court injunctions prevent the complete cessation of the DACA program prior to a decision.[33] While the Administration does not foreshadow a mass deportation should DACA be eliminated,[34] the loss of the program would immediately strip recipients and potential applicants of their rights to work, attend school, and even drive.[35]

[1]Amy Howe, Argument Preview: Justices to Review Dispute over Termination of DACA, SCOTUSBlog (Nov. 5, 2019, 5:02 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/11/argument-preview-justices-to-review-dispute-over-termination-of-daca/.

[2] Id.

[3] Deferred Action Basics, Nat’l Immigr. F. (Apr. 15, 2016), https://immigrationforum.org/article/deferred-action-basics/; Amy Howe, Symposium: Justices to Review Dispute Over Termination of DACA, SCOTUSBlog (Sept. 10, 2019, 3:06 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/09/symposium-justices-to-review-dispute-over-termination-of-daca/

[4] Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), Homeland Security, https://www.dhs.gov/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last updated Sept. 23, 2019).

[5] What is DACA and Who Are the DREAMers, Anti-Defamation League, https://www.adl.org/education/resources/tools-and-strategies/table-talk/what-is-daca-and-who-are-the-dreamers (last updated Oct. 17, 2019).

[6]Deferred Action Basics, supra note 3.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), supra note 4.

[10] Caitlin Dickerson, What Is DACA? And How Did It End Up in the Supreme Court?, N.Y. Times (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/12/us/daca-supreme-court.html.

[11] What Are the Eligibility Requirements for DACA?, CitizenPath, https://citizenpath.com/faq/daca-eligibility-requirements/.

[12] Id.

[13] Lori Robertson, The Facts on DACA, FactCheck (Jan. 22, 2018), https://www.factcheck.org/2018/01/the-facts-on-daca/.

[14] Id.

[15] Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), supra note 4.

[16] Dara Lind, March 5 Is Supposed to Be the DACA “deadline.” Here’s What That Means for Immigrants, Vox, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/2/16/17015818/daca-deadline-trump-dreamers-march-5 (last updated Mar. 5, 2018, 10:31 AM).

[17] Lomi Kriel, Trump’s Decision to End DACA Faces Supreme Court Scrutiny, Houston Chron. (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Trump-s-decision-to-end-DACA-faces-Supreme-14827072.php.

[18] Howe, supra note 3; 5 U.S.C § 551 (2012).

[19] 5 U.S.C. § 551.

[20] Howe, supra note 3.

[21] Id.

[22] Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Justices Torn, Hard to Read in Challenge to Decision to End DACA, SCOTUSBlog (Nov. 12, 2019, 2:07 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/11/argument-analysis-justices-torn-hard-to-read-in-challenge-to-decision-to-end-daca/.

[23] Id.

[24] Howe, supra note 3.

[25] Id.

[26] Howe, supra note 1.

[27] Id.

[28] Id.

[29] Howe, supra note 22.

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

[32] Supreme Court Grants Cert in Three DACA Cases, Nat’l Immigr. L. Ctr. (June 28, 2019), https://www.nilc.org/issues/daca/alert-supreme-court-grants-cert-in-three-daca-cases/.

[33] Lind, supra note 16.

[34] Hector Barreto, Here’s Why Trump is Right to End DACA, CNBC (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/06/on-daca-trump-did-the-right-thing-commentary.html.

[35] Yanet Limon-Amado, Losing DACA Would, on Top of Everything Else, Double My College Tuition, Wash. Post (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/11/12/losing-daca-would-top-everything-else-double-my-college-tuition/.

