Wake Forest Law Review
6Sep

Of Subtweets and Bedbugs: Libel in the Age of Social Media

Categories: Current Issues Blog
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By Greg Berman

Controversy erupted last week after a George Washington University professor, Dave Karpf, tweeted a joke at New York Times columnist Bret Stephens’s expense.  Quoting an 8-word post about a bedbug infestation in the Times’ newsroom, Karpf joked that “[t]he bedbugs are a metaphor.  The bedbugs are Bret Stephens.”[1]  Although this tweet did not initially gain much traction, it later went viral when Stephens personally emailed Karpf, as well as the George Washington University provost, demanding an apology for the insult.[2]  After several more tweets and an off-scheduled column post by Stephens with visible references to the controversy, both sides of the feud seem to be slowing down.[3]  Although this back and forth is just one isolated incident between two individuals, it highlights a growing trend in our discourse.  With the growing usage of social media in our society, these sorts of ideological clashes have seemingly become more prevalent than ever.[4]  And even though these virtual arguments tend to be more of an annoyance than a liability, reputation-damaging attacks (even those made on the internet) still can run the risk of triggering a costly libel lawsuit.[5] 

The tort of libel is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “[a] defamatory statement expressed in a fixed medium, esp[ecially] writing but also a picture, sign, or electronic broadcast.”[6]  The enforcement of libel laws in the United States dates predates the ratification of the Constitution, most notably with the trial of John Peter Zenger, whose 1735 jury acquittal established the idea that someone cannot be charged with libel if the remark is true.[7]  Even today, the accuracy of the allegedly libelous statements continues to be one of key factors for courts to consider in libel cases, with each state setting their own standards for liability.[8]  Another key consideration for courts comes from New York Times v. Sullivan, where the Supreme Court differentiated defamation claims involving public figures and private individuals, holding that any libel suit against a public figure requires the inaccurate statement to be made with “actual malice.”[9]  Actual malice has been defined by the Court as “knowledge that (the statement) was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”[10]  Additional protections against libel claims were enacted nine years later, when the Supreme Court limited libel laws to apply only to intentionally false statements of fact, even if a trial court is presented with baseless opinions that are similarly incorrect.[11]

Our ever-increasing move toward a digitalized world raises the question of how these libel laws can be applied to internet publications.  To start, no claim for libel can be made against any social media site, such as Facebook or Twitter, for content posted by a user of that social media site.[12]  This is primarily due to the expansive legal protections given to these “interactive computer services” by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996.[13]  That being said, individuals may still be held liable for content that they post on the internet, with each state continuing to apply its own standards for libelous conduct even as information crosses state lines.[14]  When it comes to the question of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court clarified in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. that a state can claim jurisdiction over a non-resident when injurious information is intentionally disseminated to its citizens.[15]  Specifically, the Court cited each state’s interest in protecting its citizens from intentional falsehoods as a key consideration in its decision.[16] While online information is disseminated in a different manner than the magazines from Keeton, courts have begun allow jurisdiction for internet libel cases when the online post directly targets one or more residents of the state.[17]

When applying libel laws to online statements, courts have used similar substantive principles to those used for print publications.  In 2009, former musician Courtney Love was sued by her former attorney after tweeting allegedly libelous remarks.[18]  As this was the first reported case to go to a jury decision for remarks made over Twitter, the trial court was left with a case of first impression.[19]  In a landmark decision, the court opted to apply traditional libel laws.  A jury found that Love did not know that the statements were false at the time they were made; she therefore lacked the actual malice required to be considered libel.[20]  

There have also been other cases involving libelous comments made over Twitter.[21]  For example, one such case took place after a tenant complained on her personal Twitter account about her “moldy apartment.”[22]  After seeing the post, the landlord sued the tenant under Illinois libel laws; the case was later dismissed with prejudice because the tweet was too vague to meet the requisite legal standards for libel.[23]  Another lawsuit took place after a mid-game conversation between an NBA coach and a referee was overheard and tweeted out by an AP reporter.[24]  The referee insisted that the reported conversation never took place, and the subsequent lawsuit ultimately resulted in a $20,000 settlement.[25]  Each of these cases present factually unique scenarios, but all together indicate a growing trend: even as the medium for public discourse has been rapidly shifting towards the digital sphere, traditional libel laws still continue to apply.

In addition to substantive treatment, there also remain unresolved legal questions stemming from courts’ application of the single publication rule.  The single publication rule provides that “any one edition of a book or newspaper, or any one radio or television broadcast, exhibition of a motion picture or similar aggregate communication is a single publication” and therefore “only one action for damages can be maintained.”[26]  The justification behind this rule is simple: by aggregating all damages allegedly caused by a publication to a single action, a party would not be perpetually bombarded with litigation long after their active role in publication has ended.[27]  This rule has already been adopted in “the great majority of states” and was implemented within the 4th Circuit in Morrissey v. William Morrow & Co.[28]  However, some academics have proposed that the single publication rule should not always be applied to social media posts, citing the possibility that a publisher could personally solicit shares or retweets and thereby maintain an active role in republishing libelous information.[29]  The issue of continual dissemination by means of retweeting seems primed to be raised in later litigation, but thus far has not been brought before any court.[30]  Still, many circuits have already begun the process of implementing the single publication rule to online posts in general (so far these cases have been litigated over personal blogs rather than Facebook or Twitter posts), so it will be interesting to see how courts handle the issue if eventually raised by litigants down the road.[31]

As the social media presence in our society grows stronger each day, only time will tell if courts will craft separate libel principles for online publications.  There are arguments to be made on both sides, especially now that online mediums are increasingly taking over many of the informational functions previously held by their print counterparts.[32]  For now, at least, courts are continuing to use the same traditional libel laws that have been evolving and changing since John Peter Zenger’s 1735 acquittal. [33]  And while the jury is still out on whether Dave Karpf actually thinks Bret Stephens is a metaphorical bedbug, he can likely rest easy knowing that current libel laws will protect his joke from any future legal trouble.

1. Dave Korpf (@davekorpf), Twitter (Aug. 26, 2019, 5:07 PM), https://twitter.com/davekarpf/status/1166094950024515584.

[2] See Dave Korpf (@davekorpf), Twitter (Aug. 26, 2019, 9:22 PM), https://twitter.com/davekarpf/status/1166159027589570566; Dave Korpf (@davekorpf), Twitter (Aug. 26, 2019, 10:13 PM) https://twitter.com/davekarpf/status/1166171837082079232; see also Tim Efrink & Morgan Krakow, A Professor Called Bret Stephens a ‘Bedbug.’ The New York Times Columnist Complained to the Professor’s Boss, Wash. Post (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/08/27/bret-stephens-bedbug-david-karpf-twitter/ (summarizing the context of Korpf’s tweet and the resulting controversy).

[3] See Dave Korpf (@davekorpf), Twitter (Aug. 30, 2019, 7:58 PM), https://twitter.com/davekarpf/status/1167587392292892672; Bret Stephens, Opinion, World War II and the Ingredients of Slaughter, N.Y. Times (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/30/opinion/world-war-ii-anniversary.html.

[4] Jasmine Garsd, In An Increasingly Polarized America, Is It Possible To Be Civil On Social Media?, NPR (Mar. 31, 2019) https://www.npr.org/2019/03/31/708039892/in-an-increasingly-polarized-america-is-it-possible-to-be-civil-on-social-media.

[5] See id.; Adeline A. Allen, Twibel Retweeted: Twitter Libel and the Single Publication Rule,15 J. High Tech. L. 63, 81 n.99 (2014).

[6]  Libel, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

[7] Michael Kent Curtis, J. Wilson Parker, William G. Ross, Davison M. Douglas & Paul Finkelman, Constitutional Law in Context 1038 (4th ed. 2018).

[8] James L. Pielemeier, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The Special Case of Multistate Defamation, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 381, 384 (1985).

[9] 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (defining a public figure as either “an individual achiev[ing] such pervasive fame or notoriety” or an individual who “voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy”).

[10] Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.

[11] See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339 (“[u]nder the First Amendment, there is no such thing as a false idea.”).

[12] See Allen, supra note 5, at 82.  Of course, Facebook and Twitter are not immunized against suits for content that they post on their own platforms.  Cf. Force v. Facebook, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, No. 18-397, 2019 WL 3432818, slip op. at 41 (2d Cir. July 31, 2019), http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/a9011811-1969-4f97-bef7-7eb025d7d66c/1/doc/18-397_complete_opn.pdf (“If Facebook was a creator or developer, even ‘in part,’ of the terrorism-related content upon which plaintiffs’ claims rely, then Facebook is an ‘information content provider’ of that content and is not protected by Section 230(c)(1) immunity.”).

[13] 47 U.S.C. §230(c)(1) (2017) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”).  “Interactive computer service” is defined by the act as “any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server”). Id. at §230(f)(2); see also Allen, supra note 5, at 82 n.100 (describing additional protections provided by the Communications Decency Act, including how Twitter falls under its definition of “interactive computer service”).

[14] See Allen, supra note 5, at 84; Pielemeier, supra note 8, at 384.

[15] 465 U.S. 770, 777 (1984); see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 791 (1984) (holding that personal jurisdiction is proper over defendants who purposefully directed libelous information at the plaintiff’s home state with the intent of causing harm).

[16] Keeton, 465 U.S. at 777.

[17] See, e.g.,Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997); Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 263 (4th Cir. 2002); Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 707 (7th Cir. 2010) (each applying traditional libel tests for personal jurisdiction to online publications, requiring the publication to be intentionally targeted towards citizens of the state). 

[18] Gordon v. Love, No. B256367, 2016 WL 374950, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2016). The exact language of the tweet in question was “I was fucking devastated when Rhonda J. Holmes, Esquire, of San Diego was bought off @FairNewsSpears perhaps you can get a quote.”  Id.  The tweet was deleted five to seven minutes after it was posted.  Id. at *3.  This was Love’s second time being sued for defamation over comments made on her Twitter account, although the first lawsuit resulted in a $430,000 settlement before trial. Matthew Belloni, Courtney Love to Pay $430,000 in Twitter Case, Reuters (Mar. 3, 2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-courtneylove/courtney-love-to-pay-430000-in-twitter-case-idUSTRE7230F820110304.

[19] See Allen, supra note 5, at 81 n.99.

[20] Love, 2016 WL 374950, at *3.  The reason actual malice was required in the case is because Love’s attorney had gained public figure status, which was not disputed at trial. Id.

[21] See Joe Trevino, From Tweets to Twibel*: Why the Current Defamation Law Does Not Provide for Jay Cutler’s Feelings, 19 Sports Law J. 49, 61–63 (2012) (describing a series of libel lawsuits stemming from social media posts).

[22] Id. at 61.

[23] Andrew L. Wang, Twitter Apartment Mold Libel Suit Dismissed, Chi. Trib. (Jan. 22, 2010), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2010-01-22-1001210830-story.html.

[24] Trevino, supra note 21, at 63. 

[25] Lauren Dugan, The AP Settles Over NBA Twitter Lawsuit, Pays $20,000 Fine, Adweek (Dec. 8, 2011), https://www.adweek.com/digital/the-ap-settles-over-nba-twitter-lawsuit-pays-20000-fine/.

[26] Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577A(3–4) (Am. Law Inst. 1977).

[27] Id. at § 577A cmt. b.

[28] 739 F.2d 962, 967 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Keeton, 465 U.S. at 777 n.8).

[29] Allen, supra note 5, at 87–88.

[30] See Lori A. Wood, Cyber-Defamation and the Single Publication Rule, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 895, 915 (2001) (calling for courts to define “republication” in the context of internet publications).

[31] See, e.g., Firth v. State, 775 N.E.2d 463, 466 (N.Y. 2002); Van Buskirk v. N.Y. Times Co., 325 F.3d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 2003); Oja v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 440 F.3d 1122, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 2006); Nationwide Bi-Weekly Admin., Inc. v. Belo Corp., 512 F.3d 137, 144 (5th Cir. 2007).  But see Swafford v. Memphis Individual Prac. Ass’n, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 361, at *38 (Tenn. App. 1998).

[32] See Allen, supra note 5, at 91 n.157.

[33] See Trevino, supra note 19, at 69.

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18Mar

A Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Intentional Harm to Persons-Reflections on Professor Bublick’s Thoughts

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By: Andrew R. Klein

I appreciate the opportunity to comment on the Wake Forest Law Review’s recent tort law symposium.  The Law Review brought together an all-star cast of scholars who produced “must read” articles for those interested in the field.

My primary concern is that excessive fragmentation of the Restatement of Torts—particularly in stable areas of the law—will make the Restatement more difficult to use and, perhaps, less relevant to the bench and bar.

Among the symposium’s most interesting pieces is an article by Professor Ellen Bublick, titled A Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Intentional Harm to Persons—Thoughts.[1] In this article, Professor Bublick proposes a stand-alone Restatement (Third) of Torts project devoted to intentional torts.[2] In introducing her proposal, Professor Bublick provides excellent observations on the structure of theRestatement (Third) of Torts as the American Law Institute (“ALI”) continues to update its work in the area.[3] She then provides guidelines for how ALI might move forward with a new project specifically devoted to intentional torts.[4]

Professor Bublick’s primary thesis is that failing to produce a separate project on intentional torts risks leaving the Restatement (Third)structurally inconsistent, as the current “umbrella” provision on liability for intentional physical harm does not appear to cover the broad range of trespassory torts[5] that encompasses harms beyond the physical.[6] Although I agree with many of Professor Bublick’s points, I am ultimately skeptical about whether a new project is truly necessary, or even in the ALI’s best interests.  My primary concern is that excessive fragmentation of the Restatement of Torts—particularly in stable areas of the law—will make the Restatement more difficult to use and, perhaps, less relevant to the bench and bar.  So, despite stylistic differences between the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, as well as some theoretical tension, I believe that current sections on intentional torts from the Restatement (Second) can remain harmoniously in place alongside the Restatement (Third)’s provisions.

As a starting point, it is important to note that much of what Professor Bublick seeks already exists in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm.  The Restatement (Third) includes a definition of intent.[7] It includes a definition of physical harm.[8] It also includes a liability provision for intentional physical harm.[9] What it does not include, according to Professor Bublick, is “a new provision for exceptions to liability” that would parallel similar sections in the Restatement (Third) relating to negligence.[10] Nor does the Restatement (Third) include specific sections on trespassory torts that do not involve physical harm.[11] Thus, as Professor Bublick begins her discussion, she suggests that “[w]ith three of the four provisions already enshrined in the existing Restatement (Third), it might seem that a future project could simply add the final provision (for exceptions to liability), import Restatement (Second)’s provisions regarding trespassory torts, and be finished.”[12] To this, I respond, why not?

Professor Bublick answers that such an approach is “untenable.”[13] One of her main concerns is that the trespassory torts encompass a broader category of harm than would be covered by the Restatement (Third)’s umbrella provision.[14] She also argues that the Restatement (Second) fails to “extend liability to all conduct intended to cause physical harm that does so.”[15] I briefly address both of these objections below.

To support her latter point, Professor Bublick provides an example, envisioning a hypothetical lifeguard who chooses not to save a drowning neighbor who was having an affair with her husband.[16] She then asserts that “this omission [by the lifeguard], which produced harm . . . might not count as a battery, and yet . . . might satisfy the Restatement (Third)’s umbrella rule.”[17] Given the breadth of the umbrella provision, I suppose that is true.  But I have a hard time believing that any court in the country would impose battery liability in such a situation given that Professor Bublick’s hypothetical lifeguard did not make contact with the victim.  The best source for this conclusion is theRestatement (Second) of Torts itself, which defines battery as requiring a harmful or offensive contact.[18] Simply incorporating this definition into the Restatement (Third)would more than adequately limit the reach of the umbrella provision and cause no discernible damage to the Restatement (Third)’s structure or style.

I address Professor Bublick’s first point in a similar fashion.  Professor Bublick is correct when she notes that the umbrella provision does not align perfectly with the range of interests that are protected by trespassory torts—for example, battery based on offensive contact, some instances of assault, false imprisonment, or even trespass to land actions where the defendant does not intend to cause damage to property.[19] Again, the breadth of the umbrella rule makes this true.  But none of the areas identified by Professor Bublick represent doctrine that has dramatically changed since the publication date of the Restatement (Second). Therefore, simple incorporation of the definitions contained in existing sections would more than adequately address the problems that Professor Bublick describes.  Ironically, the best source that supports this view comes from a work compiled and organized by Professor Bublick herself—the second edition of A Concise Restatement of Torts.[20] In the Concise Restatement of Torts, Professor Bublick organized key provisions from the Restatement (Second) and Restatement (Third) into a brief, coherent one-volume book that provides an excellent resource for students and practitioners alike.  In the first two sections of the Concise Restatement, Professor Bublick weaved together sections from the Restatement (Second) and Restatement (Third) in a way that clearly explicated the elements of and defenses to traditional intentional torts, including trespassory torts that do not require physical harm.[21] The fact that Professor Bublick introduced this book with the umbrella provision of the Restatement (Third) does nothing—at least in my view—to deter from the coherence of her work.[22]

In questioning Professor Bublick’s call for a stand-alone Restatement (Third) project on intentional torts, I do not challenge her suggestion that the style and structure of the newer projects are not a perfect fit with the Restatement (Second). I also acknowledge that Professor Bublick and others who are deeply involved in ongoing Restatement projects have expressed concern about creating what they describe as a “Restatement-light.”[23] In addition, there is little doubt that ALI leaders will need to continue to pay attention to coordination and consistency in the Restatement of Torts, not only in initiating new projects, but also in maintaining existing projects.  Of course, complications are multiplied every time a new piece to the puzzle is created.  So in an area like intentional torts that has largely remained stable and consistent, I question whether it makes sense to start anew.  The potential gains seem minimal at best.  At the same time, there is at least some risk that a new project will create additional complications, making the Restatement as a whole more difficult to use for those who rely on its clarity for guidance.  Certainly, the ALI has no shortage of suggestions regarding how to revise the Restatement of Torts, from clarifying which parts of the Restatement (Second) remain effective,[24] to determining the scope of strict-liability doctrines,[25] to addressing the role of foreseeability in proximate cause.[26] With the intentional torts, however, I would counsel to leave well enough alone.

[1]. Ellen M. Bublick, A Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Intentional Harm to Persons—Thoughts, 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1335 (2009).

[2]. Id. at 1336.

[3]. See id. at 1336–46.

[4]. See id. at 1346–53.

[5]. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical & Emotional Harm § 5 (2010) (“An actor who intentionally causes physical harm is subject to liability for that harm.”).  Comment a to this Section describes it as an “umbrella rule,” and states that the “Restatement Second, Torts, remains largely authoritative in explaining the details of the specific torts encompassed by this Section . . . until the Third Restatement addresses the specific intentional torts.”  Id. cmt. a.

[6]. Bublick, supra note 1, at 1342–43.  Other leaders in the ALI have agreed.  See, e.g., Ellen Pryor, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Coordination and Continuation, 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1383, 1385 (2009) (noting the ALI working group’s rejection of a “Restatement-light” approach due to an “overall disconnect between the style and particularized approach of the Restatement (Second) and the Restatement (Third), as well as the inability to alter the deeper architecture of Division One (‘Intentional Harms to Persons, Land, and Chattels’) of the Restatement (Second) in the ways that might be necessary to fit with future restated topics.”); see also id. at 1392 (discussing the possibility of a new project on intentional torts).

[7]. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical & Emotional Harm § 1 (2010).

[8]. Id. § 4.

[9]. Id. § 5.

[10]. Bublick, supra note 1, at 1342.

[11]. Id.

[12]. Id.

[13]. Id.

[14]. Id. at 1343.

[15]. Id. at 1344.

[16]. Id.

[17]. Id.

[18]. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 13, 18 (1965).

[19]. Bublick, supra note 1, at 1344.

[20]. Am. Law Inst., A Concise Restatement of Torts (Ellen Bublick ed., 2d ed. 2010).

[21]. See id. at 2–52.

[22]. It is worth noting that the late Professor Gary Schwartz did not believe the Restatement (Third) of Torts should devote significant attention to intentional torts when he wrote the original prospectus for a “basic principles” of torts project in 1995.  Gary T. Schwartz, Prospectus for Restatement (Third): Basic Principles: Report to the American Law Institute 6 (1995).   (Professor Schwartz was the first reporter for what later became known as the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm.)  In his prospectus, Professor Schwartz wrote that “a ‘basic tort principles’ restatement should not devote much attention to the entire range of intentional torts, currently dealt with mainly in Volume I of the Second Restatement.”  Id. Professor Schwartz noted a lack of significant appellate litigation in the intentional torts area subsequent to the promulgation of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and stated that it would suffice for the new project to limit its focus in the area to ensuring a clear definition of intent.  Id. at 7–8.

[23]. See e.g., Pryor, supra note 6, at 1385 (discussing a “Restatement-light approach” to updating some topics in tort law by applying a less exhaustive review of areas of tort law that have remained stable).

[24]. See id. at 1390.

[25]. See Kenneth W. Simmons, Restatement (Third) of Torts and Traditional Strict Liability: Robust Rationales, Slender Doctrines, 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1355, 1356 (2009).

[26]. See David G. Owen, Figuring Foreseeability, 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1277, 1293–95 (2009).

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24Jan

The Vast Domain of the Restatement (Third) of Torts

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By: Vincent R. Johnson

Introduction: Broad Territory

When I talk to foreign audiences, I often emphasize the fact that in the United States, unlike in many other countries,[1] tort law is a large and dynamic field.  However, despite my pressing that point, listeners may fail to appreciate the broad scope and importance of this area of American law.

The bad news is that the task of completing the Restatement (Third) is becoming somewhat urgent. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, students are routinely asked by professors to restate rules that they must regard as “ancient”— sections in the Restatement (Second) of Torts that were published in 1965, 1977, and 1979.

That probably is not surprising.  The domain of American tort law is immense.  Everyday scores of courts in dozens of jurisdictions, hand down tort decisions on a nearly endless range of issues.  Indeed, a large segment of the American legal profession makes its living, in whole or in part, by litigating torts.

The tremendous territory covered by American tort law is suggested by the great amount of work still left to be done on the Restatement (Third) of Torts.  Work on the Restatement (Third) has been diligently underway for roughly twenty years, and much has been accomplished.  However, what I personally think of as the most educationally valuable parts of the Restatement (Second) of Torts have not yet been touched by the work on the Restatement (Third).

When I advise first-year law students, I recommend that they use the various Restatements to help them master the subjects in tort law that are either the most elementary or the most complex.  The former group includes a number of “simple” intentional torts that are often front-loaded in basic law school torts courses: battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land and chattels, and conversion.  The latter group encompasses several topics that, although vitally important, are so complex that they are commonly omitted from first-year torts classes and left to advanced law school courses.  These topics include misrepresentation, defamation, invasion of privacy, tortious interference, injurious falsehood, and nuisance.

My advice to students reflects this line of reasoning: the Restatement sections dealing with the “simple” intentional torts are almost invariably clear, colorful, and easy to grasp.  Those parts of the Restatement help students to understand the interplay of general rules and exceptions, and nicely demonstrate how factual differences drive the application of the law.  In contrast, the Restatement sections dealing with the “advanced” subjects do a beautiful job of breaking complex subjects into manageable parts and allowing students to grapple effectively with extraordinarily challenging issues.  Those issues include, among others, questions dealing with tort liability related to the exercise of free speech rights, legal protection of privacy interests, commercial deception, and the limits of business competition.

I. A Pressing Task

From my perspective, some of the most important and interesting work on the Restatement (Third) lies ahead.  That is the good news.  The bad news is that the task of completing the Restatement (Third) is becoming somewhat urgent.  In the second decade of the twenty-first century, students are routinely asked by professors to restate rules that they must regard as “ancient”—sections in the Restatement (Second) of Torts that were published in 1965, 1977, and 1979.  Those provisions were promulgated long before many of today’s law students were born, and well before a host of modern technologies transformed modern life.  Fortunately, in the Restatement (Second), the “simple” and “advanced” areas of tort law have held up reasonably well.  Nevertheless, until work on the Restatement (Third) of Torts is complete, it is difficult for users of the Restatement to even determine the currently controlling rules.  A law professor may know that volume two of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is essentially obsolete and that volumes one, three, and four are still generally the latest word on the subjects they cover.  But law students, lawyers, and judges probably do not have that same advantage in terms of differentiating which parts of theRestatement (Second) still survive.

Moreover, there is a need to finish the Restatement (Third) of Torts before it is time to start the fourth.  It will not be long before it is necessary to restate the law of products liability, which was the first part of the work completed for the Restatement (Third) of Torts.

II. The Road Ahead

It is reassuring that, as Professor Ellen Pryor explains in her article,[2] the Restatement (Third) of Torts working group has rejected the idea of a “Restatement-light” patched together from the recent projects of the Restatement (Third)[3] and many sections in the Restatement (Second) that have not been superseded.  Moreover, the working group’s list of the major topics that should be included in a fully integrated third Restatement does a good job charting the work that remains to be done by the American Law Institute (“ALI”).[4] That list includes: “Intentional Torts to Persons,” “Economic Torts,” “Torts Relating to Land and Water,” “Defamation and Privacy,” “Damages for Physical and Emotional Harm,” and perhaps other topics (such as complex malpractice issues).[5]

Of course, it is possible to quibble with the working group’s list. The category called “Torts Relating to Interests in Land and Water” seems likely to include the law of public and private nuisance. However, treating nuisance actions as “torts relating to interests in land and water” seems destined to preempt any serious consideration of the recent judicial precedent holding that injuries related to mass-marketed products, such as handguns and lead paint, should be actionable as nuisances.[6] Nevertheless, the categories identified by the working group offer a good starting point for dividing up the remaining work.

III. Recommendations

As a law professor, I would like to offer these thoughts to those who will lead the efforts to bring the Restatement (Third) of Torts to a conclusion:

First, the sections dealing with the simple intentional torts (battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land and chattels, and conversion) should be revised in a way that retains the rich doctrinal complexity and clear illustrations that made the Restatement (Second) such a success.  Any effort to reduce the number of illustrations should be avoided.  Moreover, the drafters should strive for the same economy of expression that was characteristic of the illustrations in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  Some of the ALI’s recent Restatements have included illustrations that, viewed from the standpoint of usefulness, are too few in number and too complex in structure.  Ideally, a lawyer, law student, or judge should be able to look over the illustrations in a Restatement section and quickly determine if he or she is on the right track in terms of understanding the law.  The illustrations should not be so nuanced, qualified, or uncertain in result that the only proper reaction from the reader is a quizzical expression and a furrowed brow.

Second, when the sections dealing with the law of misrepresentation are revised, great care needs to be taken to clarify liability issues relating to indirectly disseminated false statements. This is the most difficult part of the law of fraud and negligent misrepresentation for a law professor to teach and for students to understand.  Case holdings, and the analyses offered in judicial opinions, also suggest that judges struggle with these principles.  In particular, the ALI needs to address important questions of liability related to false statements deliberately disseminated via mass media.  Some recent decisions have essentially reached the conclusion that it is permissible for financial and business institutions to intentionally mislead the public generally, so long as they are not aware of which particular investors will be defrauded.[7] These types of questionable decisions need to be scrutinized by the ALI.  On certain related points, such as liability for false statements contained in commercial documents[8] or public filings,[9] the Restatement (Second) of Torts charted an intelligent course.  However, some courts have rejected its teachings.[10] The Reporters charged with the task of revising the misrepresentation sections of theRestatement should muster the precedent and policy arguments that will ensure that the law of fraud holds purposeful disseminators of false statements accountable for the harm they cause.[11]

Third, in the field of defamation, there are several areas of the law that cry out for clarification: the distinctions between public and private figures,[12] and between matters of public concern and matters of private concern; the murky subject of qualified privilege; the issue of whether persons suing with respect to matters of private concern must prove that the defendant acted with negligence (or some other degree of fault) regarding the falsity of a defamatory statement; the extent to which the traditional rules on libel and slander per se remain viable; and application of the single-publication rule to defamatory websites and other Internet communications.[13]

Fourth, with respect to invasion of privacy, it is remarkable how well Dean William L. Prosser’s four privacy categories,[14] articulated in the mid-twentieth century, have held up in the new Digital Age, when many invasion of privacy claims are based on electronic activities (e.g., the use of social networking websites and smart phones) that only recently have become possible.  However, the privacy sections of the Restatement (Second) are haphazard in their treatment of issues relating to culpability.  For example, the provisions on liability for appropriation of name or likeness do not address culpability.[15] In contrast, the section on false-light invasion of privacy purports to require a degree of culpability that may no longer be consistent with current constitutional jurisprudence.[16] There are also unanswered questions about whether tort liability can be imposed, consistently with the First Amendment, for invasions of privacy based on truthful disclosure of facts.[17] And important issues must be addressed relating to what types of dissemination of information constitute the kind of publicity that will serve as the basis for invasion of privacy liability.[18]

Fifth, the Restatement (Second)’s treatment of tortious interference needs a top-to-bottom review.  Many courts have diverged from the path charted in this area by theRestatement (Second).  For example, a number of courts have rejected the second Restatement’s view that “burdening” contractual performance should be actionable.[19]Additionally, other courts[20] have articulated financial interest privileges broader than the one recognized in the Restatement (Second).[21] Current American law regarding tortious interference is very unclear about whether a defendant’s “improper motive” is (1) a basis for liability separate from the use of “improper means,” (2) a factor which tips the balance in the assessment of whether conduct is unprivileged, or (3) simply irrelevant to issues of liability.[22] The Restatement (Third) needs to grapple with and clarify the tangled mass of precedent that courts and lawyers now face in the field of tortious interference with contract and prospective advantage.

Sixth, the Restatement (Second)’s provisions relating to malicious prosecution and related actions have always seemed too complex.  They need to be revised to clarify these difficult causes of action and their relationship to recent developments, such as the increasing use of anti-SLAPP laws.[23]

Finally, the Restatement (Third) must chart a prudent course with respect to an issue that formed no significant part of the Restatement (Second), namely the recently recognized and much litigated “economic loss rule.”[24] Court decisions addressing this subject are being issued so frequently that it may qualify as the “hottest” topic in modern tort law.  As Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted, at “the current pace, the economic loss doctrine may consume much of tort law if left unchecked.”[25]

IV. Tracing the Bounds of the Realm

As these few points suggest, the Restatement (Third) of Torts is still far from finished, and this task may not be concluded for many years.  Perhaps this is what makes American tort law such an interesting field.

The challenge of effectively restating the common law of torts has long been a great one.  However, the work facing the current generation of ALI scholars may be no more challenging than what was required in the past.  As a writer remarked almost a century ago about English contributions to Anglo-American law, it was at times “more difficult for jurists to state this branch of the law scientifically than for judges to make the law itself.  Writers on the law were like map-makers whose rulers conquer territory so rapidly that the bounds of their realms cannot be traced.”[26]

Perhaps not much has changed in the vast domain of tort law.

[1].   For example, until recently China had no tort system.  See Vincent R. Johnson, Standardized Tests, Erroneous Scores, and Tort Liability, 38 Rutgers L.J. 655, 672 (2007); Zhu Yan, The Legislative Background of Chinese Tort Law and Its Key Issues, in Haftungsrecht im dritten Millennium [Liability Law in the Third Millenium] 111, 112–13 (Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi et al. eds., 2009).  A new tort code recently came into force.  Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Qin Quan Ze Ren Fa (中華人民共和國侵權責任法) [Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010), http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display
.asp?db=1&id=7846&keyword=tort%20law (China).  The new Chinese code is a brief document with ninety-two articles. A side-by-side Mandarin-English translation runs less than twenty pages, with plenty of white space.

[2].   See Ellen Pryor, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Coordination and Continuation, 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1383, 1385 (2009).

[3].   See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical & Emotional Harm (2010); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liab. (2000); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. (1998).

[4].   See Pryor, supra note 2, at 1389.

[5].   Id.

[6].   See Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1214 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that victims of a shooting perpetrated by a man who purchased a gun illegally stated claims for public nuisance and negligence against manufacturers, distributors, and dealers of the firearms that were actually fired); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (Ohio 2002) (holding that a city stated a public nuisance claim against handgun manufacturers, trade associations, and a handgun distributor).  But see State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 455–58 (R.I. 2008) (holding that a nuisance claim against lead-based paint manufacturers should have been dismissed).  A federal law enacted in 2005 now bars a wide range of civil liability actions against manufacturers, importers, dealers, and other sellers of firearms and ammunition, including claims based on nuisance.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2006).  But see Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1146 (9th Cir. 2009) (allowing claims against an unlicensed foreign manufacturer of firearms to proceed), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3320 (2010).

[7].   See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig.), 490 F. Supp. 2d 784, 820–22 (S.D. Tex. 2007).  In Enron, the court declined to find that investors stated an action for fraud even though the main defendant, Merrill Lynch, had allegedly “cook[ed] its books” by devising fraudulent transactions to mislead investors and rating agencies, and had “issued through its analysts, even as Enron was descending into bankruptcy . . . ‘buy’ or ‘strong buy’ recommendations for Enron securities, which Merrill Lynch knew would be ‘widely disseminated in the financial news media.’”  Id. at 787.

[8].   See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 532 (1977).

[9].   Id. § 536.

[10].   See, e.g., Ernst & Young, L.L.P. v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 582 (Tex. 2001) (declining to apply Restatement (Second) of Torts § 536).

[11].   See, e.g., Andrew R. Simank, Comment, Deliberately Defrauding Investors: The Scope of Liability, 42 St. Mary’s L.J. (forthcoming 2011).

[12].   See generally Joseph H. King, Jr., Deus ex Machina and the Unfulfilled Promise of New York Times v. Sullivan: Applying the Times for All Seasons, 95 Ky. L.J. 649, 671–94 (2007).

[13].   See Pendergrass v. ChoicePoint, Inc., No. 08–188, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99767, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2008) (declining to apply the single-publication rule to limited dissemination of information).

[14].   See Catsouras v. Dep’t of Cal. Highway Patrol, 104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 387 (Ct. App. 2010) (noting the influence of William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1960), and the similar analysis enshrined in Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652A–652E (1977)).

[15].   See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C (1977).

[16].   See West v. Media Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640, 647 (Tenn. 2001) (rejecting the Restatement’s actual malice requirement “brought by private plaintiffs about matters of private concern”).

[17].   See Hall v. Post, 323 N.C. 259, 268–69, 372 S.E.2d 711, 716–17 (1988) (declining to recognize the private-facts tort because of its potential conflicts with the First Amendment); see also Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 693 (Ind. 1997) (refusing to recognize disclosure actions due to conflict with the “truth-in-defense” provisions of the Indiana Constitution).

[18].   See Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 42 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (differentiating two types of publicity).

[19].   See, e.g., Price v. Sorrell, 784 P.2d 614, 616 (Wyo. 1989) (rejecting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766A (1979)).

[20].   See, e.g., RAN Corp. v. Hudesman, 823 P.2d 646, 649 (Alaska 1991) (recognizing a financial-interest privilege that protects more than investments).

[21].   See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 769 (1979).

[22].   See Vincent R. Johnson, Advanced Tort Law: A Problem Approach 425–28 (2010) (discussing the role of motive in the law of tortious interference).

[23].   See LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 970 A.2d 1007 (N.J. 2009). LoBiondo involved a claim alleging malicious use of process.  It arose from a SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) defamation suit.  Under the law of many states, SLAPP actions are subject to early dismissal because of the protections afforded by the First Amendment to speech on public issues.  The New Jersey Supreme Court referred to the claim of malicious use of process as a “SLAPP-back suit.”

[24].   See generally Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule, 66 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 523, 524 n.1 (2009) (collecting examples of recent scholarship).

[25].   Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 181 (Wis. 2005) (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting).

[26].   Percy H. Winfield, The Foundation of Liability in Tort, 27 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1927).

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20Dec

A Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Intentional Harm to Persons—Thoughts

Categories: Law Review
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By: Ellen M. Bublick*

Bublick_LawReview_December2009

* Dan B. Dobbs Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law. For helpful suggestions and feedback, many thanks to participants in the Symposium on the Third Restatement of Torts, particularly Dan Dobbs, Mike Green, Bill Powers, Ellen Pryor, Ken Simons, Aaron Twerski, and the editors of the Wake Forest Law Review.

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