Tags:
17Sep

Trump Wins Again on the “Shadow Docket”

Categories: Current Issues Blog
Comments Off on Trump Wins Again on the “Shadow Docket”

By Elliott Riches

On September 11, the Trump Administration received a major victory in the Supreme Court.[1] No, the Court hadn’t granted certiorari or heard oral argument; this win came in what the legal community refers to as the “shadow docket.”[2] Most law students or legal practitioners will likely be familiar with the Supreme Court’s primary method for deciding cases: petition for certiorari, certiorari granted, oral argument, months of waiting, and finally a written opinion.[3] The Court has operated this way for years. The Trump Administration, though, has found a new, quicker way to resolve issues in its favor. It uses extraordinary measures such as a petition for certiorari before judgment or application for a stay pending appeal before the case even makes its way through the appellate process.[4]

The Supreme Court Rules do provide for this sort of relief. Supreme Court Rule 11 provides that litigants may seek relief in the Supreme Court before a lower court has issued its ruling.[5] The Court also allows for the issuance of a stay pending appeal.[6] But the Court’s own rules specify that “[e]xcept in the most extraordinary circumstances, an application for a stay will not be entertained unless the relief requested was first sought in the appropriate court or courts below or from a judge or judges thereof.”[7] In order to receive this sort of stay, the applicant must carry an “especially heavy” burden.[8] To meet this burden, it “must demonstrate (1) ‘a reasonable probability’ that [the] Court will grant certiorari, (2) ‘a fair prospect’ that the Court will then reverse the decision below, and (3) ‘a likelihood that irreparable harm [will] result from the denial of a stay.’”[9] The Trump Administration has filed at least twenty applications for a stay before judgment, not to mention other forms of extraordinary relief including petitions for certiorari before judgment and applications for writs of mandamus.[10] In contrast, Presidents Barack Obama & George W. Bush sought this sort of extraordinary relief a combined total of only eight times.[11]

That takes us to the administration’s most recent victory. On July 16, 2019, the United States, through the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, promulgated a rule that would deny asylum to all Central Americans who passed through Mexico unless they first were denied asylum in either Mexico or another country.[12] The day they issued the rule, several organizations that represent immigrants seeking asylum sued the administration seeking both a temporary restraining order and a nationwide preliminary injunction.[13] The district court granted the preliminary injunction finding that the rule was “likely inconsistent with the existing asylum laws,” might violate the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) notice-and-comment rules, and was likely invalid as arbitrary and capricious.[14] In response, the administration appealed the ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and also sought a stay in that court pending the disposition of the appeal.[15] The Ninth Circuit instead narrowed the scope of the injunction to only apply within that Circuit, but allowed the District Court to examine additional factors to expand the injunction, which the District Court subsequently did.[16] Unsatisfied with the result in both the District Court and the Court of Appeals, the government sought a stay pending appeal in the Supreme Court.[17]

The Supreme Court chose to grant the stay without any explanation, simply writing, “The application for stay presented to Justice Kagan and by her referred to the Court is granted.”[18] The Court did not elaborate on its reasoning but instead merely issued procedural rules regarding the stay.[19] Two justices noted their dissent from the ruling; Justice Sotomayor was joined by Justice Ginsburg in her written dissent.[20] Among other reasons, Justice Sotomayor noted the frequency with which the Trump Administration had sought this sort of extraordinary relief in the Supreme Court.[21] She writes, “The Government has treated this exceptional mechanism as a new normal.”[22] Justice Sotomayor went on to comment that, in contrast to historical precedent, the Trump Administration now seeks extraordinary relief “reflexively.”[23] She urged her fellow Justices to exercise “restraint” in allowing the administration to take “shortcuts,” a plea that apparently fell on mostly deaf ears.[24]

The Court would have been wise to heed Justice Sotomayor’s plea and deny extraordinary relief. This is not an issue of whether the policy is right or wrong; it is an issue of process. For years, extraordinary relief has only been asked for, let only granted, in truly extraordinary circumstances. The current administration’s consistent asking for relief weakens the institutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court. As Justice Gorsuch wrote, “This Court often speaks most wisely when it speaks last.”[25] By granting this sort of relief the Court is not allowing the appellate process to play out. Instead, it is choosing to circumvent the Courts of Appeal and make decisions about a case well before they have the kind of developed record and analysis traditionally seen in Supreme Court cases.

One potential argument those who support the administration’s drastic measures may make is that extraordinary relief is necessary against the trend of nationwide injunctions.[26] Justice Thomas discussed the issue of nationwide injunctions in the travel ban case writing that “they appear inconsistent with longstanding limits on equitable relief” and that if the trend continues, the Court “must address their legality.”[27] However, Thomas was not joined by any other justices in his lengthy concurrence on this issue. Therefore, until the Court does address the issue of nationwide injunctions, neither the Court nor litigants should attempt to prevent these injunctions using the shadow docket.

This is obviously not the first time, nor will it likely be the last time, that the Trump Administration seeks extraordinary relief in the Supreme Court. While the process for obtaining an opinion from the Supreme Court can sometimes take months or even years, extraordinary relief can be obtained in very short order.[28] Extraordinary relief is therefore a much more efficient solution for the Trump Administration’s desire to implement its administrative agenda, as opposed to waiting for the traditional Court process to unfold. Given the frequency with which the Trump Administration has filed for extraordinary relief, it is only an issue of when, not if, they next request it. Meanwhile, courtwatchers and the American people are left to wonder: how many more times will the Court give the administration what it wants?

[1] Barr v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, No. 19A230, 2019 WL 4292781 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2019) (mem.), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/19a230_k53l.pdf (granting request for a stay pending appeal of injunction of immigration rule).

[2] See William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 1, 1 (2015).

[3] See Sup. Ct. R. 12, 16, 24, 28, 41.

[4] See, e.g., Application for a Stay Pending Appeal, E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 2019 WL 4292781 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2019) (No. 19A230), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/19/19A230/113613/20190826132549423_East%20Bay%20II%20Stay%20FINAL.pdf.

[5] 28 U.S.C. § 2101(e) (2012); Sup. Ct. R. 11.

[6] Sup. Ct. R. 23.

[7] Id.

[8] Packwood v. Senate Select Comm. on Ethics, 510 U.S. 1319, 1320 (1994) (Rehnquist, J., in chambers).

[9] Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (quoting Conkridght v. Frommert, 566 U.S. 1401, 1402 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., in chambers)).

[10] Ian Millhiser, Justice Sotomayor Warns the Supreme Court is Doing “Extraordinary” Favors for Trump, Vox (Sept. 12, 2019, 11:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/9/12/20862320/sotomayor-supreme-court-favors-trump; Steve Vladeck (@steve_vladeck), Twitter (July 12, 2019, 4:11 PM), https://twitter.com/steve_vladeck/status/1149773351784726528.

[11]Id.

[12] Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 Fed. Reg. 33,829, 33,835, 33,840 (Jul. 16, 2019) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 1003, 1208).

[13] E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 385 F. Supp. 3d 922, 935 (N.D. Cal. 2019).

[14] Id. at 930.

[15] Barr v. E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, No. 19A230, 2019 WL 4292781, at *2 (U.S. 2019) (mem.).

[16] Id.; E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, No. 19-cv-04073-JST, 2019 WL 4265078, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2019).

[17] Application for Stay Pending Appeal, supra note 4.

[18] E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 2019 WL 4292781, at *1 (U.S. 2019) (No. 19A230).

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Id. at *3 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

[22] Id.

[23] Id.

[24] Id.

[25] Maslenjak v. U.S., 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1932 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

[26] Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424–25 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Injunctions that prohibit the Executive Branch from applying a law or policy against anyone—often called ‘universal’ or ‘nationwide’ injunctions—have become increasingly common.”)

[27] Id. at 2425.

[28] In the East Bay case, the application for stay was filed on August 26, 2019. See Application for Stay Pending Appeal, supra note 4. As mentioned above, the Court issued the stay on September 11, 2019.

Tags: